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Lausanne, where a course in trade policy required me to write an empirical term paper. I ended
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on immigration issues is influenced by business and union contributions from industries which
are heavily dependent on undocumented workers. The findings turned out to be mixed at
best. Nonetheless, I have been fascinated by empirical work ever since.
As soon as I was back at the University of Zurich, I started focusing on econometric courses.
Among them, Rafael Lalive’s course on causal analysis attracted my particular interest, a field
only vaguely known to me at this time. This course has had a lasting impact on the way I
think about applied econometrics: I shifted from approaching research questions by standard
econometric methods towards the quasi-emperimental approach (see Angrist and Pischke,
2009, for an outstanding text book about causal analysis).
Thanks to Josef Zweimu¨ller and Rafael Lalive who employed me as research assistant at the
chair for Macroeconomics at the University of Zurich while I was writing my Master’s thesis,
I got the chance to gain valuable insights into the academic work environment. The inspiring
and extremely pleasant working atmosphere Josef Zweimu¨ller created (and still creates) at his
chair dispelled any remaining doubts I had in deciding whether or not to start doctoral studies
in the first place. This thesis is (hopefully) good evidence that I took the right decision.
It took me slightly more than four years to complete this work. During this time I greatly
benefited from the help and support of many people. First and foremost, I would like to thank
Josef Zweimu¨ller and Rafael Lalive. Josef, my supervisor, was a constant source of research
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also very grateful to Rainer Winkelmann for agreeing to be the co-advisor of my thesis.
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general, for his pleasant and motivating companionship during the time we shared at the
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tennis, soccer, etc.) and also for the four years together at the University of Zurich. Further
thanks go to Tobias Wu¨rgler for the good time and the delicious dinners (Thanksgiving!) at
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Favre, Philippe Ruh, Jin Wiederkehr, Roger Abegg, and Katrin Koller, who all contributed to
making my time at the Chair for Macroeconomics very enjoyable during coffee breaks, lunches,
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can
be counted.”
Albert Einstein (1879 – 1955)
My thesis sheds empirical light on three research questions which belong to the realm of
labor economics: What is the effect of early retirement on retirees’ mortality? How does an
employment quota affect firms’ demand for disabled workers? And why are fluctuations in
workplace accidents pro-cyclical? Chapter 2 shows that, for some groups of workers, early
retirement increases the probability of premature death. Moreover, the driving force seems
to be changes in health-related behavior, such as excessive alcohol consumption and smoking.
The results in chapter 3 suggest that an employment quota is favorable to firms’ demand
for disabled workers. In addition, chapter 4 finds that a rise in the tax, to which firms that
do not comply with the employment quota are subject, also boosts this demand. Chapter
5 provides evidence that the pro-cyclicality of workplace accidents is governed by workers’
reporting behavior.
The two crucial ingredients required to provide the answers to these questions are adequate
data and a convincing empirical strategy. All chapters work with the Austrian Social Security
Database (see Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009, for a detailed description of this data set). This data
set covers the universe of Austrian wage earners in the private sector and collects workers’
complete labor market and earnings history from 1972 onwards along with information about
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socio–demographic characteristics and information about the employer. Moreover, these data
can be linked to several other micro data sets (e.g. to causes-of-deaths statistics provided by
Statistics Austria (see chapter 2), to individuals’ disability status recorded by the Austrian
Federal Welfare Office (see chapters 3 and 4), or to information on workplace accidents col-
lected by the Austrian Social Insurance for Occupational Risks (see chapter 5)). The empirical
strategy adopted in my thesis mainly comes in the flavor of the quasi-emperimental approach
(Meyer, 1995). Chapter 2 uses instrumental variable techniques (Angrist et al., 1996; Imbens
and Angrist, 1994), chapter 3 applies a regression discontinuity design (Hahn et al., 2001),
and chapter 4 an interrupted time series design (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Chapter 5, in
contrast, uses standard panel data methods.
The availability of adequate data and the adoption of a convincing empirical strategy are
clearly not sufficient for a research question to be of any relevance. Personally, I consider
research questions relevant if their answers have implications also beyond academia. In my
view, the ultimate aim of applied or empirical labor economics is to provide a sound basis
upon which policy makers can build appropriate policy interventions in the labor market.
This thesis seeks to live up to this ambition by stating clear policy implications that follow
from my results. In other words, referring to the quote above, I hope that among those things
that can be and are counted, which is – alas! – a necessary condition for carrying out empirical
work, my research presented in the following four chapters does indeed count in the sense that
it will eventually contribute to shaping better public policies. The remainder of this chapter
provides a short overview on each of the four main chapters.
Chapter 2: Fatal Attraction? Access to Early Retirement and Mortality
In many industrialized countries, dramatic demographic changes put governments under in-
creasing pressure to implement major reforms to old age social security systems. A particular
focus of many reforms is to increase the retirement age by restricting access to early retirement
schemes. Chapter 2 of my thesis investigates whether attempts to raise the effective retirement
age come along with consequences for the health of retirees. More precisely, we estimate the
causal effect of early retirement on mortality for blue-collar workers. To overcome the problem
of negative health selection, we exploit an exogenous change in unemployment insurance rules
in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to withdraw permanently from employment
up to 3.5 years earlier than workers in non-eligible regions. For males, instrumental-variable
estimates show that retiring one year earlier causes a significant 2.4 percentage points (about
13%) increase in the probability of dying before age 67. We do not find any adverse effect
of early retirement on mortality for females. Our analysis of death causes suggests that male
excess mortality is concentrated among three causes of deaths: (i) ischemic heart diseases
(mostly heart attacks), (ii) diseases related to excessive alcohol consumption, and (iii) vehicle
2
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injuries. These causes account for 78 percent of the causal retirement effect (while accounting
for only 24 percent of all deaths in the sample). About 32 percent of the causal retirement
effect are directly attributable to smoking and excessive alcohol consumption.
Our results have an obvious policy implication. From a welfare point of view, our results
suggest that early retirement has severe negative welfare consequences for male blue collar
workers. Increasing the effective early retirement age is therefore warranted not only because
it helps to resolve the financing problems of pay-as-you-go social security systems but also
because it increases individual welfare. Increasing life expectancy by raising the effective
retirement age, however, will not help to resolve the financing problem one-for-one because
increases in life expectancy will partly offset the improvement in the worker-retiree ratio.
Chapter 3: Do Financial Incentives Affect Firms’ Demand for Disabled Workers?
Government efforts to eliminate employment discrimination of disabled workers are common
in all OECD countries. However, previous literature has shown that e.g. anti-discrimination
legislation does not necessarily improve economic conditions for the disabled (see Acemoglu
and Angrist, 2001, for an extensive evaluation of such a legislation in the U.S.). A number
of OECD countries use – on top of anti-discrimination legislation – employment quotas to
counteract the wedge between disabled and non-disabled employment rates. For instance,
Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 non-disabled workers.
Non-complying firms pay a tax for each job-month missed. Employment quotas have not been
studied yet in the economic literature. Chapter 3 of my thesis fills this gap by studying the role
of Austria’s employment quota on firms’ demand for disabled workers. Specifically, we compare
firms who employ 25 non-disabled workers and are subject to the non-compliance tax to firms
who employ 24 non-disabled and are not subject to the tax. While firms may manipulate
non-disabled employment to avoid the tax, a simple framework suggests (i) manipulation
introduces a downward bias of our estimates and (ii) manipulation need not be strong. Two
important manipulation checks indeed support the claim that manipulation is unlikely to be
quantitatively large in our context.
Results indicate that (i) firms with 25 non-disabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12
percent) more disabled workers than would be expected from smaller firms, (ii) employment
effects are stronger in low-wage firms than in in high-wage firms, and (iii) the quota generates
excess disabled employment on the order of 0.07 among firms located at non-disabled firm size
50 and higher. Two reforms of the system also suggest that increasing the non-compliance
tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to over-complying firms
slightly dampens the employment effects of the non-compliance tax. These results suggest
that employment quotas in favor of disabled workers are, in contrast to anti-discrimination
legislation, an effective tool for promoting disabled employment.
3
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Chapter 4: The Effects of Increasing Financial Incentives for Firms to Promote
Employment of Disabled Workers
Chapter 4 closely relates to chapter 3. It also investigates the employment quota in Austria,
but focuses on the effect of an increase in the non-compliance tax from e 150 to e 196 in
July 2001 on firms’ demand for disabled workers. Adopting an interrupted time-series design,
chapter 4 finds that this tax increase had an immediate as well as a short-run impact on the
number of disabled workers at the firm level. By the end of 2002, one in 15 firms employ one
disabled worker more than they would have without the tax increase. In terms of the average
number of disabled workers, this corresponds to a 6.4% increase in the number of disabled
workers per firm. I conclude that the tax increase considerably increased firms’ demand for
disabled workers and thus policy makers aiming at boosting employment of disabled workers
should favor a further rise in the non-compliance tax.
Chapter 5: Recessions Are Bad for Workplace Safety
Workplace accidents are an important economic phenomenon. Yet, the pro-cyclical fluctua-
tions in workplace accidents are not well understood. They could be related to fluctuations in
effort and working hours, but workplace accidents may also be affected by reporting behavior.
Chapter 5 uses unique data on workplace accidents from an Austrian matched worker-firm
dataset to study in detail how economic incentives affect workplace accidents. We find that
workers who reported an accident in a particular period of time are more likely to be fired
later on. Moreover, we find support for the idea that recessions influence the reporting of
moderate workplace accidents: if workers think the probability of dismissals at the firm level
is high, they are less likely to report a moderate workplace accident.
The cyclical sensitivity of the incidence of workplace accidents thus appears to be related
to reporting behavior. As indicated in the theoretical part of this chapter, the cyclical fluc-
tuations in reporting behavior has clear welfare implications as investments in prevention of
workplace accidents may be suboptimal. If in recessions firing rates go up workers may under-
report workplace accidents and thus firms under-invest in workplace safety. In booms workers
may over-report workplace accidents and therefore firms over-invest in workplace safety, i.e.
although workers benefit from the investments in workplace safety they are wasteful from a
social point of view. Our empirical evidence suggests that recessions are bad for workplace
safety. From the point of view of economic policy, a way to bring the economy closer to
the social optimum would be to introduce measures that impede the discriminating layoffs
of workers who reported an accident. This would increase the incentive of firms to invest in
workplace safety also during recessions.
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CHAPTER 2
Fatal Attraction?
Access to Early Retirement and Mortality
Joint with Andreas Kuhn and Josef Zweimu¨ller
An earlier version of this chapter has been published in 2010 as IZA Discussion Paper Series,
No. 5160; CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 8024; IEW Working Paper Series, No. 499;
and NRN Working Paper Series, No 1008.
“Retirement kills more people than hard work ever did.”
Malcolm S. Forbes (1919 – 1990), publisher of Forbes magazine
2.1 Introduction
In many industrialized countries, dramatic demographic changes put governments under in-
creasing pressure to implement major reforms to old age social security systems. A particular
focus of many reforms is to increase the effective retirement age by restricting access to early
retirement schemes. Workers and their political representatives often strongly oppose such
reforms. Among the most important arguments is that, after having worked all their lives
in physically demanding jobs, workers should have the option to retire early and thus avoid
emerging health problems. While leaving an unhealthy work environment is, ceteris paribus,
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clearly conducive to good health, the health effects of permanently exiting the labor force
may go in the opposite direction. Retirement is not only associated with lower income and
fewer resources to invest in one’s health, but also with less cognitive and physical activity
(Rohwedder and Willis, 2010) as well as with changes in daily routines and lifestyles which
are potentially associated with unhealthy behavior (e.g. Balia and Jones, 2008; Henkens et al.,
2008; Midanik et al., 1995; Scarmeas and Stern, 2003). In sum, the overall consequences of
early retirement are not at all clear.
This study presents new evidence on the causal effect of early retirement on mortality for
blue-collar workers. Blue-collar workers are an interesting group because they typically work
in physically demanding jobs and because emerging health problems – and/or their prevention
– often induce these workers to retire earlier. To solve the problem of negative health selection
into retirement we take advantage of a major change to the Austrian unemployment insurance
system which affected some but not all older workers. Defining the date of early retirement as
the date of permanent withdrawal from employment, this policy change allowed older workers
in eligible regions to retire up to 3.5 years earlier than comparable workers in non-eligible
regions. Exploiting regional differences in eligibility to extended unemployment benefits of
otherwise comparable workers allows us to overcome the reverse-causality problem. Since the
program generates variation in the retirement age that is arguably exogenous to individuals’
health status, we can estimate the causal impact of early retirement on mortality using instru-
mental variable techniques. Moreover, the comparison between OLS and IV estimates allows
us to assess the extent of health-driven selection into early retirement.
We find that a reduction in the retirement age causes a significant increase in the risk of
premature death – defined as death before age 67 – for males but not for females. The effect
for males is not only statistically significant but also quantitatively important. According
to our estimates, one additional year of early retirement causes an increase in the risk of
premature death of 2.4 percentage points (a relative increase of about 13.4 percent). In line
with expectations, we find that IV estimates are considerably smaller than the simple OLS
estimate, both for men and for women. This is consistent with negative health selection into
retirement and underlines the importance of a proper identification strategy when estimating
the causal impact of early retirement on mortality. Our results indicate no causal effect of
early retirement on mortality for females suggesting that the negative association between
retirement age and mortality indicated by the OLS estimate is entirely due to negative health
selection. There are several reasons why male but not female blue-collar workers suffer from
higher mortality. Women may be more capable of coping with major life events such as
retirement; they may be more health-conscious and adopt less unhealthy behaviors (such as
smoking, drinking and unhealthy diet); they may be more active after permanently exiting
the labor market due to their higher involvement in household activities; and they may suffer
6
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less from a loss of social status and identity because work is less central in life for additional
income earners as compared to the main breadwinner (our empirical analysis is based on older
cohorts for whom the traditional role model is still the dominant one).
We consider several channels to understand why male early retirees die earlier. A first
channel suggests that early exit from the labor market is associated with lower permanent
income. We find that earnings losses due to early retirement cannot explain our finding
for men, because these losses are quantitatively too small to have a substantial impact on
mortality. A second channel suggests that changes in health-related behaviors associated with
smoking, drinking, unhealthy diet, and little physical exercise may cause premature death
following early retirement. Our results strongly support this hypothesis. We find that excess
mortality is concentrated on three causes of deaths: (i) ischemic heart diseases (mostly heart
attacks), (ii) diseases related to excessive alcohol consumption, and (iii) vehicle injuries. These
three causes of death account for 78 percent of the causal retirement effect (while accounting
for only 24 percent of all deaths in the sample). We calculate that 32.4 percent of the causal
retirement effect can be directly attributed to smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. A
third channel suggests that the detrimental mortality effect arises from retirement following
an involuntary job loss but not from voluntary quits. Even though our data do not distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary retirement, we exploit severance payment rules to proxy
the voluntariness of the retirement decision. Our empirical results suggest that retirement
following an involuntary job loss is likely to cause excess mortality among blue collar males,
while retirement after a voluntary quit does not.
Our study goes beyond the existing literature in several respects. First, our empirical
strategy is based upon a policy change that, arguably, generates huge exogenous variation in
the potential minimum age of permanently leaving the labor force. While treated and control
groups are ex-ante similar in observable characteristics, the group of eligible individuals retires
between 9 and 12 months earlier than the group of non-eligible individuals. Second, we use
an administrative data set containing precise and reliable information on both the timing of
retirement and the date of death. Austrian social security data are collected for the purpose of
assessing individuals’ eligibility to (and level of) old age social security benefits. Information
on any individual’s work history and the date of his or her death is thus precise so our estimates
are unlikely contaminated by measurement error. This is different from many previous studies
which focused on subjective measures of health or well-being that are subject to non-negligible
measurement problems.1 Third, the data contains the universe of blue-collar workers in the
1The distinction between subjective and objective measures appears to be of special importance (Bound,
1991), as even self-reported measures of physical health may be subject to considerable reporting error (Baker
et al., 2004). It is likely that truly subjective measures of health, i.e. individuals’ assessment of their well-being,
perform even worse because of ex-post justification bias and similar effects. Indeed, studies using subjective
health measures tend to find beneficial effects of retirement while the evidence is less consistent for objective
health measures. It is also conceivable that there is considerable measurement error with respect to retirement
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private sector in Austria. Hence there is a sufficiently large number of observations that
help us to get precise estimates. This is a particular advantage in the present context, because
many previous studies (mostly those based on survey data) often face the problem of imprecise
estimates due to small sample sizes.
While our empirical design is based on a policy change in a small country, we think our
results are of more general interest. First, the effect we estimate with our empirical design is
unlikely to originate from the particular institutional framework. Treated and control workers
are both covered by mandatory universal health insurance and by a generous old-age social
security system (for workers with a continuous employment history). This implies that our
estimated effect cannot be driven by (lack of) access to health care or by major income losses
after retirement. Instead we estimate a more direct effect of early retirement on mortality. In
environments where retirees have no access to health care or suffer from major income losses
after retirement, our estimate provides a lower bound. A second reason why we think that
Austria in an interesting case is that early retirement is a very common phenomenon. In
the early 1990s, the average age at retirement entry was as low as 58 for the whole Austrian
population and it was even lower for blue collar workers. Hence the typical early retiree in our
sample is quite similar (though clearly not identical) to the average blue collar worker rather
than a member of a highly selective group.
Among the large number of papers studying the health and mortality effects of retirement,
studies adopting convincing empirical strategies to estimate the causal impact of retirement
on health and/or mortality are rare. Bound and Waidmann (2007) use institutional rules
governing eligibility to public pensions to identify the effect of retirement on both subjective
and objective measures of physical health, by relying both on survey data and vital statistics
for the UK. They find no effects, or a slightly positive influence, of retirement on health,
once the possibility of endogenous entry into retirement is taken into account. Even though
institutional rules offer an apparently plausible instrument for the age at retirement, the fact
that workers know the exact rules may render these instruments invalid.2 Coe and Lindeboom
(2008) improve on this methodology and exploit sudden and arguably unexpected changes in
retirement opportunities (i.e. early retirement opportunities offered by firms to groups of
workers) in the US to identify the causal effect of early retirement on men’s health. They find
no detrimental effects of early retirement on health and, if anything, even slightly temporary
improvements.3 Charles (2002) also uses age discontinuities in the financial incentives to
age, especially in survey data, whereas such error is arguably of minor importance in administrative data.
2As pointed out by Coe and Lindeboom (2008), workers who know the exact legal rules may adjust their
behavior before actually retiring. Moreover, workers subject to different retirement rules may also differ with
respect to unobserved variables, absent any behavioral responses.
3A potential problem with this approach is that even though firms were restricted in targeting specific
groups of individuals, they were free to choose whether or not to offer any early retirement window at all.
Hence workers who were offered any early retirement opportunity may differ from workers who were not.
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retire, as well as legal changes to these incentives, to identify the causal effect of retirement on
subjective well-being. He finds a positive effect of retirement on subjective well-being when
accounting for the endogeneity of the retirement decision, while the raw correlation between
age at retirement and well-being is negative. Similar results on mental well-being are reported
in Neuman (2008) for the US and Johnston and Lee (2009) for the UK, and Coe and Zamarro
(2008) in a cross-country study for Europe, all using survey data and a similar empirical design.
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997) use panel-data methods to study the effects of labor market
status on the health of Dutch elderly, finding that early retirement has a positive impact on self-
assessed measures of health. One of the few studies finding a detrimental effect of retirement
on health is Behncke (2009), who applies matching methods to survey data from the UK.
She finds that retirement increases both the risk of a cardiovascular disease and the risk of
being diagnosed with cancer. While the estimated positive effect on several health outcomes
is in line with much of the medical literature (see also footnote 4), the empirical design may
still suffer from endogeneity bias dues to unobserved factors (such as individuals’ true health
status). Qualitatively similar results are reported in Dave et al. (2008), who analyze the effects
of retirement using panel-data methods and relying on survey data from the US. They find
negative effects of retirement on both mental health and measures of self-assessed physical
health. Note, however, that conventional panel-data methods are vulnerable to time-varying
unobserved confounders such as unobserved health shocks. In sum, the available evidence
uses different outcome measures and different strategies to deal with endogenous entry into
retirement and, consequently, yields no clear pattern regarding the causal impact of retirement
on health.4
Our study is also related to a literature that focuses on the impact of involuntary job loss
on mortality, with respect to both research topic and methodology. An interesting recent
study by Sullivan and Wachter (2009) estimates the effect of job displacement on mortality
in the US. They find a strong impact of involuntary job loss on mortality, particularly for
older (high-seniority) workers and for workers who suffer large earnings losses (i.e. low-wage
workers). In a related study in Sweden, Eliason and Storrie (2009) examine the impact of job
loss on cause-specific mortality. They find a strong increase in overall mortality among men,
but no impact on females. There was, however, an increase in suicides and alcohol-related
mortality for both men and women. Adverse effects of involuntary job loss on mortality are
4Unsurprisingly, similar ambivalence regarding the health effects of retirement is found among medical and
epidemiological studies. Bamia et al. (2008) find that the risk of all-cause mortality is significantly higher for
retirees than for older workers still engaged in economic activity. This finding is consistent with the results of
Gallo et al. (2006), who argue that job loss increases individuals’ risk of cardiovascular disease and therefore has
detrimental effects on the health of older workers. Morris et al. (1994) also find increases risk of cardiovascular
disease for the UK. Somewhat contrasting evidence is presented in Tsai et al. (2005) who study the effects of
early retirement on mortality in a very specific sample of workers in the petrochemical industry. Similarly,
Litwin (2007) finds no association between early retirement and all-cause mortality and Brockmann et al.
(2009) find no effect of retirement on health, at least when focusing on previously healthy workers only.
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also reported in another recent study based on Norwegian data by Rege et al. (2009).
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss the institutional background
and we describe how changes in the unemployment insurance system lead to early permanent
withdrawal from work for some groups of workers. Section 2.3 discusses the data source as well
as the selection of our sample and presents descriptive statistics. Details of our econometric
framework are given in section 2.4. Our results are presented in sections 2.5 and 2.6. In section
2.7, we focus on potential channels explaining excess mortality among male retirees. Section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 Pathways to Retirement in Austria
In this section we describe the various pathways into early retirement in Austria. We define
as “early retirement” the date at which an individual withdraws permanently from the labor
market. This does not require the individual to be a retiree in the legal sense of drawing
regular old age social security benefits. Instead, our definition of early retirement hinges upon
the last day of regular employment and does not refer to the particular transfer an individual
gets after having permanently withdrawn from work.
2.2.1 The Retirement System
Almost all workers in Austria are covered by the old age social security system, and the
benefits paid by this system are the most important source of income for retirees (OECD,
2007). The level of old age social security benefits depends on retirement age, the contributions
(i.e. earnings) made to the system in the years before retirement as well as on the number
of contribution months (i.e. work experience).5 The maximum gross replacement rate for a
worker retiring at the statutory retirement age in the year 1993 was 80% of his or her previous
earnings, given a continuous work history with 45 insurance years before retiring. Social
security benefits are subject to income tax and mandatory health insurance contributions.
The regular statutory retirement age is age 65 for men and age 60 for women. For workers
with long-insurance duration the statutory retirement age is age 60 for men and age 55 for
women (“vorzeitige Alterspension wegen langer Versicherungsdauer”). Eligibility to statutory
retirement with long-insurance duration is linked to an individual’s previous work history:
workers who paid social security contributions for at least 35 years and who worked at least 2
out of the 3 years prior to retirement have the option to retire early at age 60 for men and at
age 55 for women.
5There were several changes to the pension system during our observation period. However, these changes
affected both the treatment and the control group in the same way. See Hofer and Koman (2006) for details.
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There are several pathways into regular retirement. A first pathway is the direct transition
from employment to retirement. A second pathway is the indirect transition from employment
to retirement via the unemployment system. Individuals with a continuous work history be-
come eligible for regular old-age social security benefits at age 60 after having drawn regular
unemployment benefits and/or means-tested unemployment assistance for at least 12 out of
the previous 15 months (“vorzeitige Alterspension wegen Arbeitslosigkeit”). An unemployed
person aged 50 or older could draw regular unemployment benefits for a maximum period of
52 weeks (30 weeks before August 1989) with a replacement rate of 40–60%. Unemployment
assistance payments may, in principle, last for an indefinite time period. Alternatively, unem-
ployed individuals who had paid social security contributions for at least 15 out of the last 25
years are also eligible to regular early retirement benefits at age 60 after a period of 12 months
in special income support (“Sonderunterstu¨tzung”). which is equivalent to a regular unem-
ployment spell but grants a transfer that is 25% higher than regular unemployment benefits.
Individuals eligible to special income support could “move” from unemployment benefits to
special income support. This pathway essentially allowed workers to withdraw permanently
from work at age 58 and bridge the gap to regular old age social-security benefits via an un-
employment spell of 52 weeks (30 weeks before August 1989) and special income support for
another 12 months. A third pathway is via disability insurance. This latter pathway becomes
more easy to access after age 55 when eligibility rules to disability benefits become significantly
relaxed (Hofer and Koman, 2006).6
2.2.2 The Regional Extended Benefit Program
To assess the causal effect of early retirement on mortality, we exploit a policy change to the
Austrian unemployment insurance system that introduced a further pathway to retirement, the
Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP). The REBP allowed eligible workers to withdraw
permanently from employment as much as 3.5 years earlier than non-eligible workers. The
REBP was introduced in response to the steel crisis of the late 1980s which hit certain regions of
the country particularly hard. To mitigate economic hardship in these regions, the Austrian
government enacted a change in the unemployment insurance law that granted access to
unemployment benefits (UB) for up to 209 weeks.7 To become eligible, a worker had to fulfill
the following three criteria at the time of unemployment entry: (i) age 50 or older, (ii) a
continuous work history before becoming unemployed (i.e. 780 weeks of employment in the
6After age 55, disability benefits could be drawn when an individual’s work capacity within his or her main
occupation is reduced by more than 50 percent of that of a healthy individual. Before age 55, a reduction of
the individual’s general work capacity, not restricted to a particular occupation, is required for eligibility to a
disability pension.
7Previous econometric evaluations of the REBP have found large effects of the program on realized unem-
ployment duration (Lalive, 2008a; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2004a,b; Winter-Ebmer, 1998).
11
2.3. Data and Sample Early Retirement and Mortality
last 25 years preceding the unemployment spell), and (iii) at least 6 months of residence in
one of the eligible regions. The program was enacted in June 1988 and remained in force until
July 1993.8 In contrast, workers aged 50 or older who were not eligible to the REBP were
entitled to a maximum of 52 weeks of regular unemployment benefits (to only 30 weeks before
August 1989).
Figure 2.1 summarizes the institutional design of our study. The figure makes clear that
individuals eligible to the REBP could effectively withdraw from the labor force at age 55
(men) or 50 (women) by claiming unemployment benefits for the maximum duration of 4
years, followed by one full year of special income support. This is different for workers not
eligible to the REBP. Male workers had the option of effective retirement at age 58 (58.5 before
August 1989) and female workers at age 53 (53.5 before August 1989) by bridging the time
until the regular early retirement age by exhausting the maximum duration of unemployment
benefits of 52 weeks (30 weeks before August 1989) followed by a year of special income
support.
2.3 Data and Sample
2.3.1 Data Source
We use individual register data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), described
in more detail in Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009). The data cover the universe of Austrian wage
earners in the private sector and collects, on a daily basis, workers’ complete labor market
and earnings history up to the year 2006. The data also contain a limited set of socio-
economic characteristics (year and month of birth, age, sex, general occupation) and additional
information on the firms where the workers were employed. The administrative purpose of
collecting these data is to provide all the information necessary for calculating old age social
security benefits.
The data contain precise information on the date of retirement and on mortality (date of
death). Information on mortality is observable up to the year 2008. Moreover, the data contain
information necessary for determining an individual’s eligibility to the REBP. This latter
information is of crucial importance because we want to exploit the exogenous variation in the
retirement age that the program induces, i.e. we will use eligibility status as an instrument
for the retirement age. We use information on individuals’ month of birth and employment
history to determine whether a worker meets the age and employment criteria set by the
8 Initially 28 out of about 100 labor market districts were eligible to extended unemployment benefits.
The REBP underwent a reform in January 1992 that excluded 6 formerly eligible regions from the program.
Moreover, eligibility criteria were tightened, as not only location of residence but also the individual’s workplace
had to be in a REBP region (see section 2.3.2 for details).
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REBP. However, we do not observe the place of residence. To proxy community of residence
we use the community of work. While this introduces some measurement error due to the
false classification of REBP eligible workers as non-eligible and vice versa, we find that this is
not a major drawback, as most individuals work in the same labor market district where they
live.9
2.3.2 Sample Selection
Workers
First, we restrict the analysis to blue collar workers.10 The main reason for our focus on
blue collar workers is that the REBP was a program targeted towards regions with a high
dominance of blue collar workers. While the program was, in principle, also available to white
collar workers, effective take-up by white collars was weak.11
We further restrict the sample to workers who meet the age criteria at some time during
the period the REBP was in effect and who had a continuous work history before reaching the
age of 50. The age criterion implies that we consider only men born between July 1929 and
December 1941 and women born between July 1934 and December 1941, respectively.12 This
ensures that these individuals eventually attain age 50 during the REBP and men (women)
are aged 59 (54) or less when the program was introduced. Put differently, while these cohorts
were able to retire earlier (recall that men/women can claim special income support as soon as
they turn 59/54) not all of them could take full advantage of the program. For instance, males
born between 1934 and 1938 could take full advantage of the REBP because they reached
age 55 during the time the REBP was in place. In contrast, males born before 1934 were too
old to take full advantage (i.e. they already were 56 years old when the REBP started) and
9We can check the extent of measurement error introduced by this proxy since we can observe the place
of residence for individuals on unemployment benefits. We correctly assess REBP-eligibility for more than
90% of all individuals in this subsample if place of work instead of place of residence is used to assess REBP
eligibility.
10Because blue and white collar workers in Austria are partially subject to different social security rules
(for example, there are differences in notice periods and the duration of sick leave benefits), we can determine
workers’ occupational status without any significant measurement error.
11In fact, eligibility status is a highly significant predictor of early retirement among blue collar workers, but
not among white collar workers. One potential explanation is that blue collar (low income) workers face higher
replacement rates than white collar (higher income) workers when unemployed and thus higher incentives for
taking advantage of the program. Specifically, replacement rates (both with respect to unemployment benefits
and early retirement benefits) are much lower for white collar workers due to earnings caps. Because the
instrument is too weak, results remain inconclusive in the case of white collar workers (results for white collar
workers are available upon request).
12In principle, we could also consider the cohorts born from January 1942 to July 1943 as they (eventually)
meet the age criteria as well. However, the data available to us from the ASSD only tracks individuals’ labor
market histories up to 2006. We omit cohorts born later than December 1941 in order to observe individuals’
labor market histories at least until age 65 (i.e. men’s statutory retirement age).
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cohorts born after 1939 were too young (i.e. they were younger than 55 when the REBP was
abolished).
The experience criterion selects workers who meet the REBP work experience requirement,
i.e. workers with at least 15 employment years during the last 25 years. Furthermore, we only
consider individuals with at least one employment year during the last two years at age 50, a
requirement for being eligible to draw unemployment benefits. Because all selected individuals
meet both the age and the experience criteria, the assessment of whether or not a worker is
eligible to extended UB entitlement entirely hinges on individuals’ place of residence (proxied
by place of work; see footnote 9). This means that by using REBP eligibility as instrument
for the retirement age, we basically compare individuals who work in eligible districts with
those who work in non-eligible districts (section 2.4 provides the details).
Finally, we drop workers from the steel sector because our instrument does not induce
changes in the retirement age for these workers. The reason is that, apart from the REBP,
there was a second important program to alleviate problems associated with mass redundancies
in the steel sector, the “steel foundation”. This program was available both in treated and
in control regions. Firms in the steel sector could decide whether to join, in order to provide
their displaced workers with state-subsidized re-training measures organized by the foundation.
Member firms had to co-finance this foundation. Displaced individuals who decided to join
this outplacement center were entitled to claim regular unemployment benefits for a period
of up to 3 years (later 4 years), regardless of age and place of residence (see Winter-Ebmer,
2001, for an evaluation of the steel foundation). We therefore do not find any difference in the
retirement age between steel-workers in eligible and non-eligible regions.
Regions
To make sure that potential differences in labor market conditions between treated and control
regions do not contaminate our empirical estimates, we contrast only those eligible and non-
eligible districts that are adjacent to each other and economically similar. We use the common
classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS). NUTS comes in three aggregation levels,
of which we choose the most disaggregated one (NUTS-3).13 We further confine our sample
to those NUTS-3 regions that contain both eligible and non-eligible districts. Since NUTS-3
regions comprise geographically adjacent districts and because these units are quite small,
this procedure implies that differences in labor market conditions between treated and control
13NUTS-3 units are defined in terms of the existing administrative units in the EU member states. An
administrative unit corresponds to a geographical area for which an administrative authority has power to
take administrative or policy decisions in accordance with the legal and institutional framework of the member
state. There are 35 distinct NUTS-3 units in Austria, each consisting of one or more district(s) (“Bezirk(e)”).
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regions are unlikely to affect our analysis.14
Figure 2.2 highlights the communities within those eight NUTS-3 units that we actually
consider in the empirical analysis. The areas in black denote eligible communities and the
areas in dark gray denote non-eligible communities within these NUTS-3 units, respectively.
The remaining communities, i.e. those shaded in light gray, denote eligible and non-eligible
communities which are not considered in the analysis.
2.3.3 Key Measures
The key variables of our analysis are our measures of early retirement and mortality. As
mentioned above our sample includes only cohorts born between 1929 and 1941 (men) and
1929 and 1934 (women), respectively. Because information on labor-market histories is only
available until December 2006 and information on mortality only until July 2008, individual
labor-market histories of workers included in the sample can be tracked (at least) up to age 65
and individuals’ mortality-related information is available (at least) up to age 67. We use this
to define our dependent variable indicating premature death, a dummy variable that indicates
whether a worker died before reaching age 67.15
Since workers in our sample have to be alive at age 50 and meet the REBP age and
experience criteria. Hence our mortality indicator measures whether or not an individual in
our sample dies between age 50 and age 67. This is a meaningful indicator in the present
context. Since we are studying birth cohorts 1941 and older, we are considering individuals
whose life expectancy is still quite low (see footnote 15). Moreover, we look at blue-collar
workers whose life expectancy is lower than that of white-collar workers. In our sample, the
probability of death before age 67 is 18.0 percent for males and 7.2 percent for females.
Our treatment variable is the number of early retirement years. This variable measures
the time span between the statutory retirement age at age 65 (for men) and 60 (for women),
respectively, and the date when the individual permanently withdraws from working life. More
14However, the map also shows that treated regions were not selected randomly. Even though we think that
there is no strong a-priori reason for believing that individuals’ health status was decisive in determining a
given community’s treatment status, we will return to this issue later (see section 2.4 below). See also the
discussion in Winter-Ebmer (1998) and Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a,b) on how the regions were selected
for eligibility in the first place. Importantly, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a) show that both employment
and unemployment rates for (potentially) eligible workers were quite similar before the start of the program.
However, they also show that the program significantly increased the risk of unemployment for older workers,
suggesting that the program may have been used deliberately as a path into early retirement, especially for
women (Lalive, 2008a). Indeed, our results on the first-stage effect of the program are perfectly in line with
this finding (see section ?? below).
15One might object that this measure is ill-suited for studying mortality because it only covers deaths
occurring between age 50 and age 67. Note, however, that life expectancy at birth was not yet very high for
those birth cohorts considered in the analysis. In fact, according to the life table based on data from 1930/33,
life expectancy at birth (at age 45) was 54.5 (24.7) years for men and 58.5 (27.0) years for women (figures
taken from Statistics Austria).
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precisely, we define the date of retirement as the day after the end of the individual’s last
regular employment spell.16 Hence a positive number on the endogenous variable denotes that
an individual has retired before the statutory retirement age. Throughout the analysis, we
will stratify the sample by gender because male and female retirement and mortality patterns
are very different.
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for our two different subsamples and by eligibility status.
Our sample consists of 17,590 blue-collar males and 3,283 blue-collar females of whom 18.0
percent and 7.2 percent die before age of 67, respectively. Male workers in eligible districts
retire 0.75 years (9 months) earlier than their colleagues in non-eligible regions. This is strong
prima-facie evidence that male workers use the REBP as an indirect channel into early retire-
ment. The situation is even more pronounced for females, who retire 1.15 years (14 months)
earlier in treated than in control regions.
Table 2.1 also shows that the treated and control samples are well balanced (though not
identical) with respect to observable characteristics. Columns (1) to (4) shows almost no
difference in average (and variance of) age, indicating the absence of any major differences
in age composition of the blue collar workers between the two types of regions. The various
variables describing the previous work experience indicate slightly higher work experience
before age 50 in non-eligible regions; the difference is rather small, however. Interestingly,
blue collar workers in eligible regions were slightly less often on sick leave before age 50 than
workers in control regions. Moreover, male blue collar workers in treated regions earned higher
wages before age 50 (average earnings at ages 43 to 49) than those in control regions. We also
see that the industry mix between regions is similar though not identical. There is a somewhat
higher fraction of manufacturing workers in treated regions, and a somewhat larger fraction of
construction and agriculture workers in control regions. Since treated and control groups are
similar but not identical controlling for remaining differences in worker characteristics and in
industry structure is potentially important in the empirical analysis below.
Columns (5) to (8) show analogous descriptive statistics for female blue collar workers. It
turns out that the differences across regions among females are very similar to those among
males. There is only a negligible difference in age and experience indicators. Blue collar
females in treated regions have a lower incidence of sick days, earn somewhat higher wages,
and are more concentrated in manufacturing than blue-collar females in control regions.
16Recall that our indicator does not require the individual to be a retiree in the legal sense of drawing
regular old age social security benefits. Instead, our definition of effective retirement hinges upon the last day
of employment and does not refer to a particular transfer an individual gets after ceasing work permanently.
Effectively retired individuals draw unemployment benefits, disability benefits, old-age social security benefits,
some other type of benefit, or no transfer.
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2.4 Econometric Framework
Estimating the causal effect of early retirement on health and mortality is difficult because
poor health is a key determinant in individuals’ retirement decisions (e.g. Disney et al., 2006;
Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). This negative health selection implies that simple OLS estimates of
a regression of individuals’ mortality risk on an indicator of early retirement will overestimate
the true causal effect of early retirement on mortality. We now detail how we deal with this
issue.
To fix ideas, let Death67i denote a dummy variable indicating death before age 67 (such
that Yi takes on the value 1 in the event of death before age 67, and 0 otherwise) and let ERi
denote the number of years spent in early retirement. That is, ERi measures the difference
between the statutory and actual retirement age such that positive values correspond to exit
from the labor force before the statutory retirement age. Our regression model of interest can
then simply be written as
Death67i = β0 + β1ERi +Xiβ + i, (2.1)
where Xi denotes additional control variables and i is the error term. We are interested
in estimating parameter β1, the causal effect of early retirement years (i.e. the number of
years between the last day in regular employment and the statutory late retirement age) on
premature death (i.e. death before age 67). Since workers self-select into early retirement
based on factors that are not observed in the data, e.g. unobserved health shocks, ERi is
endogenous and thus the simple OLS estimate of β1 is biased.
2.4.1 Identification
Our empirical design tackles reverse causality by exploiting the exogenous variation in the
date of permanent exit from employment generated by the REBP. As we explained, the REBP
allowed eligible workers in treated regions to advance permanent withdrawal from employment
by up to 3.5 years. To assess the causal relationship between early retirement and mortality,
we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Using this empirical strategy, we estimate the
causal effect for those individuals whose date of permanent exit from employment is affected
by their eligibility to the REBP, i.e. we use workers’ REBP eligibility as an instrument
for their actual retirement age (e.g. Angrist et al., 1996; Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The
credibility of our empirical strategy hinges upon the assumption that our instrument is “as
good as randomly assigned”. In other words, REBP eligibility should be uncorrelated with
unobserved variables that are associated with retirement age and that simultaneously affect the
risk of premature death. REBP eligibility was not randomized but a function of age, previous
20
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work experience, and location of residence. Hence REBP eligibility should be considered to be
conditionally randomized, where the conditioning is done on the eligibility criteria mentioned
above.17 Since the age and experience criteria are fulfilled by construction of the sample,
the question of whether our instrument is valid or not essentially boils down to the question
whether the risk of premature death is correlated with individuals’ regions of residence in the
absence of the program (an issue that we take up in section 2.4.2 below).
An equivalent way of thinking about our empirical design is to consider the eligibility
criteria, Zi as a deterministic function of a worker’s age, work experience, and his or her
location of residence. From this perspective, we have to argue that each of these indicator
functions is exogenous from an individual’s standpoint. Otherwise, it would be possible for
an individual to manipulate one (or more) of the variables determining eligibility and thus
indirectly manipulate his or her eligibility status. Age and previous work experience are
unlikely to be endogenous in the present context.18 However, endogenous mobility across
regions may be an issue since workers may move from non-eligible districts to eligible districts
in order to become eligible for the program. While this is a potential problem, it is mitigated
by the fact that eligibility rules require residence in a treated region of at least 6 months prior
to claiming unemployment benefits. Moreover, mobility is rather uncommon among older
workers in Austria. In 1991, for example, only 3 percent (4 percent) of individuals aged 55-59
(50-54) had moved across districts within states or across states within the last 5 years.19
This suggests that the type of mobility that would cause worries for our empirical strategy is
a rather negligible phenomenon.
Another related problem may arise if location of residence has per se an effect on indi-
viduals’ mortality risk. Location of residence is a REBP eligibility criterion. Conditioning
on place of residence at the district level is thus not feasible, since it is perfectly correlated
with our instrument. To circumvent this potential problem, we included only those NUTS-3
regions in our sample that comprise both districts eligible to the REBP and those that are
not so. If neither mortality risk nor the duration of early retirement is governed by REBP-
17Introducing covariates into the heterogeneous effects model technically calls for the semi-parametric proce-
dure proposed by Abadie (2003). However, no extension of this procedure for models with variable treatment
intensity yet exists (i.e. age at retirement is a continuous variable). On the other hand, however, Angrist
(2001) argues that 2SLS is likely to give a good approximation to the causal relationship of interest in many
cases (i.e. the Abadie procedure is identical to 2SLS when the first stage is linear).
18Age can clearly be considered as exogenous in our setting. The employment criteria may be subject to
an endogeneity issue if individuals improve their work history in order to become eligible for the program.
However, we restrict the sample to individuals with an almost continuous work history (recall from Table 2.1
that the workers in our sample have on average more than 20 employment years during the last 25 years).
Since the REBP was only announced shortly before coming into force and was in place for only 5 years, the
workers in our sample fulfilled the employment criteria even without altering their work behavior.
19The Austrian census asks individuals whether they moved in the past 5 years. According to these data,
88% did not move at all, 5% moved within communities, 1% moved across communities within district, and
2% immigrated from abroad (figures are from census data, Statistics Austria).
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eligibility status within any NUTS-3 unit, the independence assumption likely holds, ensuring
the validity of our instrument.20
The specification of the first-stage regression remains. Based on the previous discussion,
we assume that the following equation determines the duration of early retirement
ERi = α0 + ZiαZ +
∑
j
CijαCj +
∑
k
EikαEk +
∑
l
NilαDl +Xiα + εi, (2.2)
where, as before, the endogenous variable ERi corresponds to the number of years spent in
early retirement. Zi is our binary instrument, denoting whether an individual was eligible
(in which case Zi = 1) or not eligible (Zi = 0) to the REBP. The variables Cij, Eij, and Nil
refer, respectively, to the workers’ date of birth, previous work experience, and NUTS-3 unit
of residence, i.e. the three eligibility criteria of the program.21 We also include additional
control variables denoted by Xi in some specifications.
22 These additional controls increase
the precision of our estimates and are helpful in underlining the credibility of our empirical
strategy by showing that these additional controls do not have an effect on the 2SLS estimates.
Finally, notice that the REBP was only in effect for a limited period of time. This implies
that the various birth cohorts differ in the extent to which the REBP actually offered a
pathway to early retirement. For instance, birth cohort 1930 was already 58 years old at
the date when the REBP was implemented. In contrast, birth cohort 1933 was 55 years old
when the REBP started. The former cohort could take only limited advantage of the program
(retiring at age 58), whereas the latter cohort could take full advantage of the program (by
already retiring at age 55), as the actual benefits stemming from the program depend on an
individual’s date of birth. To capture the heterogeneity in the effect of the instrument on the
first-stage outcome, we allow for cohort-specific effects by including interaction terms between
20Three additional assumptions are needed, and they are likely to be fulfilled. First, we have to assume
that the only channel through which REBP eligibility has an impact on premature death is through its impact
on the duration of early retirement. Thus the instrument must not have any direct effect on the dependent
variable. We believe that this assumption holds in the present context, as it is difficult to imagine that the
mere eligibility to extended benefits should have any direct effect on health and mortality. Second, we assume
that the instrument has a monotone impact on the endogenous variable. In our context, we have to assume
that REBP eligibility induced some individuals to retire earlier than in the absence of eligibility, and that no
individual decided to retire later because of REBP eligibility. Although we cannot test this assumption, we
think it is quite unlikely that this assumption fails in our application. Finally, the REBP eligibility must have
an effect on the early retirement date (i.e. the date when individuals permanently leave the labor force). We
show in some detail that this is indeed the case in section 2.5.
21Specifically, j indexes half-year-of-birth and runs from 1929h2 to 1941h2 for men and from 1934h2 to
1941h2 for women; k refers to the past 1, 2, 5, 10, and 25 years (before age 50); and l indexes those 8 NUTS-3
units included in the analysis. For work experience, we also include squared terms.
22The list of additional control variables is as follows: Several terms counting the number of past days on sick
leave (also indexed by k) and the corresponding squared terms, employers’ industry affiliation (14 industries),
the log of the average of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, and the log of the standard deviation of
yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49.
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the eligibility indicator and year-semester of birth into the first-stage equation
ERi = α0 +
∑
j
(Zi · Cij)αZj +
∑
j
CijαCj +
∑
k
EikαEk +
∑
l
NilαNl +Xiα + εi, (2.3)
which implies that we now have 25 instruments for our male cohorts (1929h2–1941h2) and 15
instruments for our female cohorts (1934h2–1941h2), respectively.
2.4.2 Assessing Instrument Validity
As we have explained, our key identifying assumption is that location of residence in either
a treated or a control region is exogenous with respect to individuals’ health status. We now
provide two pieces of evidence supporting the validity of our instrument.
First, Table 2.2 shows the estimates of a regression of standardized mortality rates at the
district level for the years 1978–1984, well before the REBP was implemented. We explore
differences in standardized mortality rates at the district level for four different age groups,
separately for men (columns (1) to (4)) and women (columns (5) to (8)). The table shows
estimates from a simple regression of (district-specific) log standardized mortality rates on a
dummy indicating eligible districts. It turns out that standardized mortality rates did not
differ between eligible and non-eligible districts before the REBP started. The relevant point
estimate turns out to be both statistically and quantitatively insignificant.
The second piece of evidence makes use of individual-level information on workers’ days on
sick leave provided by the ASSD. This is a good proxy for workers’ ex-ante health condition.
We measure the number of sick leave days before the individual turns age 50, i.e. immediately
before he or she meets the age criterion on the REBP. To assess whether eligible and non-
eligible individuals have ex-ante similar health conditions, we regress the number of sick leave
days on our binary instrument Zi while controlling for cohort fixed-effects, experience, NUTS-3
fixed-effects, industry fixed-effects, and earnings. Table 2.3 shows reduced-form results for four
different counts of sick leave days, for male and female workers separately. Irrespective of the
length of retrospective information used for the sickness indicator, it turns out that workers’
health conditions do not systematically differ between eligible and non-eligible individuals
within the same NUTS-3 units, and this is valid for both men and for women.
Taken together, we think that the evidence presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provides strong
support for our claim that the selection of eligible labor-market districts was unrelated to
mortality in these districts.
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2.5 Program Eligibility and Retirement
A first look at descriptive statistics in section 2.3.4 above shows that both males and females
withdraw substantially earlier from the work force in eligible regions. We proceed by presenting
first-stage estimates of equations (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Results are given in Table 2.4
for men and Table 2.5 for women, respectively. We will first discuss the results for males.
We show estimates for four different regression specifications. Columns (1) and (2) estimate
one common effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable, while columns (3) and (4)
allow for a varying effect across birth cohorts. Columns (1) and (3) control for cohort fixed-
effects, past work experience, and NUTS-3 fixed-effects; columns (2) and (4) additionally
include past sick leave days, the average and standard deviation of yearly earnings (during
ages 43 to 49), and industry fixed-effects.
We start with the just-identified case (i.e. estimates of equation (2.2)), shown in the
first two columns of each table. For males, the common first-stage effect of the instrument
amounts to 0.71 years. This means that REBP-eligibility lowers the effective age of retirement
by roughly 8.5 months. If we add further controls in column (2), the effect of the instrument is
somewhat reduced to 0.59 years (roughly 7 months). Table 2.5 reports corresponding results
for female workers. The first stage effect averaged across birth cohorts amounts to 1.01 years in
the first specification and is only slightly reduced to about 0.94 years when additional controls
are included (see column (2) of Table 2.5).
Next, we turn to the over-identified case, given by equation (2.3) above. The overall pattern
becomes more apparent in a graph. Figure 2.3 displays the relevant parameter estimates, αˆZj,
per year-semester cohort (these estimates correspond to those displayed in column (3) of Table
2.4). The underlying regressions control for cohort fixed effects (one for each year-semester
cohort), work experience, and NUTS-3 fixed-effects. Panel (a) shows that the first-stage effect
is small for older cohorts and becomes increasingly larger for younger cohorts. This is exactly
what we expect, given the REBP rules. Cohorts born in 1929 were already close to 60 years
old when the REBP was implemented. Consequently, the REBP cannot have had a sizable
impact on the date of permanent exit from the work force for them. The figure shows that the
strongest impact is observed for cohorts born in 1934 or later, who could take full advantage
of the REBP. This strongly suggests that the REBP entitlement strongly drives the pattern
of permanent labor force exit. For female workers, the pattern is similar and the size of the
first-stage effect is even more pronounced (see Panel (b)).
Column (3) of Table 2.4 reports the estimates from Panel (a) of Figure 2.3. The first
stage effect ranges from 0.031 years (birth cohort 1931h1) to 1.36 years (birth cohort 1937h2).
Beginning with birth cohort 1931h2, all estimates are statistically significant at the 1%-level
(except for birth cohort 1933h2, which is only marginally significant at the 10%-level). Sta-
tistical significance is also reflected in the relevant F statistic, calculated for the excluded
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Table 2.4: First-stage results, men
Retirement years before the statutory retirement age
Mean 8.6678 8.6678 8.6678 8.6678
Standard deviation 2.9346 2.9346 2.9346 2.9346
Eligible district 0.7100 0.5895
Eligible district · 1929h2 0.3652 0.0900
Eligible district · 1930h1 0.1658 −0.0254
Eligible district · 1930h2 0.0879 −0.1167
Eligible district · 1931h1 0.0307 −0.0617
Eligible district · 1931h2 0.7390 0.5466
Eligible district · 1932h1 0.6021 0.4285
Eligible district · 1932h2 0.8066 0.6584
Eligible district · 1933h1 0.6284 0.4503
Eligible district · 1933h2 0.3868 0.2533
Eligible district · 1934h1 0.6323 0.4812
Eligible district · 1934h2 0.9923 0.8322
Eligible district · 1935h1 0.9849 0.7802
Eligible district · 1935h2 0.7494 0.5207
Eligible district · 1936h1 1.2162 1.1637
Eligible district · 1936h2 0.6622 0.6336
Eligible district · 1937h1 1.0500 1.0469
Eligible district · 1937h2 1.3570 1.2406
Eligible district · 1938h1 0.9968 0.9708
Eligible district · 1938h2 0.5397 0.3333
Eligible district · 1939h1 1.1068 0.9968
Eligible district · 1939h2 0.7041 0.5939
Eligible district · 1940h1 0.8803 0.9863
Eligible district · 1940h2 0.9150 0.8897
Eligible district · 1941h1 0.9651 0.9921
Eligible district · 1941h2 0.6944 0.5212
Cohort fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 17,590 17,590 17,590 17,590
R2 0.1326 0.1980 0.1357 0.2021
First Stage F-statistic (Instruments) 243.0828 174.5787 11.9630 10.2984
Notes: , ,  denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. There are 25 (15) distinct male (female) cohorts, 10 controls for past
work experience before age 50, and 8 distinct NUTS-3 regions. Additional control variables are the log
of the average of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the standard deviation of yearly earnings
between ages 43 and 49, the number of sick-leave days before age 50 (10 terms), and employers’
industry affiliation (14 industries).
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Table 2.5: First stage effect, women
Retirement years before the statutory retirement age
Mean 6.4526 6.4526 6.4526 6.4526
Standard deviation 2.2675 2.2675 2.2675 2.2675
Eligible district 1.0104 0.9399
Eligible district · 1934h2 0.6717 0.5006
Eligible district · 1935h1 0.3345 0.3267
Eligible district · 1935h2 0.4140 0.2519
Eligible district · 1936h1 0.7349 0.4873
Eligible district · 1936h2 0.7092 0.6789
Eligible district · 1937h1 1.1734 0.9597
Eligible district · 1937h2 1.2091 1.0138
Eligible district · 1938h1 1.1244 0.9275
Eligible district · 1938h2 0.9883 1.1578
Eligible district · 1939h1 0.8349 0.8560
Eligible district · 1939h2 1.6288 1.6173
Eligible district · 1940h1 1.1276 1.1186
Eligible district · 1940h2 1.3271 1.2925
Eligible district · 1941h1 1.2916 1.3071
Eligible district · 1941h2 1.1064 1.0060
Cohort fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283
R2 0.1721 0.2489 0.1779 0.2558
First Stage F-statistic (Instruments) 153.1078 137.4533 11.9306 11.2351
Notes: , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. There are 25 (15) distinct male (female) cohorts, 10 controls for past work experience
before age 50, and 8 distinct NUTS-3 regions. Additional control variables are the log of the average
of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the standard deviation of yearly earnings between ages 43
and 49, the number of sick-leave days before age 50 (10 terms), and employers’ industry affiliation (14
industries).
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Figure 2.3: First-stage results
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Notes: The figures plot the difference in the retirement age between eligible and non-
eligible districts by year-semester birth-cohort in the sample of male and female workers,
respectively. Dashed lines show 95% confidence bands.
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instruments only and reported at the bottom of the table. It amounts to 12, i.e. it is larger
than the threshold value of 10 above which 2SLS is not supposed to be subject to a weak
instruments critique as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Adding further controls again
reduces the magnitude of the first-stage effect somewhat, but the F statistic for the excluded
instruments is still slightly larger than 10.23
Column (3) of Table 2.5 shows the corresponding point estimates for women, displayed
graphically in Panel (b) of Figure 2.3. The first-stage effect varies across birth cohorts, ranging
from about 0.33 years (birth cohort 1935h1) to about 1.63 years (birth cohort 1939h2). Starting
with birth cohort 1936h1, all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%-level. Adding
further controls in column (4) hardly changes anything. The F statistic for the excluded
instruments exceeds the value of 10 in both column (3) and column (4). This again suggests
that we do not run into any weak-instruments issues.
Treatment Intensity
Figure 2.4 takes a closer look at the distribution of the effective age at retirement by eligibility
status, for men and women separately. More precisely, the figure shows the difference in
the survivor function of still being in employment at a given age between individuals from
eligible versus non-eligible regions. The difference measured on the vertical axis of the figure
is negative throughout, indicating that the fraction of workers still at work at any particular
age is lower in eligible regions than in non-eligible regions.
We showed above that the individuals retiring between age 55 and 59 are those who drive
these effects. This exactly is what we expect from the institutional rules: workers eligible to
extended unemployment benefits due to the REBP can already retire at age 55, draw regular
unemployment benefits until the age of 59, and then draw benefits from special income support
before they become eligible to regular early retirement benefits at the age of 60. Workers in
non-eligible regions have no access to extended unemployment benefits and can first claim
special income support at age 59. Male blue collar workers eligible to the REBP are 9-14%
less likely to be in employment within the age bracket 55-59. As a consequence, our IV
estimates capture the causal effect of changes in the retirement age within this age bracket,
but tell us little, if anything, about the effects of retiring between the statutory retirement
age with long insurance duration (60/55) and the statutory retirement age (65/60).24
23Table A.1 in the appendix provides evidence on whether the REBP really causes the contrast in the
retirement age, or whether this is simply due to regional differences between eligible and non-eligible districts.
It shows the first-stage for cohorts who are not eligible to the REBP (i.e. workers aged less than 50 when the
REBP ends). It turns out that no systematic difference emerges between eligible and non-eligible districts for
cohorts too young for extended UB entitlement. This strengthens our claim that the contrast in the effective
retirement age is causally linked to the REBP.
24Early retirement also involves a substitution among different labor market activities. Figure A.1 in the
appendix shows how eligible and non-eligible workers differ with respect to labor market activities. The
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Figure 2.4: Treatment intensity
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Notes: The figures show the difference in the survivor function (i.e. the probability of
still being employed at a given age) between individuals from eligible and non-eligible
regions.
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2.6 Early Retirement and Mortality
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report our main results for blue collar males and females, respectively.
Column (1) of Table 2.6 shows the OLS estimates of a regression of the number of early
retirement years on mortality for blue-collar males. The regression controls for birth-cohort
fixed-effects, work experience, and NUTS-3 fixed-effects. The OLS estimate is highly signif-
icant and amounts to 0.0322 (with a standard error of about 0.0011). Taken literally, this
would imply that the probability of dying before age 67 increases by 3.22 percentage points
for each year of early retirement. In terms of the average probability of dying before age 67
(equal to about 18.0%), this corresponds to a relative increase of about 17.9%. The inclu-
sion of additional controls does not change the OLS estimate. However, as argued before,
OLS estimates are likely plagued by endogeneity bias due to non-random selection into early
retirement.
Columns (3) to (6) show our 2SLS results. In the just-identified case (i.e. columns (3) and
(4)), we get a much smaller point estimate than the corresponding OLS estimate. Using the
minimal (extended) set of control variables yields an IV estimate of 0.0078 (0.0122) compared
to the corresponding OLS estimate of 0.0322 (0.0324). Moreover, the IV estimate turns out
to be statistically insignificant in both cases. In the over-identified case shown in column (5),
we get a point estimate of about 0.016 (standard error of 0.0078), a decrease in magnitude of
about 50% compared to the corresponding OLS estimate. Even though the standard error of
this estimate is much larger than that in the corresponding OLS regression, the effect remains
statistically different from zero at the 5%–level. Adding further controls in column (6) leads to
an even larger point estimate of 0.0242. This estimate is slightly larger than that from column
(3), but it is still about a quarter smaller than the OLS estimate. The estimated standard
error is 0.0086, resulting in statistical significance at the 1%–level. Based on the 2SLS estimate
in column (5) and (6), respectively, one additional year spent in early retirement increases the
risk of dying before age 67 by 0.0162 (0.0242) percentage points. Evaluated at the sample
mean of the dependent variable (equal to 0.18), this means a relative increase in the risk of
premature death of about 9% (13.4%). Moreover, the comparison between OLS and 2SLS
estimates clearly shows that the OLS estimates are contaminated by reverse causality and
left-hand panel shows that workers eligible to the REBP spend less time in employment at ages 50-65 than
non-eligible workers. If eligibility to extended unemployment benefits drives earlier effective retirement of
blue collar workers in eligible regions, we should see more workers on unemployment benefits after permanent
exit from employment. This is exactly what we find: eligible workers spend more than 2 percentage points
more of their time on unemployment benefits than non-eligible workers. Apparently, the instrument induces
individuals to retire earlier by means of the extended unemployment as a channel from work to retirement by
first claiming extended unemployment benefits before accessing regular retirement benefits. The right-hand
panel shows that eligible workers substitute regular old-age pension with unemployment benefits after they
permanently drop out of employment. The figure also shows that time spent out of the labor force does not
substantially differ across the two groups (at least for men). In sum, this strongly suggests a pattern of labor
market behavior that is consistent with the incentives generated by the REBP.
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tend to be too big, which implies that there is selection into early retirement based on ill
health. We chose column (6) of Table 2.6 as our preferred estimate and refer to it as such in
the following.
Furthermore, as proposed by Angrist and Pischke (2009), we compare the 2SLS estimates
with those produced by the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator in
the over-identified case.25 Column (7) corresponds to column (5) except for the fact that
the parameters are estimated by LIML rather than 2SLS. LIML estimation yields a point
estimate of 0.0144 (standard error of 0.0086). Analogously, column (8) is the LIML estimate
that corresponds to the 2SLS estimate shown in column (6). Here we get an estimate of
0.0231 (standard error of 0.0096). In both cases, the LIML estimates are very similar to
the 2SLS estimates (though, as expected, less precise than 2SLS). However, both are still
statistically significant at least at the 10%-level. Overall, the comparison between 2SLS and
LIML estimates does not suggest that finite-sample bias is a problem (this is not a surprise
taking into account that this estimate is based on 17,590 observations).
Our IV-estimates suggest that early exit from the labor force strongly increases mortality.26
Our preferred estimate of 0.0242 implies that one additional year of early retirement increases
the probability of dying before age 67 by as much as 2.4 percentage points. Evaluated at
the average probability of dying before the age of 67 (which is equal to 18.0 percent), this
corresponds to a relative increase of about 13.4%.
Table 2.7 shows the corresponding results for female blue-collar workers. The first two
columns again report OLS results first. Female workers have a probability of dying before
the age of 67 that is increased by about 0.81–0.85 percentage points for each year spent in
early retirement. The magnitude of this conditional correlation is roughly a third smaller than
the corresponding effect found for their male counterparts, but this is still a non-negligible
correlation (in relative terms this is an effect of 11.8%, a magnitude comparable to their male
counterparts). However, and in contrast to our results for men, this effect vanishes completely
once we apply the 2SLS estimation (see columns (3) and (5)). The 2SLS estimates tell us
that female workers’ earlier exit from the work force has no impact on mortality. Again, the
corresponding LIML estimates do not indicate that the 2SLS estimates in columns (5) and
(6) suffer from small sample bias since LIML yields estimates very close in magnitude to 2SLS
coefficients.
25The more instruments there are, the more relevant issues with weak instruments eventually become. LIML
is less biased than 2SLS in finite samples with many instruments, but also has a higher variance.
26One might argue that our estimates are be driven by individuals dying while still working, a situation that
is in principle possible. Indeed, this may bias our results if death at work occurs with different probability
in eligible versus non-eligible districts. To investigate this issue in more detail, we constructed a subsample
in which all workers are excluded who die within three months after leaving employment (about 270 male
individuals) and then re-estimated our main models. The results remain quantitatively very similar to those
presented in Table 2.6 (results are available upon request).
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Our IV strategy in the over-identified case lends itself to a simple graphical representation,
which is given by Figure 2.5. The visualization builds on the equivalence of 2SLS using a
set of dummy instruments and GLS on grouped data, where the grouping is done over the
dummy instruments (this equivalence is elaborated in Angrist, 1991). Briefly, the left-hand
panel of Figure 2.5 shows the relationship between the probability of being eligible to the
REBP on the horizontal axis and the probability of dying before age 67 on the vertical axis
(which in turn may be understood as a plot of the reduced form against the first-stage).
The figure plots average residuals by year-semester date of birth and eligibility status from a
regression of the dependent variable (the endogenous variable, respectively) on cohort fixed-
effects, NUTS-3 fixed effects, and controls for past work experience (using corresponding cell
sizes as weights). The right-hand panel of Figure 2.5 shows average residuals from regressions
that include additional control variables (corresponding to regression specification shown in
column (6) in Table 2.6). The figure clearly shows that there is a positive causal relation
between the number of early retirement years and the probability of premature death (before
age 67) for male workers. In contrast, Panel (b) of Figure 2.5 shows that no such relation
exists for female workers.
Years of Life Lost
While our dependent variable, death before age 67, is precisely defined, it does not tell us
whether and to which extent early retirement affects life expectancy. Calculating the impact
on life expectancy is not straightforward because the underlying mortality hazard is nonlinear
in age and because we observe actual mortality only until age 67 for all individuals in our
sample. To convert our estimated effect of into years of life lost, we need to impose further
assumptions. To get a benchmark for the impact of early retirement on life expectancy, we
assume that differences in survival rates between treated and controls occur between age 60
and age 67 only and that there are no retirement-effects on mortality rates (i.e. non-survivor
rates) outside this age bracket. Under this assumption, the cumulative difference in survivor
rates between treated and non-treated workers in the age bracket 60 to 67 yields an estimate
for the impact on life expectancy.27 If early retirement affects mortality also outside this age
range, our estimated impact of early retirement on life expectancy will be biased (where the
bias may go in both directions). As almost all individuals in our sample retire before age 60
(only 1.4% retire after age 60), we can provide meaningful estimates for each premature death
indicator defined as the occurrence of death before age 60,...,67 in the same way as we did in
our main analysis for death before age 67. Figure 2.6 shows estimates for premature death
27Denoting by T the duration of life after age 50, expected remaining life expectancy at age 50 is given by
E(T ) =
∑∞
t=51 S(t) (Lancaster, 1992, p.13). Assuming that differences in mortality arise only within ages 60
and 67, the change in remaining life expectancy is given by ΔE(T ) =
∑67
t=61ΔS(t) = −
∑67
t=61ΔF (t) where
F (t) is equal to 1− S(t). Note that F (t) is the dependent variable in all our regressions.
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before age 60,...,67. It turns out that the probability of death before age 60 is significantly
higher among eligible than non-eligible workers. The estimated effect increases with age and
about doubles in absolute size by age 67 (where the rightmost point estimate in Figure 2.6 is
the main estimate from column (6) of Table 2.6).
Figure 2.6: 2SLS estimates of early retirement on premature death
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
Notes: The figure shows 2SLS estimates (and corresponding 95% confidence intervals)
of early retirement on premature death before age 60,...,67 (using the same model spec-
ification as in column (6) of Table 2.6).
To calculate the difference in life expectancy that arises due to differences in survivor rates
in the age bracket 60 to 67, we simply add up the eight estimated differences in survivor rates
shown in figure 2.6 which yields 0.15 years. More precisely, our estimates indicate that one
additional year of early retirement reduces life expectancy of male blue collar workers by 0.15
years or about 1.8 months. Recall that this estimate is valid only if all differences in survivor
rates occur between ages 60 and 67 – and that the (cumulative) difference in survivor rates
between treated and control groups outside the age bracket 60 to 67 is zero. This estimate is
biased upward if the cumulative difference outside this age bracket is higher among treatment
groups and vice versa.
2.7 Potential Channels
We now explore several potentially important channels that might help explain the observed
increased mortality among male blue collar early retirees. We first show that losses in earnings
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associated with early retirement are quite small and thus cannot be the main explanation of
the evident excess mortality among male workers. Second, we use ancillary information to
investigate whether the detrimental impact of early retirement on mortality can be ascribed to
specific death causes. Third, we provide some suggestive evidence on the impact of retirement
voluntariness on the estimated effect of early retirement on premature death. As the preceding
section has shown no causal effect of early retirement on premature death for women, the
analysis in this section is confined to male blue collar workers only.
2.7.1 Loss of Earnings
Earnings losses may contribute to an explanation of excess mortality among early retirees.
To check the relevance of this channel, we first estimate the reduction in permanent earnings
for individuals aged 50 or older if they retire one year earlier. We find that the reduction in
permanent income for individuals aged 50 or older is only about 2.5 percent.28 Taken at face
value, the estimated OLS estimate of -0.10 for the effect of average earnings before the age of
50 on mortality would imply that we expect an increase in the probability of dying before age
67 of about 0.25 percentage points.29 We therefore conclude that at most 10% of our preferred
estimate of the causal effect of retirement on premature mortality can be explained by the
reduction in permanent income associated with early retirement.30
The income channel in our case is much less important than that in a recent study by
Sullivan and Wachter (2009), who find that this specific channel accounts for as much as 50%–
75% of the overall effect of involuntary job loss on mortality in the US. The fact that there
is compulsory and universal health insurance coverage in Austria reconciles this difference,
however. Moreover, the reduction in income after retiring early is mitigated by relatively high
income replacement rates in the Austrian pension system. In sum, we conclude that earnings
losses associated with early retirement are too small to provide a credible explanation for our
finding of excess mortality among males.
2.7.2 Changes in Health-Related Behavior
This section investigates whether changes in individuals’ health-related behavior (such as
excessive drinking and/or smoking, an unhealthy diet, and a low level of physical activity) can
28See Table A.2 in the appendix. Note further that the volatility of income is a minor issue only in our
context because income streams are constant as soon as an individual draws pension benefits.
29The OLS estimate is taken from column (2) of Table 2.6. Based on this estimate, a reduction in permanent
income of 2.5% implies an increase in the probability of death before age 67 of approximately −(−0.010/100) ·
0.025 = 0.0025. This figure is likely to overestimate the effect of earnings on mortality because the OLS
estimate of the effect of earnings on premature death is arguably biased upward.
30This number results from dividing the estimated effect of the reduction in permanent income of 0.0025 by
our preferred 2SLS estimate of 0.0242, taken from column (6) of Table 2.6.
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explain the increased risk of premature death among male blue collar workers. In fact, there
is considerable – though not conclusive – medical research on the relation between retirement
and smoking (e.g. Ekerdt et al., 1989; Lang et al., 2007; Midanik et al., 1995), retirement and
(excessive) alcohol use (e.g. Neve et al., 2000; Perreira and Sloan, 2002), as well as between
retirement and changes in diet and physical activity (e.g. Chung et al., 2009a,b; Evenson et al.,
2002; Mein et al., 2005; Slingerland et al., 2007).
We shed light on this channel by investigating whether early retirement increases the risk of
specific causes of death that are directly or indirectly attributable to changes in health related
behavior.31 For this analysis we additionally rely on individual data on mortality provided by
Statistics Austria which contains the universe of death cases in Austria. It contains information
about the detailed causes of death according to the 9th and 10th revision of the International
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-9, ICD-10). While information
on causes of death from Statistics Austria cannot be linked directly with the ASSD (there is
no common person identifier), it is nonetheless possible to exactly match information on the
basis of four characteristics that are available in both data sets: year and month of birth, year
and month of death, NUTS-3 unit, and eligible/non-eligible district. It turns out that cause
of death can be unambiguously matched for 2,454 observations (among those 3,172 blue collar
workers in our sample who died before age 67) which implies a matching rate of 77.4%. For
147 observations the matching is ambiguous and for 571 observations in the ASSD there is no
corresponding observation in the data from Statistics Austria.
In the following we concentrate on the following causes of death: (i) Alcohol-related causes,
(ii) ischemic heart diseases, (iii) smoking-related causes (other than ischemic heart disease),
(iv) vehicle accidents, and (v) other causes. The assignment of particular diseases to “alcohol-
related causes” and “smoking-related causes” is based on the procedure applied by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (Table A.3 in the appendix details this classification
procedure). We assign deaths to alcohol-related and smoking-related causes if at least 40% of
deaths in an ICD category are attributable to excessive consumption of alcohol or smoking,
respectively. “Ischemic heart diseases” (mostly heart attacks) are also highly attributable to
smoking, and, in addition, to overweight and obesity which are related to an unhealthy diet
and a low level of physical activity.32 “Vehicle accidents” are also to a non-negligible extent
31This is similar to Bedard and Descheˆnes (2006) who use cause-specific mortality rates to investigate excess
mortality among World War II and Korean War Veterans in the U.S. They find that military-induced smoking
drives most of the observed excess mortality.
32Ischemic heart diseases are indicated by ICD-9 codes 410-414, 429.2 and ICD-10 codes I20-I25. According
to the Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Morbidity, and Economic Costs (SAMMEC) application provided by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), one of the major operating components of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, the proportion of deaths due to ischemic heart diseases for U.S.
males aged 35–64 (65 and above) in the year 2001 attributable to smoking amounts to 40% (15%). For obesity
see the study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). There is a broad consensus in
the medical literature that there are only a few main risk factors associated with cardiovascular infarction and
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attributable to alcohol abuse.33 “Other causes” are the residual category which contains all
remaining death causes as well as those deaths for which the cause of death is unknown due
to the failure to link the causes of death statistics with the ASSD.
The results for the cause-specific mortality are displayed in Table 2.8. Because the results
without and with the inclusion of additional controls are very similar, the table only reports
the results with additional controls. Column (1) repeats the estimate of column (6) of Table
2.6 that shows that premature death (before age 67) increases by 2.4 percentage points for
each additional year spent in early retirement. The causes of death displayed in the table are
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, thus the estimates from columns (2) to (6) add up to the
overall estimate from column (1) (and the mortality rates for the particular death causes sum
up to the total mortality rate). Column (2) shows that one year spent in early retirement
increases the probability of dying from alcohol-related diseases by 0.71 percentage points. In
other words, the risk of dying from diseases (partially) caused by excessive alcohol consumption
contributes 29% (=0.0071/0.0242) to the overall effect. Column (3) shows that that the
risk of dying before age 67 due to ischemic heart diseases is increased by 0.94 percentage
points, and therefore ischemic heart diseases account for 39% (=0.0094/0.0242) of the total
effect. The contribution of vehicle injuries (column (5)) amounts to another 0.24 percentage
points (or 10% in terms of the total effect). Interestingly, the risk of dying from smoking-
related diseases (other than ischemic heart diseases) does not significantly increase due to
early retirement (column (4)). The risk of dying from other causes is not significantly affected
by early retirement (column (6)).34 Taken together, alcohol-related causes, ischemic heart
diseases, and vehicle injuries account for as much as 78% of the overall causal effect of early
retirement. This implies a strong concentration of excess mortality among blue collar males
to three causes (which account for 24% of all deaths in our male sample).
Clearly, not all those deaths can directly be attributed to underlying changes in health-
related behavior. For instance, only 40% of all deaths caused by portal hypertension can
directly be attributed to alcohol abuse (Table A.3 shows the respective attributable fractions).
To account more directly for excessive alcohol consumption and smoking as causes of excess
coronary heart disease. Among the most important risk factors are smoking, hypertension, diabetes, obesity,
and psychosocial factors, while a healthy diet (e.g. eating fruit and vegetables) and regular physical exercise
appear to be protective (Canto and Iskandrian, 2003; Greenland et al., 2003; Yusuf et al., 2004)
33Vehicle accidents are indicated by ICD-9 codes 800-848 and ICD-10 codes V00-V99. According to the
U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2002) 28% (13%) of all motor-vehicle accidents of U.S.
males aged 55-64 (65 and older) are related to alcohol.
34We also investigate several subsets of the remaining causes in Table A.4. This Table shows analogous
results for the following subcategories: Alcohol-unrelated digestive system diseases, non-ischemic heart dis-
eases, smoking-unrelated respiratory diseases, smoking-unrelated cancer, self-inflicted injuries, other injuries,
cerebrovascular diseases, and all remaining causes. It turns out that none of those cause specific deaths are
affected by early retirement and thus do not contribute to the overall impact of early retirement on premature
death. This strongly supports the notion that the alcohol-related causes, ischemic heart diseases, and vehicle
injuries are the driving force for the detrimental impact of early retirement on premature death.
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mortality, we multiply the estimated contribution of each cause to the overall effect by their
respective fraction of these deaths that are attributable to alcohol consumption and smoking
behavior. The fractions we use for this calculation are as follows: 58% of diseases classified
as “alcohol-related causes” are directly attributable to excessive alcohol consumption;35 34%
of ischemic heart diseases are caused by smoking;36 and roughly 26% of vehicle injuries are
caused by alcohol consumption. This suggests that the contribution of smoking and excessive
alcohol consumption amounts to as much as 32.4% (= (0.58 · 0.0071 + 0.34 · 0.0091 + 0.26 ·
0.0024)/0.0242) of total excess mortality. Clearly, unhealthy practices are not only confined to
smoking and drinking but also to other dimensions such as unhealthy diet and lack of physical
activity. Unhealthy diet and lack of physical activity result in overweight and obesity which are
themselves important underlying reasons for ischemic heart diseases (see U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (2001)). Hence the contribution of unhealthy behaviors to excess
mortality among blue collar males is likely to be much higher than the 32.4% we derived
from smoking- and drinking-attributable causes only. We conclude that detrimental changes
in health-related behaviors are a major reason for excess mortality among blue collar early
retirees.
2.7.3 Voluntary or Involuntary Retirement?
Another hypothesis is related to firing decisions of firms. Since the REBP mitigated economic
hardships associated with unemployment of older workers, the implementation of this program
made it easier for firms to release older workers. If these firm decisions underlie the estimated
treatment effects, we should see a larger effect among released workers as opposed those who
voluntarily quit their jobs (Henkens et al., 2008; van Solinge and Henkens, 2007).37
While it is not possible to directly distinguish between quits and layoffs in our data, we
can exploit the institutional particularity that there are sharp discontinuities in eligibility for
severance pay in Austria. After 3 years of continuous work history with the same employer,
a worker becomes eligible for severance payments. Severance payments amount to twice the
monthly salary and increase to three salaries after 5 years, to four after 10 years, to six after
35This corresponds to the weighted average of the attributable fractions (the weights are the share of indi-
viduals dying of the specific alcohol-related diseases listed in Table A.3).
3634% corresponds to the weighted average of the age dependent smoking attributable fractions regarding
ischemic heart diseases (see footnote 32; the weights are the share of individuals dying of ischemic heart diseases
before and after age 65).
37Of course, there are other potential sources of treatment effect heterogeneity. One especially interesting
dimension is workers’ ex-ante health status because it is easily imaginable that mortality effects be predomi-
nantly driven by workers with weak ex-ante health. Appendix table A.5 sheds light on this issue. The mortality
effect is strong and highly significant ex-ante among workers who are unhealthier. This suggests that effective
early retirement causes premature death by adding to already existing health problems. In contrast, we see
that the mortality effect is small and insignificant among workers who are ex-ante healthier.
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15 years, to nine after 20 years, and to twelve monthly salaries after 25 years of continuous
work history with the same employer. Given that the financial stakes involved are quite high,
one might argue that a comparison of workers just above and below any given threshold may
be informative about the degree of retirement voluntariness. More specifically, it may be
reasonable to assume that the probability of a voluntary quit is higher, ceteris paribus, if a
worker has just crossed any of the tenure thresholds above, and thus received severance pay,
compared to the situation that he just failed to cross the threshold (and thus had to forego
[increased] severance pay). Before the threshold around 10, for example, the worker only gets
three months of severance pay and might be sorely tempted to wait around to get six. If he
goes before ten years, he does not lose severance pay, but receives a reduced amount.
Table 2.9 shows the resulting estimates using two different subsamples. The first (second)
subsample contains only male workers with job tenure in a range of up to 6 (12) months
around any tenure threshold relevant for severance pay (i.e. 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 years of job
tenure). We then re-estimate, for each of the two subsamples, our main models of columns (5)
and (6) of Table 2.6 for those workers below or above any existing tenure threshold relevant
for severance pay. The first four columns show estimates based on the subsample including
only workers with job tenure within 6 months of any threshold. The first column shows a
significant effect of retirement on premature death for workers below the tenure threshold,
while the third column only shows a small, and statistically, insignificant effect for workers
just above the tenure threshold. A similar result is obtained if additional controls are used
(compare columns (2) and (4)) and if the subsample considered includes workers within 12
months of any tenure threshold (remaining columns of Table 2.9).
Even though we cannot directly distinguish between voluntary and involuntary entry into
early retirement, we find suggestive evidence that retirement voluntariness may indeed be
related to the health effects of early retirement and the potentially underlying behavior. Early
retirement followed by voluntary quits seem to be unrelated to mortality, while early retirement
caused by involuntary layoffs is so.
2.8 Conclusions
This study estimates the causal effect of early retirement on mortality for blue collar workers.
To resolve the problem of negative health selection into early retirement we exploit a policy
change to the Austrian unemployment insurance system which allowed workers in eligible
regions to withdraw permanently from employment up to 3.5 years earlier than workers in
non-eligible regions. The program generated substantial exogenous variation in the effective
early-retirement age: eligible male (female) blue collar workers retired on average 9 (12) months
earlier than their non-eligible colleagues. This provides us with an empirical design which
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allows us to identify the causal impact of early retirement on mortality using instrumental
variable techniques.
For male blue collar workers, we find that early retirement age causes a significant increase
in the risk of premature death (death before age 67). The effect for males is not only statis-
tically significant but also quantitatively important. One additional year in early retirement
causes an increase in the risk of premature death of 2.4 percentage points (a relative increase
of 13.4%). Our results suggest that lower earnings of early retirees cannot explain male excess
mortality because these losses are quantitatively too small to have a substantial impact on
mortality. In contrast, we find that changes in health-related behavior (in particular, smoking
and excessive alcohol consumption) contribute to a large extent to excess mortality. Male
excess mortality is concentrated among three causes of deaths: (i) ischemic heart diseases
(mostly heart attacks), (ii) diseases related to excessive alcohol consumption, and (iii) vehicle
injuries. These three causes of death account for 78 percent of the causal retirement effect
(while accounting for only 24 percent of all deaths in the sample). 32.4 percent of the causal
retirement effect is directly attributable to smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. Our
empirical results also suggest that early retirement following an involuntary job loss is likely to
cause excess mortality among blue collar males, while retirement after a voluntary quit does
not.
While the retirement-effect on mortality is highly significant and quantitatively important
for males, we do not find such an effect for females. There are several reasons why male but
not female workers suffer from higher mortality following early retirement. Women may be
more able to cope with major life events, they may be more health-conscious and adopt less
unhealthy behaviors; they may be more active due to their higher involvement in household
activities; and they may suffer less from a loss of social status and identity.
In line with prior expectations and previous evidence, we also find that IV-estimates are
smaller than the simple OLS estimate, both for men and for women. This is consistent
with negative health selection into retirement and underlines the importance of a proper
identification strategy when estimating the causal impact on mortality.
Our results have an obvious policy implication. From a welfare point of view, our results
suggest that early retirement has severe negative welfare consequences for male blue collar
workers. Increasing the effective early retirement age is therefore warranted not only because
it helps to resolve the financing problems of pay-as-you-go social security systems but also
because it increases individual welfare. Increasing life expectancy by raising the effective
retirement age, however, will not help to resolve the financing problem one-for-one because
increases in life expectancy will partly offset the improvement in the worker-retiree ratio.
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2.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: First stage results for cohorts ineligible to the REBP
Men Women
Mean 8.2685 5.3875
Standard deviation 3.4948 2.1897
Eligible district −0.0071 0.0791
(0.1115) (0.0800)
Cohort fixed-effects Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes
NUTS fixed-effects Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3, 444 3, 005
R2 0.2397 0.1876
Notes: , ,  denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Considered birth cohorts are 08.1943–04.1947 for men and
08.1943–04.1952 for women. There are 25 (15) distinct male (fe-
male) cohorts, 10 controls for past work experience before age 50,
and 8 distinct NUTS-3 regions. Additional control variables are the
log of the average of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the
standard deviation of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the
number of sick-leave days before age 50 (10 terms), and employers’
industry affiliation (14 industries).
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Table A.2: The association between earnings from age 50 onwards and early retirement
Earnings from age 50 onwards
Mean 9.7237 9.7237
Standard deviation 0.3540 0.3540
Retirement years before age 65 −0.0222 −0.0250
(0.0011) (0.0010)
Cohort fixed-effects Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes
NUTS-3 fixed-effects Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes
Number of observations 17, 590 17, 590
R2 0.3141 0.6223
Notes: , ,  denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean earnings derived
from work income, unemployment benefits (assuming a replacement rate of
40%), and disability and old-age retirement (assuming a replacement rate of
80%) are estimated up to individuals’ death date (right-censored death dates
(July 1, 2009) are replaced by the expected death date based on workers’
expected life-expectancy (taken from mortality tables by Statistics Austria).
There are 25 (15) distinct male (female) cohorts, 10 controls for past work
experience before age 50, and 8 distinct NUTS-3 regions. Additional control
variables are the log of the average of yearly earnings between ages 43 and
49, the standard deviation of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the
number of sick-leave days before age 50 (10 terms), and employers’ industry
affiliation (14 industries).
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Table A.3: Classification of alcohol- and smoking-related causes
Category Included diseasesa ICD-9b ICD-10b Attribu-
table
fraction
(in %)c
Alcohol- Chronic conditions:
related Alcoholic psychosis 291 F10.3-F10.9 100
causes Alcohol abuse 305.0, 303.0 F10.0, F10.1 100
Alcohol dependence syndrome 303.9 F10.2 100
Alcohol polyneuropathy 357.5 G62.1 100
Degeneration of nervous system due to alcohol n/a G31.2 100
Alcoholic myopathy n/a G72.1 100
Alcohol cardiomyopathy 425.5 I42.6 100
Alcoholic gastritis 535.3 K29.2 100
Alcoholic liver disease 571.0-571.3 K70-K70.4,
K70.9
100
Alcohol-induced chronic pancreatitis n/a K86.0 100
Liver cirrhosis, unspecified 571.5-571.9 K74.3-K74.6,
K76.0, K76.9
40
Esophageal cancer 150 C15 40
Chronic pancreatitis 577.1 K86.1 84
Portal hypertension 572.3 K76.6 40
Gastroesophageal hemorrhage 530.7 K22.6 47
Acute conditions:
Alcohol poisoning 980.0-980.1,
E860.0-E860.1,
E860.2, E860.9
X45,Y15, T51.0-
T51.1, T51.9
100
Suicide by and exposure to alcohol n/a X65 100
Excessive blood level of alcohol 790.3 R78.0 100
Smoking- Malignant Neoplasms:
related Lip, Oral Cavity, Pharynx 140-149 C00–C14 71
causes Esophagus 150 C15 72
Larynx 161 C32 82
Trachea, Lung, Bronchus 162 C33-C34 87
Urinary Bladder 188 C67 46
Cardiovascular Diseases:
Aortic Aneurysm 441 I71 64
Respiratory Diseases:
Bronchitis, Emphysema 490-492 J40-J42, J43 91
Chronic Airway Obstruction 496 J44 81
Notes: a The choice of included diseases for alcohol-related causes is based on the Alcohol-Related Disease Impact (ARDI)
software provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), one of the major operating components of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We restrict alcohol-related diseases to those with alcohol-attributable
mortality fractions of at least 40% (fractions of at least 40% are considered “high causation” diseases by the HHS). The alcohol-
attributable mortality fractions refer to 5-year average annual estimates of health impacts based on the years 2001–2005 for U.S.
males. The choice of included diseases for smoking-related causes is based on the Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Morbidity, and
Economic Costs (SAMMEC) application also provided by the CDC. Again, we restrict smoking-related diseases to those with
smoking-attributable mortality fractions of at least 40%. The smoking-attributable mortality fractions refer to U.S. males aged 65
and above in the year 2001. b ICD (International Classification of Diseases) is the international standard diagnostic classification
for all general epidemiological, many health management purposes and clinical use. c Alcohol- or smoking-attributable fractions
are defined as the proportion of deaths from the listed causes that are due to alcohol or smoking, repsectively (these fractions
are derived from meta-studies conducted by the HHS).
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Table A.5: Health predisposition
Death before age 67
Sick leave days (past 10 years) Below median Above median
Mean 0.1481 0.1481 0.2117 0.2117
Standard deviation 0.3553 0.3553 0.4085 0.4085
Retirement years before age 65 0.0072 0.0122 0.0254 0.0340
(0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0120)
Cohort fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 8,681 8,681 8,909 8,909
R2 0.0267 0.0399 0.0722 0.0845
Notes: , ,  denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respec-
tively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. There are 25 (15) distinct male (female)
cohorts, 10 controls for past work experience before age 50, and 8 distinct NUTS-3 re-
gions. Additional control variables are the log of the average of yearly earnings between
ages 43 and 49, the standard deviation of yearly earnings between ages 43 and 49, the
number of sick-leave days before age 50 (10 terms), and employers’ industry affiliation
(14 industries).
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CHAPTER 3
Do Financial Incentives Affect Firms’
Demand for Disabled Workers?
Joint with Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimu¨ller
A revised version of this chapter is accepted for publication in the Journal of the European
Economic Association, forthcoming.
3.1 Introduction
Integrating disabled workers is a key challenge of employment policy. One out of seven indi-
viduals who live in OECD countries report a health problem that limits activities of daily life
(OECD, 2003). Employment matters tremendously for disabled individuals’ economic well-
being. The work incomes of disabled individuals with a job are nearly as high as those of
individuals without a disability. In contrast, the financial resources available to a disabled
individual without a job are 46 % lower than the disposable income of an employed disabled
individual. Even though work is of crucial importance for disabled individuals’ material stan-
dard of living, their employment rates are substantially below those of the non-disabled.
This chapter studies whether an employment quota for firms can help increase the demand
for disabled workers. Understanding the effects of quota is important for several reasons.
First, the two most important policies for encouraging employment of disabled workers among
OECD member countries are anti-discrimination legislation and employment quotas. While
the effects of anti-discrimination policies are quite well understood, the effects of employment
quotas on firms’ employment decisions have been explored less. Second, labor economists
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have long attempted to understand the importance of financial incentives in labor demand
(Hamermesh, 1993). The employment quota policy allows studying firms’ reaction to a sharp
change in the relative cost of employing disabled and non-disabled workers. Third, legislation
very similar to that in Austria is in force in many other OECD countries (or has been so until
very recently, as in the U.K). (table 3.1 provides an overview). While these regulations have
a core component in the form of a mandatory employment quota in common, they differ in
terms of the quota amount (ranging from 7% in Italy to 2% in Korea and Spain), in terms
of the target firms, and in terms of the salience of non–compliance sanctions (ranging from
0.25% of the monthly pay-roll for firms in Germany to 4% in Italy).
Table 3.1: OECD countries with employment quotas
Country Quota Targeted firms Sanction
Austria 4% private and public employers with
over 25 employees
e 200.- per month for each place
not filled (0.4% of payroll)
Belgium 2–2.5% only public employers –
France 6% public and private employers with
over 19 employees
e 150–250 per month (0.45–0.75%
of payroll)
Germany 5% public and private employers with
over 19 employees
e 100–250.- per month for each
place not filled, depending on ful-
fillment (0.25–0.65% of payroll)
Italy 7% public and private employers with
over 50 workers, one/two places for
15–35/36–50 employees
e 1,075.- per month for each place
not filled (4% of payroll)
Korea 2% public sector and private employers
with over 300 employees
e 324.- per month for each place
not filled (0.5% of payroll)
Poland 6% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
40.65% of average wage per month
for each place not filled (2.4% of
payroll)
Spain 2% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
–
Source: OECD (2003)
We study the case of Austria, where the Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA)
defines specific employment targets, coupled with financial incentives for meeting these targets.
Austrian law firms have to hire at least one disabled individual per 25 non-disabled employees.
Firms that fail to comply with this obligation are subject to a tax of currently 223 e per month,
i.e. about 12 % of the average wage of Austrian employees or 0.48 % of the wage bill for 25
non-disabled workers. The tax revenues are used to subsidize firms that provide employment
to disabled workers (regardless of whether they are subject to the employment quota or not).
We propose an empirical strategy that exploits the discontinuous change in financial in-
centives due to employment quota. To assess the role of the non-compliance tax on threshold
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firms employing 25 (or 50, 75, etc.) non-disabled workers, we compare the number of disabled
workers in firms just below and just above the quota threshold. The central idea of this empir-
ical strategy is this: When a firm with 25 non-disabled workers decides not to hire a disabled
worker, it has to pay the non-compliance tax. In contrast, when a firm with 24 non-disabled
workers does not hire a disabled worker, it is not subject to this tax.
The objective of our empirical analysis is to estimate the effect of the non-compliance tax
on disabled employment for threshold firms if they did not have to pay the non-compliance
fine at the current threshold but a slightly modified threshold. Note that the counterfactual
is not a world without a quota system. Rather, we focus on how the quota’s non-compliance
tax affects the marginal firms’ disabled employment decisions. This effect is policy relevant
for at least two reasons. First, it is central to understand whether financial sanctions work for
the marginal firm before assessing the overall employment effects. It is hard to see how the
overall employment effect could be non-zero if the marginal firms are not affected. Second,
the causal parameter we study is central in calculating the effects of marginal changes to the
quota amount on disabled employment. It is crucial to understand this parameter because the
quota level is both the most important parameter of the policy and it varies strongly across
OECD countries.
The key threat to a causal interpretation of our results is that firm size is endogenous.
Firms may self-select below thresholds to avoid becoming subject to the employment quota.
Manipulation of threshold location invalidates the regression discontinuity design (McCrary,
2008).1 We address manipulation in two ways. First, we develop a simple behavioral frame-
work to assess whether self-selection takes place. The key result of this theoretical analysis is
that i) self-selection need not take place for low non-compliance taxes and ii) if manipulation
takes place our approach will produce an estimate of a lower bound on the causal parameter.
Second, we implement two important checks to detect manipulation. First, endogenous self-
selection is expected to result in a discontinuity in the firm size distribution. Our empirical
evidence indicates that there is no such discontinuity. Second, the two populations of firms
below and above thresholds are very similar in terms of a range of observable characteristics.
Thus, both the theoretical analysis of manipulation and the empirical checks for it suggest
that it is not present. We thus maintain the central identifying assumption that firms just
below thresholds provide valid information on the employment decisions of threshold firms
without the quota system. The causal impact of employment quota can therefore be identified
by comparing employment decisions of threshold firms to those of firms just below thresholds.
The empirical analysis documents four important results. First, firms facing the obligation
to employ disabled workers do in fact employ more disabled workers than similar firms without
1The RDD has been used in a number of studies to measure causal effects. See Angrist and Lavy (1999),
DiNardo and Lee (2004), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lalive (2008b), for studies assessing the causal
effects of unions, social assistance, or unemployment benefits on labor market outcomes.
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this obligation. A comparison of firms just above the quota threshold to those just below the
threshold shows that roughly 1 in 25 firms around the first threshold (25 non-disabled workers)
have a disabled worker on the payroll whom they would have not hired in the absence of the
employment quota. The average effect at higher order thresholds (50, 75, ...) is roughly twice
as large but imprecisely estimated. Both estimates suggest that firms are quite responsive
to the tax (the elasticity of substitution is around 1.60 for firms employing 25 non-disabled
workers and around 1.58 for firms hiring 100 non-disabled workers).2 Second, we document
important heterogeneity of the effects of employment quota with respect to wages. We find
that firms’ response to the per-head non-compliance tax decreases monotonically with a firm’s
position in the wage distribution. Third, we explore the extent to which firms’ employment
decisions merely reflect poaching from other firms rather than creating or maintaining em-
ployment. We find that roughly 64 % of the employment effect can be attributed to workers
already employed by the firm on the date of acquiring formal disability status. About 34 % of
excess employment can be attributed to workers who were employed by other firms at the time
of acquiring disability status. The remaining 2 % of excess employment goes to individuals
who were not employed at the time of acquiring disability status. Fourth, two reforms of the
system suggest that increasing the non-compliance tax increases excess disabled employment,
whereas paying a bonus to over-complying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of
the non-compliance tax.
The existing literature has extensively studied the effects of anti-discrimination legislation
for disabled individuals. Using state-by-state variation in the timing of passage of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Beegle
and Stock (2003) find that the ADA has not improved employment of disabled individuals in
the U.S. and may, in some cases, have even reduced their employment chances. Kruse and
Schur (2003) challenge this finding, arguing that the data used in the earlier studies may not
have provided precise information on disability status. Jolls and Prescott (2004) and Jolls
(2004) argue that the ADA increased education participation by those individuals for whom
the ADA probably offered improved employment prospects, and argue that increased educa-
tion participation is the result of an increase in the return on further education. Bell and
2Recall that the elasticity of substitution is the negative of the percentage change disabled to non-disabled
employment caused by a percentage change in the relative disabled to non-disabled wage. Consider the first
threshold. Disabled to non-disabled employment increases by 0.15 % (effect of 0.0373 divided by threshold
firm size of 25) because the tax reduced the relative wage of a disabled worker by about 7.5 percent (regular
monthly earnings are 1,850 EUR; this means that the tax decreases disabled to non-disabled relative earnings
from 1,850 / 1,850 to 1,850 / 2,000). The relative disabled and non-disabled wage is 1 whereas the disabled to
non-disabled employment level stands at 0.31/25. Thus the elasticity of substitution of threshold firms stands
at about 1.60 (= −(0.0373/25)/(1850/2000− 1) · 1/(0.31/25)). The corresponding elasticity for the threshold
firm with 100 non-disabled workers is 1.58 (= −(0.0636/100)/(2000/2150−1) ·1/((2.3044/4)/100)). Note that
average disabled employment is adjusted to reflect that the firm with 100 workers has already passed three
thresholds and regular monthly earnings are 2,000 EUR rather than 1,850 EUR in large firms.
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Heitmueller (2009) study the effects of the Disability Discrimination Act in the U.K. Their
results confirm that, as in the U.S., disability legislation did not have a significant impact on
employment prospects for disabled individuals in the U.K. 3 The existing literature on the
effects of employment quota is rather sparse. Wagner et al. (2001) study employment quota
in Germany.4 Their paper assesses the impact of the employment quota in Germany on job
dynamics in 400 small firms and finds no effect of the quota threshold. Wuellrich (2010) stud-
ies the employment effects of an increase in the non-compliance tax in Austria and finds a
positive effect on employment of disabled workers.5
This chapter contributes to the literature in at least two dimensions. First, our study
adds to the literature by discussing whether a regression discontinuity design can be used to
estimate the causal effect of the employment quota on threshold firms’ employment of disabled
workers. While a large number of studies have looked at the effects of anti-discrimination
legislation with respect to disabled workers, we are not aware of previous studies that attempt
to evaluate the effect of quota rules on employment of disabled workers. While theoretical
findings caution against adopting regression discontinuity for point identification, they suggest
regression discontinuity provides useful estimates of the lower bound on the causal role of non-
compliance taxes. Furthermore, the empirical checks for failures of regression discontinuity
do not indicate significant departures from the key identifying assumption. The regression
discontinuity design therefore appears a useful design to evaluate non-compliance taxation.
Second, our evaluation is based on high-quality data from Austrian private firms and their
(disabled and non-disabled) workers. In fact, we use the same data sources the Austrian
social welfare authorities use to determine compliance with employment quota: the Austrian
Social Security Data (ASSD) linked to data from the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO).
The former data set allows us to calculate the exact size of the labor force (divided into
disabled and non-disabled workers) of every single Austrian firm. The latter data set allows
us to assess the number of individuals with formal disability status within each firm. Since
our data set covers all of the 46,467 Austrian private sector firms from 1996–2003 situated
close to quota thresholds, we can provide informative contrasts of firms just below and just
above the quota threshold to estimate the quota effect. (See Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009, for a
description of the ASSD)
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a detailed description of the
institutional environment in Austria. Section 3.3 presents the behavioral framework. Section
3See also Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2009) and Verick (2004) who study the effects of German anti-
discrimination legislation. Moreover, two strands of the literature study (i) the role of employment protection
for worker effort (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005), and (ii) the role of general employment protection provisions on
firm dynamics and firm size (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002; Borgarello et al., 2004).
4See Welch (1976) for an early theoretical attempt to characterize the effects of quota on the labor market.
5See also Humer et al. (2007) for an overview of the Austrian system and a descriptive account of disabled
workers’ career patterns.
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3.4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Our main results are presented in section
3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
This section provides a description of the key legal background document – The Disabled
Persons Employment Act (DPEA). DPEA was implemented in Austria in 1970 and forms
the legal basis of the Austrian employment quota system – its main instrument – to promote
employment among severely disabled workers. It defines the process by which individuals
acquire the formal status of being “severely disabled”, regulates the employment obligations
for firms and the financial sanctions associated with non-compliance of these obligations,
specifies rules on how to pay out subsidies to firms employing disabled workers, and introduces
employment protection rules for disabled workers. We first discuss the legal background as it
applied to the period January 1999 to June 2001. We then discuss two important reforms to
this system that took place before and after this period.
Employment quota The quota rule obliges firms to hire one disabled worker per 25 non-
disabled workers, leading to a quota of 4 %.6 Firms that do not comply with this obligation
are subject to a flat non-compliance tax. The non-compliance tax currently amounts to e 223
(2010) but it stood at about 150 e in 1999. The non-compliance tax amounted to roughly 8
% of a worker’s average monthly salary or 0.32 % of a firm’s average monthly payroll for 25
non-disabled workers.
The FWO is in charge of enforcing the employment obligation, by checking the size of each
firm and the number of employed disabled workers on the first day of each month. The exact
calculation of the employment quota takes the particular disabilities into account. There is
some double-weighting, i.e. particular groups of disabled workers are equivalent to two disabled
workers, which include the (i) blind, (ii) disabled individuals of age 19 years or younger, (iii)
disabled apprentices, (iv) disabled individuals of age 50 or older with a degree of disability
of at least 70 percent, (v) disabled individuals of 55 years or older, and (vi) individuals in a
wheelchair. The FWO levies a non-compliance tax on firms that do not fulfill the employment
quota. Disabled workers have to be hired on the same type of contracts offered to non-disabled
workers, both with respect to wages and part-time vs. full-time status. This means that firms
can not just temporarily employ a disabled worker to fulfill the quota.
Importantly, the non-compliance tax for disabled worker is the only labor market regulation
that kicks in at a firm size of 25 non-disabled workers (and multiples thereof). This means
6The Austrian quota is lower than that in Germany (5 %), France (6 %), Poland (6 %), and Italy (7%);
but it is higher than that in Belgium, Korea, and Spain (2 %).
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that contrasting firms with 25 employees to firms with fewer than 25 workers really informs
on the non-compliance tax rather than on other labor market regulations.7
Acquisition of disability status The process by which working age individuals acquire
the formal status of a disabled individual is as follows. In order to become entitled, disabled
individuals have to file an application with the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO). The
application is approved once a FWO medical expert assesses a physical, mental, intellectual,
or sensory disorder which reduces the individual’s work capacity by at least 50 percent. This
procedure aims to rule out that the formal status of a disabled individual can be obtained
by fraud – at either the initiative of a worker himself nor of a firm putting pressure on one
of his employees. We can not rule out that the procedure is only triggered after a firm has
crossed the threshold. Yet we expect relabeling of existing workers to be of minor importance.
Both workers and firms have important incentives to initiate the process to become recognized
disabled at onset of disability. Workers gain in terms of increased job protection. Firms gain
in getting access to accommodation and wage subsidies (see below).
Recognized disabled individuals make up a non-negligible proportion of the Austrian work
force. In 2009, almost 95,000 individuals or 2.2 % of total employment were registered as
disabled according to the law.
Workplace accommodation and (wage) subsidies The DPEA also defines how the
revenues collected through non-compliance taxes are to be spent. These revenues amounted to
e 88.2 millions in 2009. The main beneficiaries are those firms that actually offer employment
to disabled workers as well as the disabled workers themselves. Firms are eligible for three
kinds of allowances (in form of grants, loans, or benefits in kind) of the following kind.
First, allowances are granted for costs associated with the provision of adequate access to
the premises and adequate workplace accommodation in favor of their disabled workers. This
kind of allowance is limited to e 25,000, requires that the applying firm contributes 50% to
the total costs involved, and is only available to firms with less or equal to 50 non-disabled
employees.
Second, allowances are granted for wage subsidies. Wage subsidies accrue to four groups
of workers: they accrue (i) to entrants in the amount of at most e 700 a month for up to two
years, (ii) to current employees if the firm can show credibly the reduction in work capacity
due to a impairment (limited to not exceed 50% of the disabled worker’s monthly wage or e
650 a month), (iii) to apprentices in the amount of at most e 400 a month for the duration of
the entire apprenticeship, and (iv) to disabled workers whose employer can show credibly that
7There is a discontinuity in labor regulations at firm size of 15 employees. Firms above this employment
threshold have to establish a works council.
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their appointment is at risk without a wage subsidy (at most 50% of the disabled worker’s
monthly wage, but no more than e 1,000 a month, for up to three years).
Third, firms can apply for work assistance (such as counseling the firm regarding the
efficient integration of disabled workers). This is service free of charge and provided by the
FWO.
Basically, these allowances represent a reallocation of resources from firms that fail to
comply with the quota rule to those firms that employ at least one disabled worker. The
reallocation is used to compensate the latter for their effort in employing disabled workers.
Note, however, that these allowances are available to all firms, not just to those subject to the
employment obligation.8
Disabled workers are eligible to allowances for the following purposes: vocational (re)training,
professional development, work assistance (counseling service), mobility enhancing measures
(e.g. provision of a guide dog), and formation of a subsistence securing self-employment (up
to e 60,000).
Employment protection The DPEA provides increased employment protection for dis-
abled workers, i.e. protection from dismissal and protection from wage cuts due to disability.
The increased protection against dismissal is twofold. First, it stipulates that a contract may
only be terminated after a notice period of at least four weeks. Second, dismissal is only
valid if a special FWO committee agrees to it. Dismissals without the consent of this com-
mittee are unlawful. However, the increased dismissal protection comes into effect only after
a probationary period of three months has elapsed.
Policy Changes There have been two important reforms of the DPEA since the late 1990s.
First, the non-compliance tax was subject to an extraordinary increase by e 46 or 30% on
July 1, 2001, from e 150 to e 196.9 Second, the DPEA originally included a bonus for firms
that employed more disabled workers than they actually had to according to the employment
quota. Over-complying firms were granted a bonus in the amount of the non-compliance tax
for each excess disabled worker per month. The bonus for over-compliance was abolished
on January 1, 1999. Third, the probationary period originally amounted to one month, and
was extended in two steps: from one to three months on January 1, 1999 and from three to
8Dyk et al. (2002) investigate, inter alia, to what extent firms make use of these allowances. They conclude
from their firm survey that almost 40% of firms that employ at least one disabled worker receive such allowances.
Wage subsidies constitute the most important type of allowance (86% of those firms that claim some form of
allowances obtain wage subsidies). This number only amounts to 6% for allowances regarding costs associated
with the provision of adequate access to the premises and adequate workplace accommodation in favor of their
disabled workers. Moreover, 60% of all firms assess the existence of such allowances as essential for the hiring
of disabled workers.
9The non-compliance tax is indexed to the inflation rate.
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currently six months on July 1, 2001.
In the empirical analysis of the DPEA (see section 3.5), we focus on the period from
January 1999 to June 2001, but will provide results also for the preceding and subsequent
period to assess the role of changes in the salience of the tax and the role of combining the
tax with a bonus.
3.3 A Simple Behavioral Framework
This section discusses the firm’s decision problem in a simple framework designed to dis-
cuss whether manipulation of non-disabled firm size takes place in a quota system with non-
compliance taxation. This discussion is central in order to understand whether or not our
proposed identification strategy works.
Set-up Firms can hire two types of workers: disabled and non-disabled. Non-disabled work-
ers have productivity P and disabled workers have productivity p < P . Labor is indivisible
and can be hired only in discrete amounts. We focus on local employment decisions, i.e. em-
ployment decisions of firms hiring at or close to the first quota threshold T = 25 and explore
which firms will locate around that threshold.10 Thus, let S = 0, 1, 2, ... denote the number
of non-disabled and Y = 0, 1, 2, ... the number of disabled workers hired by the firm. We
distinguish between employment choices made in the absence of the quota tax, denoted by
S0 and Y0, and employment choices with quota tax, denoted by S1 and Y1. Manipulation of
non-disabled employment refers to a situation where S1 = S0.
We assume that both types of workers earn the same real wage w despite their productivity
not being identical.11 The wage does not fall short of the productivity of the disabled worker,
i.e. 0 < w < p < P , so the firms’ real profit per disabled worker is positive.12
10Note that productivity per worker is not assumed to be globally independent of firm size and composition
of the workforce, i.e. P and p differ between firms hiring a total of 10 workers compared to firms hiring a total
of 100 workers. Technology shapes global firm size and composition. Our framework can be understood to
describe how firms integrate small differences in local demand condition into their employment choices for firms
whose technology delivers a firm size around the quota threshold T . Also note that extending the analysis to
higher order thresholds would follow similar logic as we discuss below. We therefore concentrate on explaining
the consequences of manipulation at the first quota threshold T = 25.
11Firms can not cut wages of workers who experience a sudden decrease in work capacity. Moreover, our
analysis of wage determination of disabled and non-disabled workers is consistent with this assumption being
plausible also for new entrants.
12The assumption that non-disabled workers produce more than they cost may appear in contrast with the
fact that recognized disabled workers must have lost at least 50 % of work capacity. Note, however, that firms
have access to wage subsidies and subsidies for workplace accommodations. Also, firms care about the effective
wage, i.e. the wage net of wage subsidies. Wage subsidies are likely to contribute to disabled workers being
profitable. We do not explicitly take wage subsidies into account noting that doing so would be relatively
straightforward.
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Our key focus is on firms’ employment decisions rather than on pricing behavior and general
equilibrium interactions. For simplicity, we assume that firms take real profits per worker as
given (1 − w/p per disabled worker; and 1 − w/P per non-disabled worker) and make their
employment decisions after they have learned the level of demand for their product, denoted
by Z. Demand is continuously distributed across firms.
Employment without tax Without the quota in place, firms maximize
π0(S, Y ) = min(SP + Y p, Z)− (S + Y )w
Consider first optimal employment of non-disabled workers (assuming firms do not hire
disabled workers). Optimal non-disabled employment is characterized by a threshold rule.
All firms will hire at least Z/P non-disabled workers rounded to the integer below, i.e. the
”floor” number of non-disabled workers Z/P . Firms will hire an additional non-disabled
worker if and only if the residual demand for their product exceeds the wage rate. Thus, let
R(Z) ≡ Z−Z/P P denote residual demand. Firms will hire Z/P rounded to the next integer
above, the ”ceiling” number of workers, if and only if R(Z) > w.
Consider now optimal hiring of disabled workers. Clearly, firms who do not hire the
marginal non-disabled worker also will not hire a disabled worker. These firms have low
residual demand 0 < R(Z) < w. Yet firms with intermediate residual demand, i.e. w <
R(Z) < p, are indifferent between employing one non-disabled worker or one disabled worker.
Both will produce extra revenue of w < R(Z) < p and cost the same. We assume that these
firms do employ an extra disabled worker. Firms with high residual demand, i.e. p < R(Z) <
P , do not hire a disabled worker since hiring a non-disabled worker increases revenue by more
than hiring a disabled worker.
Figure 3.1a summarizes firms’ optimal employment choices without the quota in place
by displaying the probability density function of the residual demand R(Z). We assume
an exponential residual demand distribution. Figure 3.1a shows that the majority of firms
face residual demand R(Z) ∈ [0, w]. Such firms stay at the floor number of non-disabled
employment without hiring a disabled worker. Firms facing residual demand R(Z) ∈ [w, p]
hire an additional worker, thereby being indifferent between a disabled or non-disabled one.
The remaining firms face residual demand R(Z) ∈ [p, P ]. They employ the ceiling number of
non-disabled workers (and no disabled workers).
Employment with non-compliance taxes Now suppose there is a system that requires
firms with non-disabled employment S ≥ T to hire one disabled worker whereas firms with
S < T do not face such an obligation. To enforce compliance with the employment quota,
firms that do not hire the disabled worker have to pay a tax τ . We assume that the tax is
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Figure 3.1: Employment choices derived from the model
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(b) optimal employment choices with taxes
lower both than the wage rate τ < w and the productivity differential between disabled and
non-disabled workers, i.e. τ < P − p or p < P − τ .13
With quota in place, firms maximize
π1(S, Y ) = min(SP + Y p, Z)− (S + Y )w −min(S/T  − Y, 0)τ
How does the tax affect employment decisions? Consider firms who would hire below the
threshold without the tax, i.e. firms with S0 < T . Non-compliance taxes are irrelevant for
this set of firms, so employment choices are not affected, i.e. S1 = S0 and Y1 = Y0.
Next, consider firms who would hire exactly at the threshold if the tax were not present,
13Both assumptions are well in line with the Austrian system where the tax is on the order of 8 % of monthly
earnings. Moreover, productivity of a disabled worker is likely to be substantially lower than productivity of
a non-disabled worker since disabled individuals have lost at least 50 % of work capacity.
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i.e. S0 = T . How these firms react to the tax depends on residual demand.
Consider firms with high residual demand, i.e. p < R(Z) < P . Some of these firms will
substitute a non-disabled worker by a disabled worker because doing so increases profit by the
tax τ and reduces profit by R(Z) − p.14 This means that firms with p < R(Z) < p + τ will
substitute one non-disabled worker with a disabled worker, i.e. S1 = S0 − 1 and Y1 = Y0 + 1.
These firms manipulate non-disabled employment to avoid paying the tax. The firms with
large residual demand, i.e. p+ τ < R(Z) < P , will not change employment in response to the
tax, i.e. S1 = S0 and Y1 = Y0.
Next, consider firms with intermediate residual demand, i.e. w < R(Z) < p. These firms
employ a disabled worker as per our assumption above. Introducing the tax does not change
their decisions, i.e. S1 = S0 and Y1 = Y0.
Finally, consider firms with low residual demand, i.e. 0 < R(Z) < w. Some firms in this
group are interested in hiring a disabled worker because doing so saves the tax τ and costs
w−R(Z). This means that firms with residual demand w− τ < R(Z) < w employ one extra
disabled worker, i.e. Y1 = Y0 + 1, and the same number of non-disabled workers, i.e. S1 = S0.
Firms with really low residual demand 0 < R(Z) < w − τ are not affected by the tax, i.e.
S1 = S0 and Y1 = Y0.
Figure 3.1b summarizes firms’ optimal employment choices with the quota in place. In
contrast to figure 3.1a, firms that face residual demand as low as R(Z) ∈ [w− τ, w] no longer
stay at the floor number of non-disabled workers, but hire an extra disabled worker. Moreover,
firms facing residual demand R(Z) ∈ [w, p] are not indifferent between hiring a disabled or
non-disabled worker anymore. They now unambiguously opt for the disabled one. Finally,
while firms facing residual demand R(Z) ∈ [p, p+ τ ] hired an additional non-disabled worker
without the quota in place, they now substitute this worker by a disabled one.
Consequences of Manipulation The presence of the quota leads some firms to choose
firm size just below the quota threshold that would not choose that firm size in the absence
of the quota. How does manipulation a Regression Discontinuity estimate (RDE) of the role
of employment quota? Simply put, the RDE is based on contrasting firms who choose to hire
at the threshold T to firms who choose to hire just below the threshold (we discuss the details
of the empirical strategy further below). The key question is whether and to what extent
manipulation biases mean employment of disabled workers by threshold firms.
Let observed non-disabled employment be S. Note that S = S0 for firms that are not
affected by the presence of the tax (i.e. S0 < T ) and S = S1 for firms that are affected by the
presence of the tax (i.e. S0 ≥ T ). Suppose that residual demand R(Z) conditional on ”floor”
14Note that none of these firms will simply let go the last non-disabled worker since that costs R(Z) − w
but saves only τ , i.e. this choice is strictly dominated by simply substituting the last non-disabled worker by
a disabled worker.
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non-disabled employment is distributed according to a distribution G(r, z) ≡ Prob(R(Z) <
r|Z/P  = z). Assume that G(r, z) is independent of ”floor” non-disabled firm size, i.e.
G(r, z) = G(r) in a small neighborhood around the quota threshold T with standard properties
(G(0) = 0 and G(P ) = 1).
Consider firms hiring at the threshold with observed firm size S = T . This set of firms
consists of two sub-groups. The non-manipulators are the firms with residual demand 0 <
R(Z) < p and p + τ < R(Z) < P and non-disabled employment of S = S1 = S0. The
manipulators are the firms with residual demand p < R(Z) < p + τ and S = S1 = S0 − 1.
These firms want to employ one non-disabled worker without the tax but choose to substitute
that worker by a disabled worker due to the tax. Manipulation does not increases the number
of firms located at the threshold, i.e. the set of firms located at the threshold is G(P ) =
1. Interestingly, manipulators entering the non-disabled group at T from T + 1 replace the
manipulators leaving non-disabled employment T for T − 1. This means that – on average –
the number of disabled workers hired by threshold firms is identical with manipulation as it
would be without manipulation.
Consider firms hiring just below the threshold with observed firm size S = T − 1. These
firms serve to identify the counterfactual disabled employment decisions without tax. Again,
this set of firms consists of two groups. The first group is the population of firms choosing to
employ S = S0 = T − 1 non-disabled workers. The second group is the set of manipulating
firms, i.e. firms with p < R(T ) < p + τ and S1 = T − 1 but S0 = T . Thus, manipulation
increases the number of firms located just below the threshold from 1 to 1+G(p+ τ)−G(p) –
manipulation creates bunching (McCrary, 2008). Bunching is weak if the tax is small or there
are few firms with residual demand between p and p+ τ . Moreover, manipulation introduces
an upward bias in mean disabled employment since all manipulating firms hire a disabled
worker because of the tax but would not without the tax.
In sum, this simple framework suggests that manipulation of non-disabled firm size may
take place, manipulation can be detected with a simple test for bunching, and manipulation
introduces an upward bias into mean disabled employment just below the quota threshold.
This discussion implies that regression discontinuity generally produces a lower bound on the
causal effect of the non-compliance tax on disabled employment. Moreover, manipulation can
be detected and serves to assess the key identifying assumption that firms just below the
threshold inform on the counterfactual for firms at the threshold.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The first part of this section provides the essential background regarding the data for the
empirical analysis. The second part of this section discusses identification and estimation of
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the causal effect of the non-compliance tax on disabled employment.
3.4.1 Data
To assess the impact of the employment quota on the firms’ hiring decisions with respect
to disabled workers, we use register data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian Social
security database (ASSD), which contains detailed information on the individuals’ employment
history and characteristics from 1972–2003 on a daily basis together with an unambiguous firm
identifier, as well as firms’ industry affiliation and location (see Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009) and
(ii) personal data from the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO) from 1970–2003, which
reports disability status, disability type, and disability degree for all individuals who are
disabled in the context of the DPEA. One advantage of this type of information is that a
medical procedure (rather than self-reported by firms or workers) objectively assesses the
disability status. Note, however, that the FWO data set is inflow-based. This means that
the stock of disabled workers might be incompletely captured in the early stages of this data.
This drawback gradually vanishes if a snapshot of the stock of disabled workers is taken at a
later time. Accordingly, we will only use data from very recent years. We restrict the years
of data to the time period from 1996–2003 (see the next paragraph for details). The ASSD
and FWO data can be linked on the basis of a person identifier. This allows us to calculate
two crucial pieces of information accurately: the number of the non-disabled workers and the
number of disabled workers each firm employs. The former variables determines whether a
firm is required to hire a disabled worker and the latter represents how many disabled workers
each firm actually employs. Hence we can precisely determine whether and the extent to
which a firm complies with the employment quota. The FWO checks firms’ compliance with
the employment quota on the first day each month. We account for this administrative modus
operandi by creating a data set with monthly reference dates, all of which correspond to the
first day of each month.15
We restrict the empirical analysis to the time period from 1996–2003 to account for the fact
that data on the disability status is only reliable for the most recent time period (see preceding
paragraph). We divide this time period into three sub-periods of equal lengths (30 months),
across which regulations of the DPEA were changed, but within which the regulations of the
DPEA were unchanged (see section 3.2 for details). These time periods are defined as follows:
(i) from July 1996 to December 1998, (ii) from January 1999 to June 2001, and (iii) from July
15Note that firms cannot simply hire disabled workers for one day in order to fulfill the employment quota.
A regulatory restriction of the DPEA rules out this behavior. It even turns out that disabled workers have
on average a substantially higher tenure than non-disabled workers. The average (s.d.) number amounts to
10.3 (8.7) years for disabled and to 6.1 (6.9) years for non-disabled workers. The difference of 4.2 years is
statistically significant at the 1%–level. This calculation is based on a sample of 2,000,000 Austrian workers
on August 1, 2000.
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2001 to December 2003. We focus on the time period from January 1999 to June 2001 (non-
compliance tax of e 150; no bonus for over-compliance; probationary period of 3 months),
but will also provide evidence for the preceding and subsequent time period (the former is
characterized by a bonus for over-compliance and a probationary period of one month; the
latter by a non-compliance tax of e 196 and a probationary period of six months). The choice
of the time period in the middle allows us to directly assess how the effect of the DPEA
on firms’ demand for disabled workers varies with these policy changes. We further restrict
the analysis to firms in the private sector – those likely to pursue a clear, profit maximizing
objective. In particular, we look at firms operating in the services sector, manufacturing,
construction, and the tourism industry.
3.4.2 Identification
Our empirical strategy is based on the fact that the DPEA discontinuously changes the finan-
cial incentives for employing disabled workers. The DPEA requires that firms hire a disabled
worker if the size of the firm (as measured by the number of non-disabled workers) Si is greater
than or equal to the quota threshold T ∈ {25, 50, 75, ...}. Firms that do not comply are subject
to a non-compliance tax. This creates financial incentives for firms to hire disabled workers
as firms face a trade-off between hiring a disabled worker or paying a compensation to be rid
of this obligation.
Our aim is to identify the causal effect of the non-compliance quota tax on disabled em-
ployment. This causal parameter provides information on the effect of being subject to the
tax at the factual threshold of 25, 50, etc. compared to moving the tax threshold up or down
by a small unit. This parameter is important for policy. Recall that various OECD countries
implement different quota. Thus, the threshold is a key element of employment quota policies.
Our analysis aims to assess the role of setting the quota at 1 disabled worker in 25 non-disabled
workers compared to setting it at 1 in 24 or 1 in 26 non-disabled workers.
Our empirical strategy contrast threshold firms’ disabled employment to employment de-
cisions expected from firms below the threshold to learn about the causal effect of the non-
compliance tax on disabled labor demand. This identification strategy builds on the key
behavioral assumptions that both disabled labor demand and supply are continuous in non-
disabled employment at the threshold. Labor supply of disabled workers is clearly continuous
in firm size because none of the DPEA provisions except the quota (increased employment
protection, wage subsidies, workplace accommodation, etc.) change with firm size. Labor
demand is continuous if firms do not endogenously choose their location with respect to the
threshold. Section 3.3 argues that firms may manipulate the number of non-disabled workers
but the extent of manipulation is low for low non-compliance taxes. We argue that this is
rather the case in Austria. Recall that the tax amounted to 150 e in 1999, which is only
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8 % relative to the average wage of Austrian employees or 0.32 % relative to the wage bill
for 25 non-disabled workers. In section 3.4.4 we provide evidence that the non-manipulation
assumption seems to hold. We are, however, aware that if the non-manipulation assumption
fails to hold (since non-disabled employment is endogenous just as disabled employment if the
tax is sufficiently high), our empirical strategy provides a lower bound on the the causal effect
of non-compliance taxes rather than the causal effect.
3.4.3 Estimation
This sub-section provides an outline of the models we use to estimate the discontinuity in
disabled employment at the quota threshold.
Basic RD regression for quota threshold T = 25 The following linear regression
allows identification of the discontinuity in the average number of disabled workers per firm
at treatment assignment threshold T = 25:
Yit = α0 + α1 ·Dit + β0 · S˜it + β1 ·Dit · S˜it + it, (3.1)
where Yit denotes the number of disabled workers, Dit indicates whether a firm is treated
or not, and S˜it = Sit − T ∈ [−12, 12] denotes the difference between current non-disabled
employment Sit and threshold T = 25 of firm i at date t. Including S˜it is important since
non-disabled employment will turn out to be strongly correlated with disabled employment.
The key parameter is α1. This parameter measures the average causal effect of DPEA on
the number of disabled workers for firms at the quota threshold T . α0 measures the average
number of disabled workers for firms just below the assignment threshold T . The parameters
β0 and β1 capture the correlation between firm size Sit and the average number of disabled
workers per firm.
CovariatesWe will also use a ‘long’ version of model (3.1) that includes covariates measur-
ing (i) firm size dynamics, (ii) characteristics of firms’ workforce, (iii) firms’ industry affiliation,
and (iv) firms’ geographical location (at the state–level), and time fixed-effects. This model
looks as follows.
Yit = α0 + α1 ·Dit + β0 · S˜it + β1 ·Dit · S˜it
+X ′it · γ1 +X ′it · S˜it · γ2 + πt + θ · S˜it · πt + it, (3.2)
where X ′it is a vector that contains the full set of control variables (see table 3.2 for a detailed
list of these control variables) and πt are time fixed effects (a dummy for each reference
month). In addition, model (3.2) includes an interaction between S˜it and Xit as well as
between S˜it and πt. Xit controls for firm characteristics and πt controls for changes over time
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that potentially affect the hiring strategy of either disabled or non-disabled workers, such
as economic conditions, for example. The interactions between S˜it and Xit and between S˜it
and πt allow for different effects of the forcing variable S˜it for different types of firms. Note,
that the inclusion of all these covariates should not affect the estimated discontinuity, if the
no-manipulation assumption holds.
Functional form of trends in S˜ Note that the discrete support of the assignment vari-
able S˜it implies that we need to extrapolate in order to predict the counterfactual for threshold
firms, i.e. we need to extrapolate the number of disabled workers threshold firms employ in the
absence of the non-compliance tax.16 Model (3.1) and (3.2) both assume a linear functional
form. Mis-specification of this functional form would lead to a biased estimate of the discon-
tinuity. Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest two approaches to assess sensitivity to functional
form. The first approach – polynomial approximation – adds higher order polynomials to the
baseline model (3.1). The second approach – local linear regression – keeps the linear func-
tional form but reduces the bandwidth. We implement both approaches to discuss sensitivity
of the baseline model to functional form assumptions.
Adjusted model for pooled quota thresholds T > 25 For the investigation of the
pooled higher thresholds T > 25, we extend models (3.1) and (3.2) with a set of threshold
dummies Git that reflect the threshold that is closest to firm i at date t to control for differ-
ences in non-disabled employment across normalized thresholds (note that, for pooled quota
thresholds T > 25, S˜it denotes the difference between current non-disabled employment Sit
and threshold Tit that is closest to firm i at date t.).
17 In addition, to allow for effect hetero-
geneity across thresholds, we include interactions between the threshold dummies Git and (i)
the treatment indicator Dit, (ii) the normalized firm size S˜it, and (iii) the interaction between
Dit and S˜it. Thus, the treatment effect α1 in this model can be interpreted as an inverse
variance weighted average of the threshold specific treatment effects (see Angrist, 1998).
3.4.4 Manipulation Checks
We now present results of the two key tests for manipulation of firm size suggested by Lee
and Lemieux (2010). First, recall that the identification strategy is only valid if demand for
16Discrete support of the assignment variable also affects the variance-covariance matrix estimates. Lee
and Card (2008) suggest using cluster-consistent standard errors (clustered on the distinct values of Eit) to
account for the uncertainty related to the choice of the functional form. Furthermore, remember that we use
pooled cross-section data for the econometric analysis. Observations of the same firm cannot be considered to
be independent from each other. Thus, we not only need to cluster on Eit but also on firms (note that this
is non-nested). Cameron et al. (ming) propose a new variance estimator for OLS that provides cluster-robust
inference when there is two-way clustering that is non-nested. As a consequence, we report two types of robust
standard errors in our regression outputs: standard errors that are (i) clustered on Eit and (ii) those that are
clustered on Eit and firms.
17Let Git = floor((Eit +12)/25) indicate a firm’s threshold group, i.e. Git = 1 for firms located around the
threshold at firm size 25, Git = 2 for firms located around the threshold at firm size 50, etc.
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disabled workers is continuous in firm size. This assumption would be violated if firms self-
select around the threshold. We assess whether there is endogenous selection of firms at the
quota threshold studying firm size density. Firms might stay just below the threshold in order
to avoid becoming subject to the non-compliance tax. If this endogenous sorting behavior
related to the DPEA is present, we would expect a spike in the firm size distribution just
below the threshold. Figure 3.2 reports the firm size distribution around the quota threshold
T = 25. Visual inspection suggests that no important spike is present. We also formally
test for the presence of a discontinuity in the firm size distribution (see McCrary, 2008). We
apply model (3.1) with a cubic trend in S˜ using the density of the firm size distribution (in
%) as outcome variable. The parameter measuring possible discontinuities at the threshold is
insignificant for the threshold T = 25.18. Clearly, there is no spike in the firm size distribution.
Figure 3.2: Firm size distribution at quota threshold T = 25
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Notes: Discontinuity at threshold = 0.1464 with standared error = 0.1264 (adjusted for
clustering on firm size), based on model 3.1 with a cubic trend in S˜ using the density
of the firm size distribution (in %) as outcome variable (number of observations = 25).
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO.
Second, our identification strategy only works if firms are identical at the threshold. While
we can not test this assumption for unobserved characteristics, we provide evidence on continu-
ity of means of observed background characteristics of firms. Table 3.2 reports key background
statistics on firms located around the threshold T = 25. The first line provides information on
firm size – the number of jobs provided to non-disabled workers – for firms above and below
18There is no discontinuity at pooled thresholds T > 25 either. See supplementary results.
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the threshold T = 25. We refer to firms employing 25 non-disabled workers or more as treated
firms. These firms face the non-compliance tax if they do not provide a job to at least one
non-disabled worker. We refer to firms below the threshold as control firms. These firms will
be used to assess the counterfactual hiring decisions.
Table 3.2 indicates that treated firms differ from control firms. Treated firms are, by con-
struction, larger than control firms. Whereas control firms employ 17.11 non-disabled workers
on average (column 1), treated firms employ almost 30.14 non-disabled workers (column 2)
almost twice as many as control firms. The difference in firm size is statistically significant at
any conventional level (column 3).
Table 3.2 also displays information on firm size dynamics. The firm characteristic “em-
ployment stability” indicates whether the work force in month t was subject to any changes
since month t− 1. The characteristic “expanded since 6 months” measures whether firm size
in month t is strictly larger than firm size in month t− 6. The firm characteristic “contracted
since 6 months” measures whether firm size in t is strictly smaller than in month t − 6. The
workforce of treated firms is significantly less stable than control firms. Whereas 41 % of
control firms have an unchanged workforce, this number only amounts to 26 % for treated
firms. In terms of employment growth, results indicate that 47 % of treated firms and 45 %
of control firms expanded during that past 6 months, the difference of 2 percentage points
being statistically significant. In contrast, 39 % of treated firms downsized within the last six
months compared to 34 % of control firms. This suggests that treated and control firms differ
more strongly in terms firm size contractions than in terms of expansion of the non-disabled
workforce.
To shed more light on how treated and control firms differ, Figure 3.3 plots mean employ-
ment stability (a), mean wage (b), and mean firm age (c) as a function of firm size. Figure
3.3 clearly indicates that employment stability is a strongly decreasing monotone function of
firm size. Almost half of all firms employing 13 non-disabled workers saw their employment
adjusted between this month and the previous one. In contrast, only about one in 5 firms with
37 jobs for non-disabled workers saw a change to their employment level. Most importantly,
visual inspection suggests there is no strong difference in employment stability for firms with
24 or 25 non-disabled workers. Similar patterns are observed for wage and firm age.
Table 3.2 implements Model 3.1 for each of the background characteristics and presents
the estimate of parameter α1 in column 4.
19 Doing so formally tests whether the actual means
for threshold firms differ from the means expected from control firms. Results are striking.
The salient difference in employment stability from Table 3.2 column 3 disappears completely
once we focus on threshold firms. This means that threshold firms and firms just below the
threshold are identical in terms of employment dynamics. This result corroborates our earlier
19All p-values in column 4 of table 3.2 are adjusted for multiple testing according to Holm (1979).
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Figure 3.3: Selected controls (mean) vs. firm size
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Notes: Figure plots the mean of selected controls vs firm size. We selected three controls
with means that vary strongly with firm size. The means of these selected controls but
also of those we do not report are continuous in firm size at the threshold. The same
result holds for pooled thresholds. See supplementary web appendix for detailed results.
Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
finding regarding the absence of manipulation in the firm size distribution.
Table 3.2 provides further background information on firms. It reports information on
the median wage paid to non-disabled workers, average tenure, the fraction of women, the
fraction of white-collar workers, the average number of apprentices, workers’ average age, and
the average age of firms. Firm age measures the number of years the firm number has been
observed in ASSD since 1972 – the year ASSD started.20 Because the purpose of the empirical
20Note that this implies that firm age is left censored. Left censoring is not problematic in this application
because the focus of this chapter is to measure the effects of the employment quota on employment of disabled
workers. This means that information on firm age is merely used to control for differences between treated
firms and control firms. Moreover, firm age will turn out to be balanced between threshold firms. This implies
that left censoring of firm age is unlikely to bias estimates of the effect of employment quota on employment
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analysis is to understand firm hirings of disabled workers, all firm characteristics are based
on non-disabled workers employed by the firm in month t. Results indicate that control firms
pay their employees about 4.06 (log) e per day, whereas treated firms pay almost 4.10 (log)
e per day. This means that treated firms pay almost 4 percent more than control firms.
With respect to tenure, table 3.2 shows that control firm employees have been working for
their current employer on average for 5.4 years whereas treated workers have been with their
employer slightly longer (5.6 years). There are also differences between treated and control
firms with respect to the fraction of women (37 % vs. 41 %), and the number of apprentices
(2.0 vs. 1.4), workers’ age (35.7 vs. 35.5 years). In contrast, the fraction of white–collar
workers is balanced. The average control firm was founded 16.0 years before the current date,
whereas treated firms were established almost exactly 1 year earlier. There are also moderate
differences in manufacturing and tourism firms.
Do these differences remain when moving to the threshold? Strikingly, results indicate that
firms on either side of the T = 25 threshold are perfectly balanced with respect to observed
covariates (see column (4) of table 3.2). This means that all of the differences in covariates
shown in column (3) of table 3.2 are not due to purposeful self-selection of firms but due to
underlying differences in firm size. Finally, as we discussed above, we find no asymmetry in
firm size density at the threshold. Overall, results in column 4 of table 3.2 indicate that firms
on either side of the threshold are observationally identical. We therefore conclude that, despite
the running variable non-disabled firm size being endogenous, our identification strategy boils
down to a regression discontinuity design.
3.5 Econometric Results
This section discusses the causal effect of non-compliance taxes on disabled employment.
3.5.1 Results for Quota Threshold T = 25
This section presents the main econometric estimates of the effects of the DPEA on the number
of disabled workers per firm at quota threshold T = 25 (for the effect of the employment
quota at thresholds higher than T = 25 see further below).21 Figure 3.4 reports the number of
disabled workers per firm by firm size for sizes ranging from 13 to 37. The evidence is based on
448,156 firm-month observations, providing information on the employment decisions of 25,755
of disabled workers.
21We put our main focus to this threshold for two reasons. First, firms at higher order thresholds are already
subject to the quota system. Studying the first threshold allows analyzing the effects of being subject to or free
of the quota system. Second, there are much fewer firms at higher order thresholds than at the first threshold.
This means that the first threshold is the most relevant threshold in terms of the number of firms subject to
the quota.
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firms. Descriptive evidence indicates that the average number of disabled workers employed
by firms below the quota threshold is lower than the number of disabled workers employed
by firms subject to the quota. Specifically, firms that employ 13 non-disabled workers offer
about 0.14 workplaces to disabled workers – 1 out of 7 firms provides employment to disabled
workers. In contrast, firms that employ 24 non-disabled workers provide 0.30 jobs to disabled
workers. Figure 3.4 also suggests an approximately linear increase in the mean number of jobs
provided to disabled workers as firm size increases. Strikingly, quota threshold firms with 25
non-disabled workers appear to offer 0.34 jobs to disabled workers, an unexpected increase,
given the behavior of firms not subject to the employment obligation. Again, the number of
jobs provided to disabled workers increases in an almost linear fashion from firm size 25 to
firm size 37.
Figure 3.4: The effect of the DPEA on the number of disabled workers at quota threshold
T = 25
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Notes: Discontinuity at threshold = 0.0533 with standared error = 0.0075 (adjusted for
clustering on firm size), based on model 3.1 (number of observations = 448,156). Source:
Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO.
Figure 3.4 thus presents evidence of an unexpected change in the average number of jobs
provided to disabled individuals. This change can be measured by superimposing the fit of
the model (3.1). Doing so yields a discontinuity at the quota threshold T = 25 of 0.0533 (the
standard error is adjusted for clustering on firm size is 0.0075; the standard error adjusted
for clustering on firm is 0.0156; the standard error adjusted for clustering on firm size and
firm is 0.0133). This discontinuity is statistically signifiant at the 1%-level. Prima facie, the
effect appears to be quantitatively small. Note, however, that the mean number of disabled
workers per firm around the first threshold is 0.26, meaning that the discontinuity constitutes a
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20.9% increase in the number of disabled workers per firm (= 0.0533/0.2550). Put differently,
roughly one out of 20 firms employs one additional disabled worker due to the DPEA.
Table 3.3 shows our main results for the effect of the employment quota on jobs provided
to disabled workers. Note first that the choice of clustering on the firm size, or on the firm
size and firm, does not affect the statistical significance of our results in any of the 4 columns.
Column (1) of table 3.3 shows results for model (3.1), thus simply repeating the results of
figure 3.4. Column (2) shows results for model (3.2), i.e. with the full set of controls, time
fixed-effects, and their respective interaction with firm size. The estimated discontinuity only
slightly changes from 0.0533 to 0.0545. We conclude that the effect is very robust to the
inclusion of covariates, which enforces the plausibility of our assumption that there is no ma-
nipulation in the number of non-disabled workers on that is associated with the presence of
the non-compliance tax. Column (3) narrows the bandwidth to S˜it ∈ [−6, 6]. The estimated
discontinuity becomes smaller, amounting to 0.0373 with this smaller bandwidth. The in-
clusion of second order polynomials in S˜it in column (4) to the specification in column (2)
leads to the same effect as narrowing the bandwidth. The estimated discontinuity amounts to
0.0366 being almost identical to that of column (3). Thus, the baseline model (3.1) is sensitive
to changes in functional form. The sensitivity analyzes in column (3) and (4) are, however,
quite consistent regarding the causal effect of the non-compliance tax. We therefore adopt the
model in column (3) as the baseline model for the remainder of the chapter. Note that results
are not sensitive to adopting the model in column (4).
Table 3.3: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm at
quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Number of disabled workers
Mean 0.2550 0.2550 0.3081 0.2550
Standard deviation 0.6390 0.6390 0.7064 0.6390
Treatment effect 0.0533 0.0545 0.0373 0.0366
Cluster: S (0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0084)
Cluster: S, firm (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0091) (0.0098)
S ∈ 25± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 12
Polynomial order in (S − 25) 1 1 1 2
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (S − 25) No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (S − 25) No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 448,156 448,156 183,678 448,156
R2 0.0304 0.0697 0.0517 0.0698
Adjusted R2 0.0304 0.0695 0.0512 0.0695
Notes: , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
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Is this effect quantitatively large? A lower bound on the extent to which firms substitute
disabled workers and non-disabled workers can be calculated as follows. The estimate of
column (3) of the treatment effect suggests that the quota leads to 0.0373 more disabled
workers holding a job in threshold firms – an increase of about 12 % compared to the recognized
disabled workforce of 0.31 disabled workers at the quota threshold. This change in disabled
worker employment is triggered by a non-compliance tax which stands on the order of 8 % of
the median non-disabled worker wage (e 150 in fine per month relative to about e 1,850 in
wages per month). The elasticity of substitution between disabled workers and non-disabled
workers is therefore at least on the order of 1.60.22 As Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) conjecture,
disabled and non-disabled workers are quite strong substitutes.
3.5.2 Placebo Regressions
To further assess the validity of our RD setup, we estimated discontinuities in the number
of disabled workers per firm at firm sizes where there should be no discontinuities. Figure
3.5 shows the estimated discontinuities (according to our baseline model) for firm sizes 7–35
(including the true threshold at firm size 25). The pattern is striking. There is a clear-cut
peak at the true threshold, which already begins to grow at around firm size 21 and then
flattens out beginning at firm size 26. Note that this is not surprising – given that there
is a true discontinuity at firm size 25. The bandwidth of our baseline model is 6, thus the
discontinuities calculated at ‘placebo’-thresholds 19–24 already consider treated firms.
The estimated discontinuities for the placebo thresholds at firm sizes 7–18 and 31–35, for
which either only treated or only control firm are considered, are in all but five instances (at
firm sizes 9, 10, 13, 14, and 34) statistically not different from zero at the 5%-level. Note,
however, that we test a large number of coefficients at once. Therefore we need to adjust
the p-values for the issue of multiple testing. It turns out that once we adjust the p-values
for multiple testing according to Holm (1979), only the estimated discontinuity of the true
threshold at firm size 25 remains statistically significant at the 5%-level.23 This strongly
22Recall that the elasticity of substitution is the negative of the percentage change disabled to non-disabled
employment caused by a percentage change in the relative disabled to non-disabled wage. Consider the first
threshold. Disabled to non-disabled employment increases by 0.15 % (effect of 0.0373 divided by threshold
firm size of 25) because the tax reduced the relative wage of a disabled worker by about 7.5 percent (regular
monthly earnings are 1,850 EUR; this means that the tax decreases disabled to non-disabled relative earnings
from 1,850 / 1,850 to 1,850 / 2,000). The relative disabled and non-disabled wage is 1 whereas the disabled to
non-disabled employment level stands at 0.31/25. Thus the elasticity of substitution of threshold firms stands
at about 1.60 (= −(0.0373/25)/(1850/2000− 1) · 1/(0.31/25)). The corresponding elasticity for the threshold
firm with 100 non-disabled workers is 1.58 (= −(0.0636/100)/(2000/2150−1) ·1/((2.3044/4)/100)). Note that
average disabled employment is adjusted to reflect that the firm with 100 workers has already passed three
thresholds and regular monthly earnings are 2,000 EUR rather than 1,850 EUR in large firms.
23We chose the Holm Method, which controls the family-wise error rate (FWE). As pointed out by Romano
et al. (2008), this is the standard approach to account for multiple testing. Note that Romano et al. (2008)
argue that this criterion can be too strict when the number of hypotheses under consideration is very large.
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supports the credibility of our estimated discontinuity at firm size 25.
Figure 3.5: Testing continuity of mean disabled employment
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Notes: Figure plots the parameter α1 in regression yit = α0+α1 ·Dit+β0 · S˜it+β1 ·Dit ·
S˜it + it where yit is number of disabled S˜it is normalized firm size, i.e. firm size minus
threshold, adopting a half-width h = 6. This parameter measures the difference in actual
mean disabled employment at the threshold compared to mean disabled employment
expected from data below the threshold for each threshold between firm size 7 to firm
size 35. Note that all thresholds except threshold 25 are placebo thresholds. Parameter
estimates within the vertical dashed lines can be affected by the factual discontinuity at
firm size 25. Parameter estimates outside the vertical dashed lines can not be affected
by the discontinuity. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
3.5.3 Effects by low-wage and high-wage firms
Next, we turn to discussing heterogeneity of the treatment effect. Table 3.4 reports the causal
effect of the employment quota for firms in different parts of the firm wage distribution at
quota threshold T = 25. We group firms according to the median daily wage paid to their
workers in the period 1999 to 2001. We then allocate each firm–month observation to four
approximately equal sized groups based on the quartiles of the firm wage distribution. This
grouping ensures that the relative size of the non-compliance tax decreases strongly. Whereas
However, in our context this does not apply (the number of hypotheses tested at once amounts to 29 in our
context). We therefore stick to standard approach and do not apply the procedure of false discovery proportion
(FDP) as suggested by Romano et al. (2008). The procedure of the Holm Method is as follows. The p-value
of each estimated discontinuity is ranked from the smallest to the largest. The first p-value is multiplied
by the number of investigated (placebo) threshold (29 in our case). The other p-values are consecutively –
according to their rank – multiplied by the number of investigated (placebo) thresholds less the number of
already adjusted p-values.
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the average firm in the first quartile face a tax of 12.6 % of its firm wage, firms in the top
quartile only face a tax of 5.6 % of the firm wage (bottom row in table 3.4).
Table 3.4: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm by
firms’ median daily wage (quartiles) at quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 -
June 2001)
Number of disabled workers
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Mean 0.2868 0.3144 0.3033 0.3283
Standard deviation 0.6947 0.7148 0.6882 0.7261
Treatment effect 0.0758 0.0418 0.0261 0.0015
Cluster: S (0.0241) (0.0185) (0.0104) (0.0076)
Cluster: S, firm (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0148) (0.0095)
S ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (S − 25) 1 1 1 1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (S − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (S − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 47,575 46,519 43,818 45,766
R2 0.0606 0.0506 0.0642 0.0814
Adjusted R2 0.0585 0.0485 0.0620 0.0793
Tax as % of monthly wage 12.6% 9.0% 7.5% 5.6%
Notes: , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Results indicate that the employment quota produces a strong increase in the workplaces
available to disabled workers among firms located in the first quartile of the wage distribution.
Quota firms provide 0.0758 workplaces for disabled workers which would not be there without
the employment quota (column 1). The estimated discontinuity in the number of disabled
workers in the second quartile of the firm wage distribution is with 0.0418 much smaller
(column 2). High-wage firms located above the median of the firm wage distribution respond
considerably less than firms below the median. Threshold firms in the third quartile provide
employment in excess of what would be expected from firms just below the threshold of 0.0261
workplaces (column 3) – or about a third the workplaces created by firms in the first quartile of
the firm wage distribution. Interestingly, firms in the top quartile of the firm wage distribution
do not appear to respond to the employment obligation (the estimated effect in column 4 is
0.0015). Note that the pattern of causal effects of the employment quota are very much in
line with the pattern of relative impact generated by a flat rate tax.
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3.5.4 Results for Pooled Quota Thresholds T > 25
This section investigates the effect of the employment quota for firms at the pooled higher
quota threshold T > 25. The employment quota may act differently for large firms than for
small firms. On one hand, large firms pay higher wages, implying that financial incentives
should have less bite than for small firms. On the other hand, existing evidence strongly
suggests that firm size is positively related to employment of the disabled. This may be
because large firms find it easier to accommodate disabled workers. Table 3.5 shows the results
for pooled higher thresholds (T = 50, 75, ...). Here we assign treatment status according to
the deviation from thresholds S˜it ≡ (Sit − Tit), where Tit represents the nearest threshold Sit
is associated with. Firms are treated if S˜i ≥ 0 and non-treated if S˜i < 0. Remember from
section 3.4.2 that all specifications in table (3.5) include threshold dummies Git, as well as
their interaction with the treatment indicator Dit and normalized firm size S˜it and Dit · S˜it.
Thus, the estimated discontinuity can be interpreted as an inverse variance weighted average
of the threshold specific treatment effects. Column 1 shows that the effect amounts to 0.1387
if no additional covariates are included. The effect becomes smaller in column 2 if controls,
time fixed-effects, and their respective interactions with the normalized firm size are added.
The effect of having to offer a job to at least one additional disabled worker is 0.1071 – almost
twice as large as the respective effect at quota threshold T = 25. Column 3 uses the smaller
bandwidth. It turns out that the effect vanishes. If higher order polynomial are added instead,
the effect becomes smaller (0.0775), but is statistically significant at least at the 10%-level if
standard errors adjusted for clustering on the deviation from the threshold E˜ are considered.
3.5.5 Effects by employment status before becoming disabled
This subsection provides separate estimates by the initial state before becoming recognized
disabled. We decompose employment provided to disabled workers who had been employed
with the same firm on the date of registration as disabled (own former employees), who
had been employed with another firm on the date of registration as disabled (other former
employees), and who had not been employed at the time of registration as disabled (non-
employees).
Providing information on the effects for these three groups of workers is important to
assess the likely mechanism that generates excess disabled employment at threshold firms.
Threshold firms can retain their own former employees, poach employees from other firms,
or create a new job for workers who were not employed when they acquired the recognized
disabled status. Encouraging retention is clearly one of the main objectives of the DPEA (see
section 3.2 on wage subsidies). Retention is also likely to conserve firm specific human capital
more than generating excess employment through hiring from the non-employment pool or
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Table 3.5: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm at
pooled quota thresholds T > 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Number of disabled workers
Mean 2.3044 2.3044 2.3833 2.3044
Standard deviation 5.3183 5.3183 5.4524 5.3183
Treatment effect 0.1387 0.1071 0.0636 0.0775
Cluster: S˜ (0.0504) (0.0394) (0.0425) (0.0419)
Cluster: S˜, firm (0.0580) (0.0524) (0.0490) (0.0706)
S ∈ T ± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 12
Polynomial order in (S − T ) 1 1 1 2
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (S − T ) No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (S − T ) No Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · Da Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · S˜ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · S˜ ·Da Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 220,187 220,187 111,746 220,187
R2 0.3859 0.4574 0.4651 0.4574
Adjusted R2 0.3854 0.4568 0.4639 0.4568
Notes: a The interaction term between the threshold dummies and the treatment indicator
D is calculated with threshold dummies demeaned by E[Threshold dummyj |D = 1]. , ,
 denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
from other firms.24
Table 3.6 provides information on the separate effects of DPEA on workers of different
types. Column 1 in table 3.6 displays the baseline effect at the quota threshold T = 25 (we
repeat the estimate in column 3 of table 3.3 for ease of comparison). Results in column 2
suggest that quota threshold firms employ 0.0239 more disabled workers who had already
been working for the firm before becoming recognized as disabled. This means that about 64
% of the baseline treatment effect at the quota threshold goes to workers who were already
employed by their current employer. The resulting excess employment likely reflects the role of
DPEA in increasing retention of existing employees. Whether the retention effect represents an
increase in total employment is not clear. Firms may be relabeling existing workers. We think,
however, that this retention effect implies an increase in employment of disabled individuals
rather than just a relabeling of existing workers. First, the process of acquiring the status
of a severely disabled worker is an involved process with a detailed medical assessment of
24Note, however, that these results do not speak about effects on total employment. Retained workers might
have found work elsewhere, and workers who used to work at other firms may trigger new hiring at these other
firms.
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a workers work capacity. Hence relabeling a non-disabled worker as disabled is unlikely to
happen. Second, since acquiring the disability status comes with substantial benefits to firms
and workers, it is unlikely that an effectively disabled worker postpones acquiring the legal
disability status to a date when the firm passes the quota threshold.
Table 3.6: Decomposing the treatment effect by employment status at date of registering as
severely disabled at quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Number of disabled workers
own former other former non-
baseline employees employees employees
Mean 0.3081 0.1688 0.0940 0.0453
Standard deviation 0.7064 0.5069 0.3253 0.2377
Treatment effect 0.0373 0.0239 0.0127 0.0007
Cluster: S (0.0075) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0022)
Cluster: S, firm (0.0091) (0.0055) (0.0026) (0.0031)
S ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (S − 25) 1 1 1 1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (S − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (S − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 183,678 183,678 183,678 183,678
R2 0.0517 0.0588 0.0328 0.0126
Adjusted R2 0.0512 0.0583 0.0323 0.0121
Percentage w.r.t. total effect 100 64 34 2
Notes: Own former employees are individuals who had been employed with same employer at date
of registering as severely disabled. Other former employees are workers who had been employed with
another employer at date of registering as severely disabled. Non-employees are workers who had not
been employed at date of registering as severely disabled. , ,  denotes significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations,
based on ASSD and FWO
Results in column 3 indicate that quota firms tend to have 0.0127 more employees on their
payrolls who had been employed in different firms when becoming recognized as disabled. This
means that up to 34 % of the treatment effect is generated by reallocating workers from other
firms to firms at the quota threshold. Results in column 4 indicate that threshold firms’ excess
employment is not generated by increased hiring from the non-employment pool.
3.5.6 Policy Changes
So far, we have looked at the baseline period from January 1999 to June 2001 (period 2),
when the non-compliance tax was roughly e 150, the probationary period amounted to three
months and there was no bonus for over-compliance (see section 3.2 for details). Now we turn
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to the preceding and subsequent time period, which differ in important ways with respect the
regulations in place.
First, we turn to the time period from July 1996 to December 1998 (period 1). This
period was characterized by the presence of a bonus for over-compliance. Firms that over-
complied with the employment quota were awarded a bonus in the amount of e 52–76 for
each excessive disabled worker and the probationary period for disabled workers was shorter
than in our baseline period. The real value of the non-compliance tax for firms hiring at
or above the non-disabled firm size of 25 remained unchanged. The column in the middle
of 3.7 repeats for the sake of convenience the result for the baseline period for the quota
threshold T = 25. Column (1) of table 3.7 shows the result for the preceding period where
firms who provided a job to a disabled worker even if they did not have to received a bonus.
The estimated discontinuity is with 0.0244 only two-third as big as in the baseline period.
The bonus for over-compliance creates incentives for firms that are below the quota threshold
to hire a disabled instead of a non-disabled worker, thus increasing the number of disabled
workers hired in the absence of the non-compliance tax. In contrast, firms that are above the
quota threshold are unaffected by the bonus in the sense that they need to hire a disabled
worker in order to avoid becoming subject to the tax. This shift leads to a smaller discontinuity
in the number of disabled workers at threshold T = 25.
Second, we turn to the time period from July 2001 to December 2003 (period 3). This time
period is characterized by a higher non-compliance tax (and a longer probationary period) as
compared to the baseline period. Column (3) of table 3.7 reports the result. The estimated
discontinuity is substantially larger than that of the baseline period. A higher tax generates
stronger incentives for firms to hire a disabled instead of a non-disabled worker.
Column 4 pools the entire time period from July 1996 to December 2003 and with full
interactions with a dummy for period 1 and period 3. Results indicate that the difference
between period 2 and 3 is statistically significant at least at the 10%-level (irrespectively of
the type of standard error). Note that this finding is also in line with Wuellrich (2010) (see
chapter 4) who finds that the increase in the non-compliance tax had a positive impact on
firms’ demand for disabled workers. In contrast, the difference between the effect of the non-
compliance tax in the period without bonus (column 2) and the period with bonus (column
1) is not significant if simultaneous clustering on firm and firm size is performed.
3.5.7 Wage Determination for Disabled Workers
The existing evidence suggests that threshold firms do react to financial incentives. A key
element shaping demand for disabled workers is the wage paid to disabled workers. The DPEA
states that disabled workers must be offered the same contract as non-disabled workers. This
implies that firms can not set wages for job entrants differently for disabled and non-disabled
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workers. But firms may affect wage growth within firms through promotion decisions. This
section therefore provides an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the wages of disabled
workers.
The analysis is based on 866,705 male workers (16,422 disabled and 850,283 non-disabled
workers) on August 1, 2000.25 We split this sample into white- and blue-collar workers. We
regress the logarithm of the daily wage (in e) on a dummy for being disabled and tenure
holding constant work experience (and its square), schooling (and its square), age (and its
square), firm location, and industry.
Panel A of table 3.8 displays the results for male white-collar workers. Column (1) shows
the baseline result. Disabled workers earn 5.4 % less than non-disabled workers. Column (2)
fully interacts the dummy for being disabled with all covariates. The wage differential between
disabled and non-disabled workers becomes larger amounting to 14.8 %. Moreover, column
(2) shows that disabled workers are significantly less remunerated for each year of tenure (this
differential persists until a tenure of 12 years). This suggests that disabled workers either
are less promoted or sort into jobs with worse prospects. Column (3) sheds light on the
starting wages by only considering workers with tenure of less than 3 months. The coefficient
of the dummy for being disabled is not statistically different from zero indicating that disabled
workers receive the same starting wage as non-disabled workers. Column (4) and (5) show
results for a tenure of three months to five years and for more than five years. Consistent with
the pattern of existing results, the wage differential becomes larger the more years of tenure a
worker has accumulated.
Panel B of table 3.8 reports the results for male blue-collar workers. The baseline effect in
column (1) amounts to -11.0 %, a magnitude almost twice as large as shown in column (1) of
Panel A. This is a plausible finding if we account for the fact that jobs of blue-collar workers
are physically more demanding. It is therefore more difficult for disabled workers to conduct
the tasks as well as non-disabled workers for these kind of jobs. Column (2) furthermore
shows that years of tenure are less compensated for disabled workers. Again, disabled workers
seem to be less promoted than non-disabled workers. In contrast to panel (A), column (4)
of panel B reveals that there are significant differences in the starting wage between disabled
and non-disabled workers. Disabled workers are offered a starting wage that is 12.0 % lower
than that of non-disabled workers. The difference remains large also for individuals with more
years of tenure (see column (4) and (5)).
For white-collar workers, we find that entry-wages of disabled workers do not differ sig-
nificantly from those of the non-disabled. Yet wage progression within firms appears to be
different for disabled workers than non-disabled workers – a pattern of results that is consistent
25We focus on men because the data do not contain information on hours and men typically tend to work
full time.
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with firms aiming to undo the productivity disadvantage of disabled workers over time. The
situation is somewhat different for disabled blue-collar workers whose wage-tenure profile is
significantly below those of their non-disabled co-workers already at when they start at their
current firm.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the effect of an employment quota in promoting employment for disabled
workers. While there is a considerable literature on the effects of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion, convincing causal evidence of employment quota systems is almost non-existent. Our
study makes a first attempt to understand the role of employment quota for disabled workers
in shaping the marginal firm’s demand for disabled employment. This analysis complements
existing evidence on anti-discrimination legislation.
The identification strategy relies on the sharp discontinuity in the relative costs of employ-
ing disabled workers created in a quota system combined with taxes raised on firms that do
not comply with legal employment requirements. This design is a priori not a valid regression
discontinuity design because firms may decide not to hire a non-disabled worker to avoid being
subject to the tax. We discuss this issue in a simple behavioral framework and find that firms
may manipulate threshold location but to only to a weak extent, and manipulation leads to a
downward bias on the causal effect of non-compliance taxation. Moreover, our extensive set
of manipulation checks finds no evidence for manipulation of the non-disabled workforce due
to the employment quota. Thus we argue that applying a regression discontinuity design is a
valid identification strategy in this study.
Results indicate that the quota promotes the employment of disabled workers in firms
located at the quota threshold compared to the situation where the quota were increased by
one worker. The quota leads to excess employment of 0.04 or loosely speaking one disabled
worker per 25 threshold firms. We also detect important interactions between wages and
firm size. Firms in the lower tail of the firm wage distribution tend to provide most of
the excess employment to disabled workers. The employment quota leads to twice as much
excess employment among large firms rather than among small firms (this effect is imprecisely
estimated). We also find that the quota boosts employment primarily among former employees
of the firm. The quota also encourages firms to poach workers from other firms but not
individuals who were not formerly employed.
We conclude that the financial sanctions accompanying the employment quota do indeed
increase compliance with the quota. This is a first result that is necessary for the quota to
promote overall employment for disabled workers. We also show that the quota employment
effect is not entirely due to reallocation of disabled workers between firms. Taken together,
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these results suggest that overall disabled employment may increase due to the employment
quota. However, the employment quota may also displace non-disabled workers leading to
ambiguous effects on overall employment. Further research should therefore put emphasis on
evaluating this policy instrument in other contexts and compare the relative effectiveness of
quota with anti-discrimination legislation.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the editor, Stefano Della Vigna, and three anonymous referees for
comments that helped substantially improve an earlier version of this study circulated with
the title ”Do Financial Incentives for Firms Promote Employment of Disabled Workers? A Re-
gression Discontinuity Approach”. Josh Angrist, David Autor, Dan Hamermesh, Bo Honore´,
Andrea Ichino, Andreas Kuhn, Michael Lechner, Enrico Moretti, Oliver Ruf, Ian Walker,
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and seminar participants at the labor seminar in
Engelberg (organized by the University of Zurich), at the University of Basel, at the Univer-
sity of St. Gallen, at the Royal Holloway University of London, at the University of Lausanne,
at the University of Zurich, and at the EALE 2007 in Oslo provided helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this study. We thank Dr. Hofer, Ministry of Social Affairs,
Vienna, and Dr. Konrad, Bundesrechenamt Vienna, for giving us access to the data. This
study was funded by the Austrian National Bank (“Jubila¨umsfonds”, grant no. 12327). Fi-
nancial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. PBZHP1-133428) and
the “Forschungskredit” of the University of Zurich is also gratefully acknowledged. Finally,
we would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Philippe Ruh.
88
3.6. Conclusion Demand for Disabled Workers I
T
ab
le
3.
7:
T
h
e
eff
ec
t
of
th
e
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
q
u
ot
a
on
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
d
is
ab
le
d
w
or
ke
rs
p
er
fi
rm
fo
r
d
iff
er
en
t
ti
m
e
p
er
io
d
s
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
is
a
b
le
d
w
or
ke
rs
J
u
ly
1
9
9
6
–
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
9
–
J
u
ly
2
0
0
1
–
J
u
ly
1
9
9
6
–
D
ec
em
b
er
1
9
9
8
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
1
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
3
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
3
–
M
ea
n
0
.2
73
5
0.
30
81
0.
33
73
0.
3
0
7
0
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
0
.6
43
5
0.
70
64
0.
77
01
0.
7
1
0
5
T
re
a
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
0
.0
24
4
0.
03
73
0.
06
07
0.
0
3
7
3
C
lu
st
er
:
S
(0
.0
05
4)



(0
.0
07
5)



(0
.0
09
4
)


(0
.0
0
7
5
)


C
lu
st
er
:
S
,
fi
rm
(0
.0
06
1)



(0
.0
09
1)



(0
.0
10
3
)


(0
.0
0
9
1
)


T
re
a
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
·P
er
io
d
1
−0
.0
1
2
9
C
lu
st
er
:
S
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
C
lu
st
er
:
S
,
fi
rm
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
T
re
a
tm
en
t
eff
ec
t
·P
er
io
d
3
0
.0
2
3
4
C
lu
st
er
:
S
(0
.0
1
0
5
)

C
lu
st
er
:
S
,
fi
rm
(0
.0
1
3
9
)
S
∈
25
±
h
h
=
6
h
=
6
h
=
6
h
=
6
P
ol
y
n
o
m
ia
l
or
d
er
in
(S
−
25
)
1
1
1
1
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
·(
S
−
25
)
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
e
fi
x
ed
–
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
e
fi
x
ed
–
eff
ec
ts
·(
S
−
25
)
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1
7
9
,9
6
8
1
8
3
,6
7
8
1
9
2
,9
5
3
5
5
6
,5
9
9
R
2
0.
05
00
0.
05
17
0.
04
65
0.
0
5
0
4
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
04
95
0.
05
12
0.
04
60
0.
0
4
9
9
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
n
o
n
-c
o
m
p
li
a
n
ce
ta
x
(i
n
e
)
14
2
–
14
6
14
8
–
15
0
19
6
–
B
o
n
u
s
fo
r
ov
er
-c
o
m
p
ly
in
g
(i
n
e
)
52
–
7
6
n
/
a
n
/
a
–
P
ro
b
a
ti
o
n
a
ry
p
er
io
d
(i
n
m
o
n
th
s)
1
3
6
–
N
o
te
s:



,


,

d
en
o
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1%
,
5
%
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
o
u
rc
e:
O
w
n
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s,
b
a
se
d
o
n
A
S
S
D
a
n
d
F
W
O
89
3.6. Conclusion Demand for Disabled Workers I
Table 3.8: Wages for disabled workers (men only; reference date: 08.2000)
logarithm of daily wage (in e)
fully tenure < tenure ∈ tenure ≥
baseline interacted .25 years [.25, 5) years 5 years
Panel A: White–collar workers (men only)
Mean 4.4871 4.4871 4.2529 4.4042 4.5534
Standard deviation 0.3966 0.3966 0.5416 0.4554 0.3228
Disabled worker −0.0541 −0.1476 −0.0390 −0.0374 −0.0592
(0.0047) (0.0229) (0.0348) (0.0091) (0.0049)
Tenure (in 10 years) 0.1648 0.1653
(0.0068) (0.0067)
Tenure2 (in 10 years) −0.0405 −0.0406
(0.0022) (0.0022)
Disabled worker · tenure −0.0347
(0.0058)
Disabled worker · tenure2 0.0149
(0.0057)
Number of Obs. 378,516 378,516 15,788 163,195 242,228
R2 0.1709 0.1717 0.1248 0.1233 0.1419
Adjusted R2 0.1709 0.1716 0.1238 0.1232 0.1418
Panel B: Blue–collar workers (men only)
Mean 4.1658 4.1658 3.9502 4.0887 4.2372
Standard deviation 0.3878 0.3878 0.4587 0.4151 0.3392
Disabled worker −0.1099 −0.2857 −0.1199 −0.1400 −0.1036
(0.0086) (0.0345) (0.0272) (0.0113) (0.0101)
Tenure (in 10 years) 0.1505 0.1499
(0.0124) (0.0119)
Tenure2 (in 10 years) −0.0414 −0.0413
(0.0051) (0.0049)
Disabled worker · tenure −0.0220
(0.0094)
Disabled worker · tenure2 0.0181
(0.0089)
Number of Obs. 477,536 477,536 30,162 201,402 300,822
R2 0.2053 0.2071 0.1327 0.1734 0.1503
Adjusted R2 0.2052 0.2070 0.1322 0.1733 0.1503
Notes: The interaction terms between tenure, experience, age, and schooling with the
dummy for being a disabled worker is calculated with their respective values demeaned by
E[tenure, experience, schooling, age | disabled worker = 1] in column 2. All regressions control
for schooling, experience, age, firm location, and industry. Sample used for this analysis: male
workers (reference date: 08.2000). , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on firm). Source: Own
Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
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CHAPTER 4
The Effects of Increasing Financial Incentives for Firms
to Promote Employment of Disabled Workers
This chapter has been published in Economics Letters, Volume 107, Issue 2, May 2010, Pages
173-176.
4.1 Introduction
Policies that promote the employment of severely disabled individuals rank high on the policy
agenda in many countries. The reason for that is that the labor market prospects of severely
disabled individuals is highly unfavorable and the size of this particular group is at the same
time far from being of minor importance (for more details see OECD, 2003). In one-third of
all OECD countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Poland, and
Spain, policy is based on a mandatory employment quota. According to such regulations,
employers are obliged to have a certain proportion of disabled individuals among their staff,
ranging from 2% in Spain to 7% in Italy . In case of non-compliance, employers are usually due
to pay a tax per month for each place not filled, ranging from 0.25–4% of the monthly pay-roll
of firms. However, the compliance rate only amounts to 50%, ranging from 25% in Spain to
67% in France. The main issue in current political discussion concerning such employment
quotas is whether the tax is simply too low to provide sufficient financial incentives for firms
to hire disabled workers. Not surprisingly, there is a strong call for increasing the tax.
This study investigates whether the unique tax increase from e 150 to e 196 in July 2001 in
the context of the Austrian employment quota promoted the employment of disabled workers.
I propose to identify the causal effect of this 30% tax increase on firms’ demand for disabled
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workers using the interrupted time-series approach (assessing the immediate as well as the
short-run impact). This approach is appealing and in the present context superior to the
difference-in-difference approach since a valid control group is unavailable. One particularly
attractive feature of this study is very large and comprehensive data from the Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD) and the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO). The combination
of these two data sets allows me to determine the number of disabled and non-disabled workers
each Austrian firm employs over time.
There are only very few economic studies that evaluate the effects of employment quotas
for disabled workers on their employment.1 Lalive et al. (2009) provide recent evidence on
the effect of the Austrian employment quota shortly before the tax increase in Austria. They
find that one out of twenty firms employs one disabled worker more than it would without the
employment quota.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview on
the institutional situation in Austria. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 outlines the
empirical strategy and section 4.5 presents the results and their discussion.
4.2 Background
The employment quota in Austria is the main element of the Disabled Persons Employment
Act (DPEA), which constitutes the most important instrument in the Austrian legal system
to enhance the labor market opportunities of severely disabled individuals. It obliges firms to
hire one disabled per 25 non-disabled workers. Firms that do not comply with this obligation
are subject to a tax of currently e 213 per month and non-hired disabled worker (i.e. the tax
acts as an implicit tax on hiring a non-disabled worker if a disabled worker would be required
by the DPEA).2 About two-third of all Austrian firms fully comply with this requirement. The
tax was steadily increased from e 118 in 1990 to e 150 in June 2001 according to a inflation-
based measure. On July 1, 2001, however, there was a unique and considerable increase in
the amount of e 46 to e 196. Henceforth, it was again gradually increased. This 30% tax
1Most previous studies on employment of disabled workers relate to general anti-discrimination legislation.
For the U.S. context see e.g. DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Beegle and Stock (2003), Kruse
and Schur (2003), Jolls and Prescott (2004), Jolls (2004), for the U.K. context see e.g. Bell and Heitmueller
(2009), and for Germany’s anti-discrimination legislation see e.g. Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2009) and
Verick (2004).
2The DPEA also defines how the revenues collected through non-compliance taxes are to be spent. The
main beneficiaries are firms (and their disabled employees) who actually offer employment to disabled work-
ers. These subsidies, either in form of allowances or loans, support those firms which employ at least one
disabled worker. In particular, they are granted for adequate workplace accommodation, wage subsidies, work
assistance, occupational retraining, or professional development. Basically, this represents a reallocation of
resources from firms that fail to comply with the quota rule to firms that employ at least one disabled worker
in order to compensate the latter for their effort in employing disabled workers.
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increase amounts to roughly 1.5% of workers’ average monthly salary or 0.19% of firms’ average
monthly pay-roll in the Austrian private sector in 2006.3 The number of disabled individuals
counting for the fulfillment of the quota is non-negligible. It amounted to over 91’000 in 2005
(roughly 2% of the total workforce in Austria).4
4.3 Data
To assess the impact of the tax increase, I use register data from two different sources: (i) the
Austrian Social security database (ASSD)5, which contains detailed information on individuals’
employment history since 1972 together with an unambiguous firm identifier, and (ii) register
data from the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO), which records the disability status
of all disabled individuals. Linking these two data sets allows the accurate calculation of
the number of disabled and non-disabled workers each firm employs. I create a data set with
monthly reference dates from January 1999 to December 2002. I further concentrate on purely
private sector firms. Finally, only firms with a firm size between 5–249 are kept (note that only
0.3 percent of all firms have firm sizes of 250 and above).6 This sample consists of 2,879,025
firm–month observations (104,780 firms). For the main analysis, I use only firms that are
subject to the non–compliance tax (i.e. firms with 25 or more non-disabled workers). This
restricted sample consists of 500,439 firm-month observations (17,017 firms).
4.4 Empirical Strategy
I adopt the interrupted time-series approach (ITSA) (see Cook and Campbell, 1979) to iden-
tify the average treatment effect of the tax increase on the number of disabled workers per
firm. This approach is appealing in the present context since there is no valid control group
available.7 The problem with the commonly used before-after estimator is that potential out-
3Source: Statistics Austria
4The legal status of being disabled is extremely restrictive in the context of the DPEA. The disabled is
approved only if a medical expert of the FWO assesses a degree of physical, mental, intellectual or sensuous
disorder, which reduces work capacity by at least 50 percent.
5See Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the ASSD data.
6For firms with less than 5 employees, employees based firm characteristics are not well defined and are
therefore excluded from the sample.
7For example, a difference-in-difference approach requires a valid control group. The two obvious candidates
for serving as a control group are firms not covered by the DPEA and non-disabled workers. However, both
control groups cannot be used. The former control group is not applicable since the conventional DID estimator
requires that in absence of the treatment, the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed
parallel paths over time. This is implausible in our context as non-treated firms are not obliged to hire any
disabled workers whereas treated firms are, independently of the tax increase. In addition, this issue cannot
be overcome by the recent semi-parametric approach suggested by Abadie (2005) due to the common support
problem regarding the firm size. The latter control group (non-disabled workers) is not applicable since, in the
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comes may change with time, which the ITSA tries to overcome. The idea behind the ITSA
is that past outcomes are the best predictor of future outcomes if the policy change had not
taken place. This prediction allows to calculate the counterfactual number of disabled workers
at the date of the tax increase. The crucial identifying assumptions are that (i) the outcome
variable is continuous in time in the absence of the tax increase, and (ii) the treatment status
is not related to the policy change. The first assumption is plausible since no further policy
changes referring solely to firms with 25 and more non-disabled workers took place in July
2001, which may have affected the outcome variable. The second assumption needs a closer
look. Firms are free to choose their firm size and hence their treatment status. The identifying
assumption fails to hold if firms that would have chosen to employ at least 25 non-disabled
workers without tax increase, did not hire as many workers due to the higher tax in place.
In that case, the average treatment effect is upward biased. Whether or not this assumption
holds is fundamentally untestable. However, I argue that it is only sensible for firms, which are
close to the threshold of 25 non-disabled workers. It is rather unlikely that firms considerably
adjust their firm size in order to avoid being subject to the tax. Moreover, in the presence
of any seasonality the ITSA is sensible to the distribution of calendar month before and after
the policy change. Therefore, I adjust the number of disabled workers per firm for seasonality.
Moreover, I allow the time trend to differ before and after the tax increase. The idea behind
this is as follows. The interruption in the time-series captures the immediate response of firms
to the increased financial incentives to hire disabled workers. However, the overall effect may
be bigger than this interruption actually reveals if some firms sluggishly respond to the tax
increase (e.g firms need time to search and/or to provide workplace accommodation to fill a
job vacancy with a disabled worker, firms may only be able to learn over time whether they
have only temporarily or permanently crossed the quota threshold, or excess employment may
also build up over time due to retention). The short-run effect of the tax increase is captured
by the difference in the time trend before and after the tax increase.
The following linear regression allows to identify the average treatment effect of the tax
increase on the number of disabled workers per firm:
Yi = β0 + β1 · Afteri + β2 · ti + β3 · Afteri · ti + FSD′i · θ +X ′i · α + i,
where Yi denotes the number of disabled workers (adjusted for seasonality). Afteri indicates
whether a firm is observed before or after the policy change. ti ∈ {−30, ..., 0, ..., 17} captures
the time trend (in the baseline specification I assume a linear time trend, but it is extended by
context of the DPEA, firm size is defined as the number of non-disabled workers. Yet, this is an important firm
characteristic by itself that confounds the number of disabled workers per firm (i.e. there is a strong positive
relationship between non-disabled and disabled workers per firm) and at the same time determines whether
a firm is subject to non-compliance taxation. Thus, non-disabled workers cannot be used as control group in
this context either.
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quadratic terms for robustness checks). FSD′i is a vector of firm size dummies and X
′
i includes
control variables such as firm age, firm location, firm’s industry affiliation, the number of
non-disabled apprentices, characteristics of firm’s average non-disabled workers (age, share of
white-collar workers, share of women), and the median log daily wage paid to its non-disabled
employees. The parameters of main interest are β1, which measures the immediate response
of the tax increase on the number of disabled workers, and β3, which measures the short-run
response to the tax increase, i.e. the change in the time trend after the tax increase.
4.5 Results and Discussion
I begin with providing some descriptive evidence. Figure 4.1 displays firms’ average number
of disabled workers (adjusted for seasonality, FSDi, and Xi) and superimposes a linear time
trend (dashed lines) before and after the tax increase (the dashed vertical line denotes the date
of the tax increase). We see that there is an interruption in the time trend at the date of the
tax increase. Moreover, we see that whereas the slope of the time trend is literally zero before
the tax increase, it has an strong upward trend after the tax increase. These two features
provide strong evidence that the 30%–increase in the non-compliance tax had an immediate
as well as short–run impact on firms’ demand for disabled workers.
Figure 4.1: The number of disabled workers (adjusted for seasonality, FDIi, and Xi) over
time
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Table 4.1 shows the econometric results.8 First, I discuss the immediate response to the
tax increase. Column (1) displays the result for the linear fit in ti. The immediate response
amounts to 0.0202 and is statistically significant at the 1%-level. This means that firms employ
0.0202 disabled workers more than they would in the absence of the tax increase, which is in
terms of the average number of disabled workers a 1.9% increase. Put differently, roughly one
in 50 firms employs one disabled worker more due to tax increase. Adding quadratic terms in
ti does not change the results much. It only makes the effect with 0.0323 more pronounced
(column (2)). Column (3) performs the same analysis as column (1), but keeps only firms
with at least 31 non-disabled workers (see discussion on endogeneity of firm size in section
4.4). It turns out that the effect does not alter as compared to column (1). Controlling for
firm fixed effects in columns (5)–(7) does not change the results with respect to the immediate
responses. With the linear specification of the time trend (column (5)), it amounts to 0.0255
and increases to 0.0367 when adding quadratic terms in ti (column (6)). Column (7) shows
that the result is again very robust to the exclusion of the firms with 25–30 non-disabled
workers.
Second, I look at the short-run responses of firms to the tax increase. It turns out that
the time trend significantly changes after the tax had been increased (expect for column (1)).
The slope of the linear time trend increases by 0.0023 (column (5)). This means that roughly
one in about 450 firms decide to employ one disabled worker more each month as a response
to the tax increase, i.e. they indeed sluggishly respond to the tax increase. In column (6)
– with a quadratic time trend – the slope in the time trend increases by 0.0035 in the first
month and exhibits no statistically different decrease over time. Again, the results are robust
to the exclusion of firms with 25–30 non-disabled workers. Columns (5)–(7) provide strong
evidence that the time trend changes after the tax increase. Columns (1)–(3) (without firm
8In order to assess the validity of the empirical design and the robustness of the results, I performed two
additional analyses. First, I run several placebo regressions. The procedure is as follows. I restrict the sample
to the time before the tax increase (January 1999 – June 2001), a sample that contains 311,480 firm-month
observations. Then I run nine placebo regressions (linear time trend) using pseudo dates for the tax increase,
which are in the center of this time-frame (December 1999 – August 2000). This choice ensures that I have
a sound number of firm-month observations on either side of these pseudo dates. The results are as follows.
Only one coefficient is statistically different from zero, but with a magnitude that is a third smaller than
the estimate in column (1) of Table 4.1 (0.01324 vs. 0.02017) and with a p-value 5 times as large (0.034 vs.
0.007). None of the remaining 8 coefficients is statistically significant at the 5%-level (though four of them are
marginally significant at the 10%-level) and all of them are considerably smaller than the estimate at the true
date. The fact that the interruption in the time-series for the true date is larger than for any of the placebo
dates (December 1999 – August 2000) and that its p-value is by far the smallest supports the plausibility of
the empirical design. Second, I also checked whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the dependent
variable. Instead of using the number of disabled workers per firm, I could also have defined the dependent
variable as the percentage of disabled relative to non-disabled workers in each firm. The results do neither
qualitatively nor quantitatively change much. This sensitivity check suggests that it is unlikely that the results
are driven by a misspecification in the relationship between the dependent variable and the time trend since
there is no obvious reason why the results should be similar irrespectively of the choice of the dependent
variable using the same specification.
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fixed-effects) show similar results.
It is of clear policy importance (as an anonymous referee suggested) whether the positive
effect of the tax increase for firms being subject to non-compliance taxation is offset by a
decrease in the number of disabled workers in firms not covered by the DPEA (e.g. if disabled
workers are simply lured away from small firms instead of being hired from non-employment).
I investigate this issue in columns (4) and (8), in which also firms with firm size ∈ [5, 24] are
included. In these specifications I interact the immediate as well as the short-run effect with an
indicator function for firms not covered by the DPEA (= I(firm size < 25)). The results are as
follows. The immediate response for firms being subject to the non-compliance tax is 0.01837
in column (4) (without firm fixed effects) and 0.02902 in column (8) (with firm fixed effects),
in each instance a value that is very close to the magnitude found in columns (1) and (5)
respectively. The interaction term between the immediate response and an indicator function
for firms not being subject to non-compliance taxation are of the same absolute magnitude as
the effect for firms subject to non-compliance taxation, but with opposite sign. This suggests
that there is no negative immediate impact for firms with less than 25 non-disabled workers
that offsets the positive impact for firms with 25 or more employees. The exact same pattern
is found for the short-run impact. This strongly supports the view that the tax increase has
indeed a positive overall impact on the number of employed disabled workers.
To sum up and taking column (5) (linear time trend and firm fixed effects) as my preferred
specification, I provide strong evidence that the tax increase led to a immediate as well as
short-run response of firms covered by the DPEA. This impact is not offset by firms not
covered by the DPEA. The immediate response of firms amounts to 0.0255, meaning that one
in 40 firms employ one disabled more than they would without the tax increase (in terms of
the average number of disabled workers, this is a 2.5% increase). After 18 month, and taking
the short-run response into account, the effect amounts to 0.0669 (= 0.0255 + 18 · 0.0023).
Thus, by the end of 2002, one in 15 firms employs one disabled more due to the tax increase
(in terms of the average number of disabled workers, this is a 6.4% increase). This suggests
that firms’ elasticity of substitution between disabled and non-disabled workers equals 2.67
(= 6.4/2.4).9 This high substitutability is not surprising in the context of the DPEA. Recall
that firms can recover the costs associated with the employment of a disabled worker (see
section 4.2) and thus the productivity gap between disabled and non-disabled workers should
not differ much. I conclude that the tax increase considerably increased firms’ demand for
disabled workers and thus policy makers aiming at boosting employment of disabled workers
should favor a further rise in the non-compliance tax.
9The average monthly wage firms pay to their workers is e 1953. Accordingly, in terms of the average
monthly wage, the increase in the non-compliance tax by e 46 amounts to 2.4%.
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CHAPTER 5
Recessions Are Bad for Workplace Safety
Joint with Jan van Ours, Jan Boone, and Josef Zweimu¨ller
5.1 Introduction
Many workers face the risk of being involved in a workplace accident.1 For instance, in the
EU-15 in 2004 there were around 4 million occupational accidents leading to more than 3
days’ absence from work, which is equivalent to an accident rate of 3.2%. The total number of
accidents, including those which did not involve absence from work amounted to 6.4 million,
equivalent to an accident rate of 5.3%.2 The incidence of fatal accidents was 3.8 per 100,000
workers. Finally, annually around 140 million working days are lost due to non-fatal accidents.
The accidents at work are estimated to cause annually costs of 55 billion Euros in EU-15,
mostly due to lost working time.
Workplace accidents seem to be related to workplace safety, but cyclical fluctuations in
workplace accidents are puzzling from an economic point of view. There are only few studies
that address this question. Kossoris (1938) is a very early reference to the pro-cyclical pattern
1According to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work a workplace accident is defined as
a “discrete occurrence in the course of work, which leads to physical or mental harm”. A fatal accident is
defined as an accident, which leads to the death of a victim within 1 year (after the day) of the accident. The
statistical information presented here is from European Commission (2008).
2There is a wide variation in the seriousness of the workplace accidents. Of all accidents in 2004, for 37%
of accidents there was no absence from work or only up to three days, for 30% the absence was more than
three days but less than two weeks and for 29% the absence was between two weeks and three months. Finally,
the remaining 4% of accidents concerned an absence of three months or more, or permanent partial or total
disability.
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in accident rates. Fairris (1998) shows that in the U.S., manufacturing injury rates are pro-
cyclical. Shea (1990) suggests that variables such as overtime, hiring and firing rates, the
share of non-production workers, and the investment-to-capital ratio may affect the accident
rate over the business cycle. If firms require more hours worked from employees in booms and
less in recessions, then hours worked will be pro-cyclical and the accident rate (per worker)
positively correlated with aggregate fluctuations in the economy.
It seems obvious that workplace accidents are pro-cyclical because effort and hours of
work are negatively related to unemployment and high effort makes accidents more likely.3
However, Boone and Van Ours (2006) provide an alternative explanation related to reporting
behavior. Their idea is that in times of high unemployment workers are reluctant to report
workplace accidents because they fear – correctly or incorrectly – that employers will hold
this against them.4 If they are fired in a recession, it will take them a long time to find a
new job. Hence the worker prefers not to report an accident. One way to distinguish between
the two explanations is to study cyclical fluctuations in fatal workplace accidents. If cycles in
workplace safety drive the cycles in workplace accidents this should also be the case for fatal
accidents, which are always reported. If reporting behavior of workers is relevant then fatal
accidents should not be affected by the unemployment rate or changes in the unemployment
rate. Using annual aggregate data from OECD countries Boone and Van Ours (2006) find
that non-fatal workplace accidents are inversely related to the unemployment rate, while fatal
accident rates do not seem to be related to labor market conditions, which suggests that
workplace accidents are indeed influenced by reporting behavior.
This chapter studies cyclical fluctuations in workplace accidents using micro data. We
have information on workplace accidents of male blue-collar workers from Austrian matched
worker-firm data over the period 2000-2006. Our unique data allow us to investigate in great
detail how economic incentives influence reporting of workplace accidents. The chapter is set
up as follows. In Section 5.2 we present a theoretical model that explains the accident reporting
behavior of individual workers. Workers are heterogeneous with respect to accident proneness
and an accident reveals the innate probability of a worker to experience an accident. Workers
report accidents because once reported firms invest in prevention. We show that workers
become less eager to report accidents the higher the probability that the firm needs to fire a
worker because then it may be more profitable for a firm to fire the worker rather than invest
3Ruhm (2000) finds a strong relationship between macroeconomic conditions and mortality, which he at-
tributes to hazardous working conditions, the physical exertion of employment, and job-related stress when
job hours are extended during short-lasting economic expansions.
4OECD (1989) notes that among social and psychological factors which influence workplace accidents
statistics that “workers may not report injuries because they fear loss of attendance bonuses, or other personal
disadvantages, such as becoming prime candidates for redundancy”. Brooker et al. (1997) finding that back
pain claim rates go down as unemployment goes up mention as possible explanation for this phenomenon that
individuals choose to under-report claims during recessionary periods because they fear losing their jobs.
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in prevention. We also show that more serious accidents are more often reported because
the prevention of such accidents is more important for a worker. Section 5.3 describes the
data on workplace accidents from our Austrian dataset. Section 5.4 presents some stylized
facts, discusses the statistical model and presents estimation results. We find that workers
who reported an accident in a particular period of time are more likely to be fired later on.
Apparently, when deciding about whom to fire in case of a negative demand shock employers
take the accident history of workers into account. And, we find support for the idea that
recessions have a disciplinary effect concerning the reporting of workplace accidents: if workers
think the probability of dismissals at the firm level is high, they are less likely to report a
moderate accident. For severe accidents we find no such effect. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theory
We introduce a model in which workers who experience a work-related accident can decide
whether to report the accident or not. If a worker reports the accident, the firm will make an
investment to accommodate the workplace that reduces the probability of an accident to this
worker in the next period. To see more precisely what we have in mind, consider the example
of a nurse working in a hospital. One of her tasks is to lift people out of bed and help them
into their wheelchair. Using the correct lifting techniques this can be done without causing
back problems. However, the patient may lose his balance causing the nurse to overstretch her
back. As a result, the nurse may (or may not) hurt her back. Having observed this accident,
the firm may decide that the nurse is no longer allowed to lift patients out of bed on her own
but instead has to get help from a colleague (or the beds of her patients are fitted with a
device that facilitates lifting them).
More generally, think of a firm that obeys the general safety regulation rules and imple-
ments all accident prevention investments that are profitable to do for everyone. Nevertheless
the firm may be willing to incur and additional cost that accommodates the individual’s work-
place once the firm has got additional information on the worker’s individual accident risk. Of
course, such workplace accommodation measures will be profitable for accident-prone workers
but may not be profitable for workers with a small (individual) accident risk.
This is the main difference with the model in Boone and Van Ours (2006) where reporting
an accident leads to a compensation (that varies with the severity of the accident) to the
worker. In the model below, reporting the accident leads to investments to prevent future
accidents. This makes the welfare analysis more interesting. Whereas there can only be
under-reporting of accidents in Boone and Van Ours (2006), in the model below there can also
be over-reporting of accidents.
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5.2.1 Positive Analysis
Consider a two period model. In the first period, a firm has two workers. If an accident
happens, a worker can report the accident by the end of the period. To simplify the exposition,
assume that accidents are verifiable, once reported. Hence it does not make sense to report an
accident that did not happen. At the end of the first period there is an (exogenous) probability
δ that demand for the firm’s products falls which forces firm is forced to fire one of the two
employees. Once the firm knows whether a worker stays or not, it can decide on worker-specific
accident-prevention measures.
We assume that workers differ in type q ∈ [0, 1] where q denotes the innate probability of a
worker to experience an accident. This probability q is distributed with density (distribution)
function f(q)(F (q)). Before an accident happens, neither the worker, nor the firm knows q,
only the distribution of q. If an accident happens, the worker experiences (expected) damage
αw and the firm αf . We assume that the damage is independent of a worker’s type. After the
accident happened, the worker (but not the firm) learns q. The worker learns how likely he is
to have a (similar) accident in the next period. While, after an accident, the worker’s q is not
observable the firm, the firm updates its beliefs about the worker’s q.5,6
The firm can invest γ in worker specific prevention of the accident. After the investment,
the probability that type q is involved in an accident is denoted by qγ ≤ q where we assume
that
d(q − qγ)
dq
> 0 (5.1)
The prevention technology leads to a bigger fall in the accident probability for more accident
prone workers. Basically, there is more to gain for high q workers.7 We assume that it is not
profitable to invest in the accident prevention technology for every worker:
E(q − qγ)αf ≶ γ (5.2)
5Assuming that the worker learns q (perfectly) simplifies notation. The important feature is that the
worker’s posterior distribution of q is more informative than the firm’s posterior.
6In fact, after the accident the firm would like to learn q. One way to screen workers on q after the accident
is to offer them a choice between receiving an amount of money (“bribe”) or the firm investing in safety
measures. To the best of our knowledge, offering such a choice to workers is illegal.
7To illustrate things, consider again the nurse in the hospital. The patient may lose his balance causing the
nurse to overstretch her back with probability λ. Given that this situation arises, the nurse’s has individual
probability q˜ that she hurts her back, hence the ex-ante probability of an accident is q = λq˜. After the accident
the nurse knows whether her back is likely to be strained again in a similar future situation (q˜ close to 1).
Alternatively, she may have hurt herself at home the day before which weakened her back. Therefore, although
she hurt her back in this incident she is unlikely to get hurt in a similar situation in the future. When the
hospital decides that the nurse is no longer allowed to lift patients out of bed on her own but has to get help
from a colleague, the probability of ending up in a hazardous situation is reduced from λ to λγ < λ. Indeed
we find that d((λ− λγ)q˜)/dq˜ > 0 in this example.
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where E(q) =
∫
qdF (q) denotes the (prior) expected probability of an accident.
Now consider the case where a worker has reported an accident. The posterior distribution
is then given by
f(q|A) = qf(q)∫ 1
0
tdF (t)
(5.3)
We assume that it is profitable to invest in prevention, once a worker has reported an accident:
E(q − qγ|A)αf > γ (5.4)
where E(q|A) = ∫ qdF (q|A). In words, once a worker has reported an accident, the firm knows
that the worker is accident prone and investment in prevention becomes profitable. This effect
gives an incentive for a worker to report an accident (see below). Note that the firm makes
its investment decision without knowing q for the worker since q is not revealed to the firm.
We also assume that it is not profitable to replace a worker who has reported an accident in
the first period. Let C denote the firing and rehiring cost. It is assumed that, a worker who
produces surplus y and receives wage w, we always have
y − w − γ − E(qγ|A)αf > −C + y − w − E(q)αf . (5.5)
That is, investing γ and reducing the probability of an accident is more profitable than invest-
ing search cost C and employing a new worker who has an accident with expected probability
E(q).
If a worker loses the job, he or she receives b < w as expected value of being unemployed.
This consists of a probability of finding a new job in the next period8 and unemployment
benefit if no other job is found. We assume that a worker prefers to stay in his job at the start
of the first period:
w − E(q)αw > b (5.6)
Similarly, every type q prefers to stay in the second period, if the firm invests in prevention:
w − qγαw > b (5.7)
for each type qγ. In other words, no worker voluntarily quits after reporting an accident.
Now consider the worker’s incentive to report an accident in the first period. On the one
hand, reporting the accident has a potential benefit to the worker. If the accident is reported,
it is optimal for the firm (equation (5.4)) to invest in workplace accommodation which reduces
the accident probability for the worker from q to qγ. On the other hand, reporting the accident
8To ease notation, we assume that the probability of having an accident in the next job –in case the worker
is fired– does not depend on a worker’s current q. That is, q is specific to the worker-firm match.
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has also a potential cost. If the firm is hit by a negative demand shock (which happens with
probability δ), the firm is better off firing the worker. (If either none or two workers reported
an accident, the firm is indifferent in firing either employee. In that case, an employee is
chosen with probability 1
2
.9)
Given that a worker is the only one who experienced an accident in the first period, his
expected pay off from reporting is given by
δb+ (1− δ)(w − qγαw) (5.8)
If the negative shock hits the firm, it will fire the worker who has reported the accident, save
on the accommodation expenditure γ and get a lower probability of future accidents for the
remaining worker (as E(q|A) > E(q)). If the worker is fired, he receives b < w. If the worker
does not report the accident, his pay off equals
1
2
δb+ (1− 1
2
δ)(w − qαw) (5.9)
Hence a worker reports if and only if the expression in equation (5.8) exceeds (5.9); which can
be rewritten as
1
2
δq + (1− δ)(q − qγ) > 12
δ(w − b)
αw
(5.10)
Because of assumption (5.1), the left hand side is increasing in q. Hence there is a critical
value q∗ such that the inequality is satisfied for all q > q∗. Thus the (ex-ante) probability that
the worker reports an accident is 1− F (q∗).
We find the following result.
Proposition 1 As δ increases, the probability that an accident is reported falls. As αw in-
creases, it becomes more likely that an accident is reported. As αw increases, the effect of δ
on q∗ is reduced.
Proof of proposition 1 Let q∗ denote the value for q where (5.10) holds with equality.
Then it is routine to verify that
dq∗
dδ
=
w−b
2αw
− 1
2
q∗γ +
1
2
(q∗ − q∗γ)
1
2
δ + (1− δ)d(q∗−q∗γ)
dq∗
> 0 (5.11)
where the inequality follows from equations (5.1), (5.7) and q − qγ > 0. If αw increases, the
right hand side of (5.10) falls and q∗ falls as well. Finally, an increase in αw reduces dq∗/dδ in
equation (5.11). Hence, q∗ is less dependent on δ as αw increases. Q.E.D.
9Note that in the second (final) period it is immaterial whether a worker reports an accident or not. No
further accidents can be prevented and there is no firing decision by the firm.
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The intuition is as follows. The higher the probability that the firm needs to fire a worker,
the less eager workers become in reporting accidents. More serious accidents (higher αw) are
more often reported, since the prevention of such accidents is more important for a worker.
Finally, the reporting of more serious accidents is less dependent on the expectations about
the firing rate δ.
Notice that our simple model yields empirically testable prediction which will be analyzed
in the empirical analysis below. In particular, we will not only investigate whether accident
reporting increases in booms and decreases in regressions but we will also test whether the
cyclicality in reporting behavior is different between moderate and severe workplace accidents.
5.2.2 Welfare Analysis
We conclude the section by summarizing the normative implications of the model. There are
two main imperfections that cause the equilibrium above to deviate from the socially optimal
outcome. First, both the worker and the firm only consider their own payoffs not the sum of
payoffs. To illustrate, equation (5.2) implies that it is not profitable for the firm to invest for
every worker. However, if we have
E(q − qγ)(αf + αw) > γ (5.12)
it is socially desirable that such an investment is made (ex ante) for every worker. Second,
after an accident the worker learns his own q but cannot credibly reveal this to the employer.
Hence the firm bases its investment decision on f(q|A) while it is socially optimal to base
this decision on q. Related to this, the decision to fire a worker (with probability δ) after an
accident should also be based on q and not on the accident itself. If the worker has accident
probability q < E(q) the social planner prefers the workplace accommodating investment to
firing the worker. However, when q > E(q)) even the social planner prefers to fire a worker
rather than investing in prevention of a further accident.
In the model above, reporting an accident leads the firm to invest in worker-specific safety
measures (if the worker is not fired). Hence for all q > q∗ (where q∗ solves equation (5.10)
with equality) the firm invests. Given that a worker is not fired after being involved in an
accident, for which values of q is it socially optimal to invest?
Lemma 2 It is socially optimal to invest in safety measures for a worker with q > qs where
qs is defined by
(qs − qsγ) =
γ
αw + αf
(5.13)
Since we assume that q − qγ is increasing in q, there is a unique value for qs that satisfies
equation (5.13). For q < qs the gain in safety (qs − qsγ)(αw + αf ) due to the investment is too
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small to cover the cost γ.
Proposition 3 Assume that the solution qs to equation (5.13) satisfies
qs <
w − b
αw
then there exists δ∗ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 such that for δ < δ∗ the firm over-invests in safety measures
compared to the social optimum while for δ > δ∗ the firm under-invests.
Proof of proposition 3 First, consider δ = 0. Then equation (5.10) implies that each
worker q ∈ [0, 1] reports his accident, inducing the firm to invest in safety. However, such
investment is only optimal for q > qs > 0. Hence for low δ we have over-investment in safety
measures. Second, consider δ = 1. Comparing equations (5.8) and (5.9), it follows that workers
q report who satisfy
w − qαw < b
That is, workers who prefer to be unemployed rather than to continue working without addi-
tional safety measures report their accident (and get fired with probability 1). If it is the case
that
w − qsαw > b
type qs does not report in equilibrium while this would be socially optimal. Hence under the
assumption made in the proposition, there is under-reporting and hence under-investment for
δ close to 1. Finally, note that qs does not depend on δ while equation (5.11) implies that q∗
is increasing in δ. Hence there exists δ∗ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 such that there is over(under)-investment for
δ > (<)δ∗. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When the probability of being fired is small,
workers report each accident thereby inducing the firm to invest even though they know their
probability of having another accident q is actually quite low. However, for δ close to zero,
there are no costs for the worker of doing this (probability of being fired is close to zero) and
the firm bases its decision on the posterior distribution (5.3) not on the realization of q.
When the probability of being fired is high, workers do not report even though they learned
that the probability of an accident q and therefore the gain from prevention q − qγ is high.
In this case, the firm does not invest even though such investment would be socially optimal.
The interpretation of this result is as follows. Recessions are bad for workplace safety in
the sense that they lead to under-reporting of accidents and therefore to underinvestment
in prevention. In booms there is over-investment in workplace safety. Thus booms are “too
good” for workplace safety. Accident-prevention investments are made that are wasteful from
a social point of view but beneficial for workers.
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5.3 Data and Key Variables
5.3.1 Data
Our data are from the Austrian Social Insurance for Occupational Risks (AUVA) which covers
all employees except federal railway employees and civil servants (2.8 million). The AUVA
defines an occupational accident as “an unexpected external event causing injury, in locational,
temporal and causal relationship to the insured occupation”.10 By law, occupational accidents,
due to which an insured person is more than 3 days incapable of working – including fatal
accidents – are required to be reported within 5 days. In 2007, roughly 110,000 occupational
accidents were reported. In case of an occupational accident the employer is legally obligated
to continued remuneration of the victim for 8-10 weeks, depending on the job tenure of the
worker. The cost of the curative treatment associated with the occupational accident is covered
by the AUVA (the 2007 budget amounted to e 950 million).
The mandatory nature of the accident insurance implies that the AUVA keeps track of
all reported workplace accidents. The data available to us covers workplace accidents that
were reported between 2000 and 2006.11 In addition to the exact accident date, the AUVA
data contains detailed information on the severity of accidents along four dimensions: (i) the
number of inpatient care days, (ii) the number of days absent from work (excluding inpatient
care days), (iii) whether the accident caused a reduction in the ability to work (i.e. whether
the victim receives a (partial) disability pension as a result of the accident), and (iv) whether
the accident is fatal. Moreover, it includes some information on the firm (such as industry
affiliation) and the worker (such as whether a worker holds a blue– or white–collar occupation).
The unique feature of our dataset consists of a personal identifier which allows us to
match the workplace accidents to individual data from the Austrian Social Security Database
(ASSD, see Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for details). The ASSD contains detailed information on
individuals’ employment status and earnings on a daily basis. It also contains some information
on the employer, like regional location, industry affiliation, and a firm identifier. This enables
us not only to derive the employment history of each individual, but also to characterize
every single firm at each reference date in terms of its firm size, employment flows, and mean
characteristics of their employees.12
10Activities in connection with the insured occupation, e.g. commuting to and from the workplace are covered
by this insurance as well.
11More precisely, the data contains all workplace accidents of which the corresponding claims were recognized
in 2000-2007. There is a time lag between reporting and recognition of accidents. For example, 93.0 % of
claims in 2000, were recognized in the same year and another 6.6 % in the subsequent year. So, almost all
claims are dealt within the same or the subsequent year. Because of this we ignore the workplace accidents
that occurred in 2007, because for this year the records may be incomplete.
12Note, however, that 3.4 % workplace accidents cannot be matched unambiguously. This occurs when an
individual is employed at more than one employer at once. Workplace accidents for those individuals cannot
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We restrict our sample to male blue–collar workers aged 25–49 who are employed in man-
ufacturing with at least 100 employees. In this sample, 97.8 % of occupational accidents
observed in the AUVA data could be matched to a corresponding employment record in the
ASSD data. This sample is the most relevant with regard to occupational accidents.13 In the
empirical analysis we work with longitudinal data (monthly reference dates) containing indi-
viduals that are employed at the reference date. For this sample, a total of 64,080 workplace
accidents are reported in the AUVA data during the period 2000–2006.
5.3.2 Definition of Key Variables
The two crucial variables for the empirical analysis are (i) a measure for the degree of severity
of an occupational accident and (ii) a measure that captures the probability that demand for
the firm’s products falls ρ. These variables are defined as follows. We distinguish two types
of accidents, moderate and severe ones. This distinction should capture whether or not the
reporting of an occupational accident is at discretion of the workers. In regard of this, we
define an accident to be moderate if it simply results in a positive number of days absent from
work (excluding inpatient care days). We define an occupational accident as severe otherwise,
i.e. if it results in a positive number of inpatient care days, in a (partial) disability pension,
or if it is fatal. This classification is a robust one for two reasons. First, it is implausible that
severe accidents are over–reported, since a worker would have to fake an injury that brings
him into hospital or one that makes him eligible to a partial disability pension. Second, severe
accidents are very unlikely to be under–reported, since the experienced damage to the worker
αw is likely to be very high (high enough to end up in hospital or to suffer from a permanent
reduction in work capacity). In contrast, our measure of moderate accidents is potentially
subject to a reporting decision.
We define the measure for the probability that a firm will face a fall in demand for their
products ρ as the fraction of the workforce a firm lays off from t − 1 to t. We therefore
assume that the workers’ best predictor at t for the probability of an adverse demand shock
in t+ 1 is the firm’s human resource planning (i.e. firing decisions) in t. We define “fired” as
be directly linked to an employer, since the AUVA data does not contain a firm identifier. We applied the
following procedure in case of an unambiguous match: we matched the workplace accident to that employment
spell, which was – based on information that is available in both data sets – the most likely. More precisely,
we chose the most likely match by first ensuring consistency of the industry classification, second ensuring
consistency of the type of employment (blue – vs. white–collar), and finally, if the match was still ambiguous,
we simply chose the longest employment spell in question.
13The following figures illustrate this (all figures refer to the year 2006): First, the manufacturing industry
is the largest in terms of the number of employees accounting for roughly 18 % of the overall number of
employees. Second, female workers only account for 28 % in the manufacturing industry. Third, this industry
accounts by far for the largest share of occupational accidents (25 % or 30,000). Fourth, roughly two-third of
occupational accidents in the manufacturing industry concern male blue–collar workers.
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a worker who is employed in t − 1 and either unemployed or out–of–labor force in t.14 Note
that the firing rate is based on the entire workforce of each firm (i.e. including workers of
all ages, white–collar workers, women, and industries other than manufacturing) and not on
our restricted sample. Moreover, all regressions will additionally include a variable capturing
the general business cycle measured by the monthly unemployment rate for male workers in
manufacturing at the state level as well as calendar month and year dummies. Thus, the
cyclical effects entirely arise from idiosyncratic variation in firms’ firing rates.
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our final sample contains 64,080 workplace accidents, of which 93.9% were moderate and
6.1% were severe. Table 5.1 shows that our final data contains 9,263,282 individual–month
observations (based on 205,170 workers who work in 1,256 different firms). Each worker has
on average a risk of 0.7 percent to get involved in an occupational accident at each reference
date, which is rather a low number. Considering the whole 2000–2006 period changes this
picture. Almost one–third of all workers report at least one occupational accident over this
period. Firms have a mean firing rate of 1.3 percent. The average unemployment rate in
the manufacturing industry for male workers is 5.0 percent. The average worker can be
characterized as follows: he is aged 37.4 years, employed in the same firm since 9.2 years, has
work experience of 18.1 years, was on sick leave for 0.3 percent in the last 2 years, and earns e
81.2 a day. Table 5.2 provides companion information at the level of the firm (i.e. the average
values of their workforce of male, blue–collar workers aged 25–49 years).
5.4 Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
To give some idea about the relationships between accident rates and the business cycle, Panel
A of Figure 1 plots the probability of a firm being confronted with at least one workplace
accident against the distribution of the firing rate at the firm level (in brackets of 5 %–
quantiles) and Panel B of Figure 1 plots the unemployment rate at the state level (in brackets
of 10 %–quantiles). The top graph of Figure 1 shows that if the firing rate is within the
bottom 25 % quantile (conditional on being positive), a firm faces a risk of 39–61 percent
that at least one moderate accident is reported (the solid line and left axis).15 This number
14A worker who is employed and then either moves to another firm or gets retired (old–age or disability–
related) is not considered to being fired.
15Only 29 percent of firms are confronted with an accident if they do not fire any worker (20% of the firm–
month observations exhibit a firing rate of zero). At first, this unexpectedly low accident rate at the very
lower tail of the firing rate distribution is puzzling. However, this low probability can be explained by a purely
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics at individual level
Variable Mean
(Standard deviation)
Accident in t (yes / no) 0.0069
(0.0829)
Accident in 2000–2006 (yes / no) 0.3293
(0.4700)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0128
(0.0192)
Unemployment rate 0.0504
(0.0281)
Age 37.3941
(6.8500)
Tenure (in 10 years) 0.9221
(0.7194)
Experience (in 10 years) 1.8069
(0.7423)
Sickness rate (last 2 years) 0.0031
(0.0207)
Daily wage (in e) 81.2243
(18.3017)
Number of worker-month observations 9,263,282
Number of workers 205,170
Number of firms 1,256
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Sample Selection: male,
blue–collar workers, aged 25–49 years and employed in firms (man-
ufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the
sample period from 2000–2006. Source: Own Calculations, based on
AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics at firm level
Variable Mean
(Standard deviation)
Moderate accident in t (yes / no) 0.3698
(0.4828)
Severe accident in t (yes / no) 0.0411
(0.1985)
Number of male, blue-collar workers, aged 25-49 107.0528
(194.9790)
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0153
(0.0275)
Unemployment rate 0.0529
(0.0306)
Age 37.3478
(2.1379)
Tenure (in 10 years) 0.8414
(0.4264)
Experience (in 10 years) 1.7413
(0.3316)
Sickness rate (last 2 years) 0.0028
(0.0048)
Daily wage (in e) 74.6025
(13.6947)
Number of firm-month observations 86,530
Number of firms 1,256
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Sample Selection: Firms (manufac-
turing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample period
from 2000–2006. All variables refer to the male, blue-collar workforce aged
25-49. Source: Own Calculations, based on AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA
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amounts to 5–10 percent for severe accidents (the dashed line and right axis). The pattern for
moderate accidents is striking. The firm’s risk that at least one moderate accident is reported
is decreasing with the expected firing rate. At the highest 5 % quantile, the risk has decreased
to 32 percent. In contrast, this risk remains fairly stable over the entire distribution of the
firing rate for severe accidents (fluctuating around roughly 4 percent). For the unemployment
rate (Panel B of Figure 1) the same pattern emerges. This prima–facie evidence strongly
supports the hypotheses underlying our theoretical model.
5.4.2 The Empirical Model
This section describes the empirical methodology. We focus on two main issues. First, our
empirical analysis will address the question whether workers who report an accident are in fact
exposed to a higher risk of subsequent job loss. Second, we empirically investigate, whether
reported workplace accidents vary over the business cycle and how the cyclicality in reporting
behavior differs between severe and more moderate workplace accidents. This second analysis
forms the basis of our empirical investigation.
The following regression equation allows us to test whether workers who have recently
reported an accident are those that are fired with a higher probability
yit+1 = κ · prait +Xf ′it · β + ψfi + φfj(i)t + πft + νit (5.14)
where yi+1t indicates whether or not a worker i is fired in period t+1 as a function of current and
past accidents that worker i has reported at his current firm j (prait), control variables X
f
it,
worker fixed–effects (ψfi ), firm fixed–effects (φ
f
j(i)t), and calendar month and year dummies
(πft ). The control variables X
f
it include a constant, the state unemployment rate for male,
blue–collar workers, the sickness rate of the last 2 years of worker i in firm j (and its square),
the daily wage (in logs), age (and its square), tenure (and its square), and experience (and
its square). νit is an error term satisfying the usual assumption which captures unobservable
(to the researcher) factors influencing the reporting of occupational accidents. The prediction
from our theoretical model is correct if the sign of κ is positive.
The following regression equation studies the cyclical behavior of accident reporting
ait = δ · fj(i),t +Xa′it · β + ψai + φaj(i)t + πat + it, (5.15)
statistical reasoning (note that the figure is unconditional on any observables). Firm–month observations
with a firing rate of zero are only half of the size as firm–month observations with a positive firing rate (178
versus 315 employees). Ceteris paribus, firm–month observations with a firing rate of zero have a 50% lower
probability of being confronted with an accident. Adjusting for that would increase the accident rate to roughly
58% for such firm–month observations, which then results in a figure perfectly consistent with our theory.
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Figure 5.1: Plot of incidence of at least one accident at firm-month level against the firing
rate (Panel A) and the unemployment rate (Panel B)
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where ait indicates whether individual i reports an accident in t, fjt is the firing rate of
firm j at time t, ψai are worker fixed–effects, φ
a
j(i)t are firm fixed–effects and π
a
t represent
calendar month and year dummies. The control variables Xait include a constant, the sickness
rate of the last 2 years of worker i in firm j (and its square), the daily wage (in logs), age
(and its square), tenure (and its square), and experience (and its square), and it is an error
term satisfying the usual assumption which captures unobservable (to the researcher) factors
influencing the reporting of occupational accidents. We estimate this regression equation
separately for moderate and severe occupational accidents using all worker–month observations
with a moderate occupational accident together with worker-months observations without any
accident, and all worker–month observations with a severe occupational accident together with
worker-months observations without any accident.
5.4.3 Empirical results
Does reporting an accident increase the subsequent firing rate? We start our anal-
ysis by investigating whether the workers who reported an accident are exposed to a higher
risk of job loss as compared to workers who did not report an accident. The existence of
a significant impact of a previous accident on the risk of subsequent job loss is of obvious
importance in the present context. Our theoretical reasoning builds upon the idea that an
incentive not to report a workplace accidence arises exactly because accident reporting may
increase the subsequent probability of getting fired. If the accident reporting behavior would
be unrelated to the risk of job loss, the mechanism emphasized in this chapter would not be
relevant.
Table 5.3 shows the results of the impact of previous accident reporting (within the last
twelve months) on the current probability of job loss. Columns (1)–(4) use the overall accident
reporting during the last 12 months as the independent variable. Column (5) additionally
allows for differential effects by the degree of severeness. It turns out that reporting any
accident in the previous year, leads to a substantial increase in the probability of being laid
off in the current month (column (1)). This effect is robust to the inclusion of worker fixed
effects (column (2)), firm fixed effects (column (3)), and the inclusion of both worker as well as
firm fixed effects (column (4)). Taking column (4) as our preferred specification (controlling
for firm and worker characteristics that persist over time), the point estimate suggests that
the firing probability is 0.15 percentage points higher for workers who have reported any
accident within the last twelve months. This effect compares to an average firing rate of 0.75
percent in our sample. Hence we conclude that the impact of accident reporting on the risk of
subsequent job loss is substantial, and equal to roughly 20 percent of the average firing rate
in the sample. When we allow for differential impacts of moderate and severe accidents in
Column (5) we see that the effect is mainly driven by moderate accidents whereas the impact
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of previous severe accidents is insignificant. The fact that severe accidents do not have an
impact on subsequent job loss may seem surprising. However, workers who have a severe
accident may temporarily be absent from their job but still count as employees of the firm
due to job protection legislation. In sum, our results strongly support the assumption made
in section 5.2, that accident reporting behavior has a significant impact on the probability of
being laid off later on.
In both specification we also see that the unemployment rate has a significant effect on the
individual probability to be fired. This effect is not surprising and represents a business cycle
effect. If the economy is in a recession workers are more likely to loose their job. The impact
is quantitatively important. A one percentage point increase in the contemporaneous unem-
ployment rate leads to a 21 percent higher probability to be fired (= [0.1589/100]/0.0075)).
All five specifications also show that a higher sickness rate within the last two years leads to
a higher firing probability. This suggests that a similar mechanism as for accident rates may
be at work for sickness rates.16
Does accident reporting behavior vary over the business cycle? Our estimate of
main interest concerns the cyclicality of accident reporting behavior. We report results of
the effect of the firing rate on the probability to report an accident in table 5.4 where sep-
arate parameter estimates for moderate (Panel A) and severe (Panel B) accidents are pre-
sented. We report results on four different specifications that differ by the inclusion of worker
and/or firm fixed effects. If neither worker nor firm fixed-effects are included (column (1)),
then the effect of the firing rate on the probability of reporting a moderate accident is not
significantly different from zero. When we include worker fixed effects, in contrast, we do
find a significant negative effect. An increase of the firing rate by one standard deviation
(= 0.0192, see Table 5.1) decreases the probability of reporting a moderate accident by 2.1
percent (= [0.0192 · (−0.0072)]/0.0065). Apparently, adding worker fixed-effects (e.g. con-
trolling for workers’ ability to prevent a moderate workplace accident) is important. Put
differently (and assuming that worker fixed effect are the only left-out confounders in column
(1)), workers’ time-invariant traits that reduce the probability of reporting a moderate work-
place accident are negatively correlated with the firing rate. Column (3) replaces the worker
fixed-effects by firm fixed-effects, which control inter alia for job safety measures provided by
the employer. It turns out that the effect is now also significantly different from zero. This
implies (assuming that the only left-out confounders are firm fixed effects in column (1)) that
any workplace characteristics provided by the employer that reduce the probability of reported
moderate accidents by workers are negatively correlated with the firing rate. The results in
16See for example Barmby et al. (1994) who indicate that the effect of absence behavior on the probability
of being fired may act as a worker discipline device.
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Table 5.3: Regression results for testing the crucial model assumption
Dummy variable
(= 1 if worker is laid off)
Mean 0.0075
Standard deviation 0.0861
moderate accident 0.0016
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0001)
severe accident 0.0002
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0006)
any accident 0.0011 0.0015 0.0008 0.0015
in t ∈ [t− 12, t− 1] (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
unemployment rate 0.0189 0.1386 0.0833 0.1589 0.1589
(0.0016) (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0070)
sickness rate (last 2 years) 0.0778 0.0436 0.0637 0.0413 0.0419
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0061)
sickness rate (last 2 years)2 −0.0655 −0.0028 −0.0455 0.0016 0.0007
(0.0188) (0.0232) (0.0185) (0.0232) (0.0232)
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of worker-month obs. 7,883,354
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All
regressions (linear probability model) include the following control variables (not shown in the
table): calendar month dummies, year dummies, age (and its square), tenure (and its square),
experience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e). (c) Sample selection: male, blue–
collar workers, aged 25–49 years and employed in firms (manufacturing sector) with on average
at least 100 employees over the sample period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in
parentheses (adjusted for clustering on workers). (e) Sample is restricted to the years 2001–2006
due to the 1 year lag in workers’ workplace accidents. (f) Source: Own Calculations, based on
AUVA, ASSD, and BMWA.
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column (2) and column (3) as compared to column (1) are in line with empirical findings
in the compensating wage differential literature that more able workers sort into jobs with
positive job characteristics (see e.g. Hwang et al. (1992). Column (4) includes worker as well
as firm fixed effects, which is our preferred specification. Column (4) suggests that increasing
the firing rate by one standard deviation leads to a 2.1 percent decrease in the probability to
report a moderate accident. Notice further that all regressions in Table 5.4 control for the
general business cycle (by including a dummy for each calendar year as well as the monthly
unemployment rate for male workers in manufacturing at the state level) as well as for seasonal
effects (by including a dummy for each calendar month). Hence the estimated cyclical effects
arise from idiosyncratic variations in the firing rates, holding the business cycle and seasonal
effects constant. The relationship between the firing rate and the reporting behavior of severe
workplace accidents is investigated in Panel B of table 5.4. We perform exactly the same
regressions as we do for moderate workplace accidents. The results show that the firing rate
does not have any statistically significant impact on workers’ reporting behavior with respect
to severe workplace accidents. This finding strongly supports our alternative explanation of
the cyclical fluctuation in workplace accident rates.
The larger a firm is the higher the risk that at least one occupational accident is reported,
simply because they employ more workers. In addition, larger firms generally tend to have
lower firing rates, which may suggest a mechanical interpretation for the negative relationship
between the incidence of an accident and the expected firing rate. Therefore, we also performed
an analysis at the level of the firm. Table 5.5 shows the parameter estimates. We also perform
a sensitivity analysis with respect to the inclusion of firm fixed effects as already done in table
5.4 by presenting results without including firm fixed effects (column (1)) and with including
firm fixed effects (column (2)). It turns out that the results based at the level of the firm are
very much in line with the estimates based on individual data. In column (1) we again see
that the firing rate is unrelated to the probability of reporting an moderate accident if firm
fixed effects are not controlled for. Including firm fixed effects changes the picture. Column
(2) shows that an increase in the firing rate by one standard deviation (= 0.0275, see table
5.2) reduces the probability that a firm faces at least one moderate workplace accident by 1.5
percent (= [0.0275 · (−0.2066)]/0.3698). The probability that a firm faces at least one severe
accident, in contrast, is unrelated to the firing rate. The analysis at the level of the firm thus
strongly supports our findings derived at the level of the worker.
To sum up, the results of Tables 5.3–5.5 are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Workers who report a workplace accident in the previous year are more likely to be laid off.
This suggests that when deciding about whom to fire employers take the accident history of
workers into account. We have also shown that while the probability of reporting a moderate
accident is governed by firms’ firing rate, this is not true for severe accidents. Recall that
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Table 5.4: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at individual
level)
Panel A: Moderate Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0065
Standard deviation 0.0804
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0006 −0.0072 −0.0084 −0.0074
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
Number of worker-month observations 9,259,374
Panel B: Severe Workplace Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if worker reports an accident)
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0206
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Worker fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
Number of worker-month observations 9,203,110
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. (b) All
regressions (linear probability model) include the following control variables: calendar month
dummies, year dummies, age (and its square), tenure (and its square), experience (and its
square), logarithm of daily wage (in e), sick leave rate in the previous two years (and its
square). (c) Sample selection: male blue–collar workers, aged 25–49 years and employed at
firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100 employees over the sample period
from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on work-
ers). (e) Source: Own Calculations, based on AUVA and ASSD.
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Table 5.5: Regression results of the impact of the firing rate on accident reporting (at firm
level)
Panel A: Moderate Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if firm faces an accident)
Mean 0.3698
Standard deviation 0.4828
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) −0.0212 −0.2066
(0.0793) (0.0743)
Firm fixed-effects No Yes
Number of firm-month observations 86,530
Panel B: Severe Accidents
Dummy variable
(= 1 if firm faces an accident)
Mean 0.0411
Standard deviation 0.1985
Firing rate (from t− 1 to t) 0.0515 −0.0293
(0.0288) (0.0322)
Firm fixed-effects No Yes
Number of firm-month observations 86,530
Notes: (a) , ,  denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level re-
spectively. (b) All regressions (linear probability model) include additionally
the following control variables: calendar month dummies, year dummies, the
number of male blue–collar workers aged 25–49 in the firm (in logs), and the
firm average of employees’ age (and its square), tenure (and its square), ex-
perience (and its square), logarithm of daily wage (in e) of this group of
workers. (c) Sample selection: male, blue–collar workers, aged 25–49 years
and employed in firms (manufacturing sector) with on average at least 100
employees over the sample period from 2000-2006. (d) Robust standard
errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on firms). (e) Source: Own
Calculations, based on AUVA and ASSD.
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the distinction between moderate and severe workplace accidents reflects the extent to which
the reporting of such an accident is at discretion of the workers. The results suggest that
the higher the firm’s firing rate, the more reluctant their workers are to report a moderate
workplace accident. We do not find such a pattern for severe workplace accidents. Hence, our
findings are consistent with the idea that the reporting behavior is the driving force behind
the pro-cyclicality of the incidence of workplace accidents. Our data do not allow to determine
whether moderate workplace accidents are rather over–reported in booms or under–reported
in recessions. The results simply tell that moderate workplace accidents are relatively less
reported in recessions. To the extent that our model captures the main aspect that drive
workers’ reporting decisions and firms’ workplace-safety investment decisions our evidence is
consistent with the idea that recessions are bad for workplace safety due to underinvestment
in accident prevention.
5.5 Conclusions
Workplace accidents are related to workplace safety. Nevertheless, cyclical fluctuations in
workplace accidents are puzzling from an economic point of view. Workplace accidents could
be pro-cyclical because effort and hours of work are negatively related to unemployment and
because higher work effort makes accidents more likely. Hence we should see more accidents
during a boom and less during a recession. Alternatively, cyclical fluctuations in workplace
accidents may be related to reporting behavior. In times of high unemployment workers
are reluctant to report workplace accidents because they fear that employers will hold this
against them. In this study we investigate this alternative explanation using high-quality
Austrian matched worker-firm data containing information about workplace accidents of blue-
collar workers in manufacturing. We find that workers who reported an accident in particular
period of time are more likely to be fired later on. Apparently, when deciding about whom to
fire, employers take the accident history of workers into account. Moreover, we find support
for the idea that recessions affect the reporting of workplace accidents: if the probability to
be dismissed is high, worker are less likely to report a moderate accident. For severe accidents
we do not find such an effect.
The cyclical sensitivity of the incidence of workplace accidents appears to be related to
reporting behavior. As indicated in the theoretical part of the chapter the cyclical fluctuations
in reporting behavior has clear welfare implications as investments in prevention of workplace
accidents may be suboptimal. If in recessions firing rates go up workers may underreport
workplace accidents and thus firms under-invest in workplace safety. In booms workers may
over-report workplace accidents and therefore firms over-invest in workplace safety, i.e. al-
though workers benefit from the investments in workplace safety they are wasteful from a
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social point of view.
In light of our theoretical analysis, our empirical evidence suggests that recessions are bad
for workplace safety. From the point of view of economic policy, a way to bring the economy
closer to the social optimum would be to introduce measures that impede the discrimination
in firing against workers who reported an accident. This would increase the incentive of firms
to invest in workplace safety also during recessions.
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